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ABSTRACT 
3 ESSAYS ON MARKETS, HIERARCHIES, AND MORALITY 
Jooho Lee 
Thomas Donaldson 
 
In my dissertation, I examine issues related to markets and hierarchies, which are core 
conceptual building blocks for economic theories of the firm, from a moral point of view. 
The first essay engages with economic theories of the firm and argues that there is a 
tension between the two primary metaphors – contracts and hierarchies – utilized by 
economists to describe the nature and purpose of the firm. 
The second essay provides a moral reason for drawing the distinction between markets 
and firms in the first place.  It argues that the principle of fair play justifies the adoption 
of a proposed three-part test for employee classification based on economic theories of 
entrepreneurship. 
The third essay applies the insights from the first two chapters by arguing that 
stakeholder theory should pay greater attention to the contract metaphor within theories 
of the firm. 
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ESSAY 1: 
 
Contracts and Hierarchies: A Moral Examination of Economic Theories of the Firm 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What is the nature of the firm, and what is its purpose?  Economic theories of the 
firm try to answer the questions of why firms exist and what are their boundaries 
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1989).  However, they are not mere academic inquiries. They also 
have important implications for corporate governance and managerial practice because 
they can shape how we view relationships inside the firm and act in light of them.  For 
instance, the economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts designed to overcome 
various forms of agency costs (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 
1976) has had enormous influence on how we structure corporate governance 
relationships in both law and practice.  Despite their widespread influence, however, 
many business ethicists have argued that economic theories of the firm fall short of our 
normative ideals for a variety of reasons.  Some have argued that economic theories 
ignore morally salient features within the firm and thus contribute to unequal relations 
between employers and employees (Néron 2015).  Others are even more skeptical of the 
very use of economic language to describe the firm.  For some, the usage of economic 
language to describe the firm de-values and de-humanizes stakeholder relationships 
because it reduces morality within the firm to an “economic morality,” which is solely 
“the morality of money and power” (Hendry 2001: 225). 
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The aim of this article is to examine the moral values implicit within economic 
theories of the firm by focusing on two primary metaphors used by economists – 
contracts and hierarchies.  Its main claim is that the contract and hierarchy metaphors are 
either morally incompatible or logically inconsistent with each other, at least in the way 
that economic theories of the firm use them.  The hierarchy metaphor has been utilized 
since the earliest economic theories of the firm, and it forms the basis for one large 
tradition of economic theories that have been very influential.  Within this view, the 
primary purpose of the firm is to minimize the costs associated with market transactions, 
and the nature of the firm is a hierarchy that can reduce such costs under certain 
circumstances (e.g., Coase 1937; Williamson 1975).  The contract metaphor has also had 
a long history, and it presents a significant challenge to the hierarchical view.  The 
contractarian view of the firm argues that the primary purpose of the firm is to facilitate 
the aims of firm participants and that the nature of the firm is a nexus of contractual 
relationships between them that are intended to achieve these aims (e.g., Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972; Easterbrook and Fischel 1991).  This paper will examine the metaphors of 
contract and hierarchy from a moral point of view by appealing to the Kantian 
requirement to treat the humanity in ourselves and others as an end and not as a mere 
means (Kant 1785).  Treating the employee as an end and not as a mere means, it will 
argue, requires respect for the employee’s will in a way that is consistent with the 
contract metaphor but at odds with the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy. 
To be clear, this paper is a normative and theoretical critique of the economic 
theory of the firm as a hierarchy.  First, it is a normative critique because it questions not 
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whether hierarchy is the dominant mode of firm organization in the real world but, 
instead, whether the idea of a hierarchy should be the dominant mode of explaining the 
nature and purpose of the firm.  Second, it is a theoretical critique because it does not 
give a final answer to the question of whether hierarchies should be the dominant mode 
of firm organization in the real world.  Instead, the paper is an attempt to change how 
academics and practitioners view the nature and purpose of the firm at a theoretical level.  
Even if authority relations do and should continue to pervade how we organize into firms, 
the claim is that we should not view the firm as a hierarchy that exists to minimize 
transaction costs because it would result in our viewing and treating the firm’s employees 
as a mere means.  Third, a normative and theoretical critique is different from a mere 
semantic dispute or an argument for arguments’ sake.  Whether or not we call various 
power relationships within the firm as hierarchies is beside the point.  What matters is 
how we view their purpose.  The economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy views the 
purpose of the firm as the minimization of transaction costs.  And if our view of the 
power relationships within the firm rests on a mechanism for cost minimization that is at 
odds with respect for persons, we ought not accept such an account nor allow it to 
influence how we structure our economic lives.  And changing our views of the purpose 
of the firm will have significant real-world consequences, including implications for law, 
corporate governance, and managerial practice.  Rather than an argument for arguments’ 
sake, the proposed shift in how we view the nature and purpose of the firm will motivate 
changes at these levels in addition to academic discourse. 
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Lastly, this paper is not an attempt to defend economic theories of the firm that 
have come to represent the contractarian view nor an attempt to present a comprehensive 
and/or a morally acceptable theory of the firm.  Instead, its aims are more modest.  By 
focusing on the moral requirements of Kantian respect within the contracts that constitute 
the firm, it attempts to point out a problem with understanding the firm as a cost-
minimizing hierarchy if we truly take seriously the idea of voluntary contracting.  
Implicit within the very idea of voluntary contracting lies a moral requirement to respect 
the humanity of all parties involved.  A firm constituted by voluntary contracts, then, 
requires far more from firm participants than narrow-minded self-interest that economic 
theories of the firm assume.  Although a full moral explication of the theory of the firm 
built on the foundation of the contract metaphor will require greater normative 
examination of some other core building blocks – agency, property, etc. – the idea of 
truly voluntary contracts within the firm rules out certain hierarchical conceptions of the 
firm and paves the way toward a truly morally acceptable theory of the firm, to be 
developed in the future. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  The first section provides a historical overview 
of economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy.  Beginning with Ronald Coase’s critique 
of Frank Knight’s theory of the firm and ending with Oliver Williamson’s account of the 
firm as a hierarchy into which firm participants contract, this section presents the ways 
the metaphors of contract and hierarchy are typically evoked within economic theories of 
the firm.  The second section begins the moral examination of economic theories of the 
firm by focusing on the contract metaphor.  After highlighting the importance of 
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voluntariness to economic accounts of contracting, it draws on Kant’s moral philosophy 
to argue that the idea of voluntariness generates an obligation to treat persons as ends and 
not as a mere means.  A voluntary contract must respect persons in such a manner and 
thus refrain from contradicting or ignoring the wills of everyone involved.  The third 
section turns to the hierarchy metaphor and argues that its usage within economic 
theories of the firm is incompatible with the idea of voluntary contracting.  One cannot 
contract into a hierarchy because doing so would either treat the humanity of the 
employee as a mere means or undermine the very purpose of the hierarchy.  The fourth 
section discusses the implications for the incompatibility of contracts with hierarchies.  
After contrasting hierarchical relationships with agency relationships, it examines the role 
that authority relationships play in theories of the firm and looks to the metaphor of 
contract to serve as a foundation for a more promising theory of the firm. 
II. CONTRACTS AND HIERARCHIES 
This section provides an overview of the metaphors of contract and hierarchy 
within economic theories of the firm and distinguishes two types of theories that 
emphasize one metaphor over the other.  Economic theories of the firm typically begin 
with the baseline assumption that markets serve an important and valuable coordinating 
mechanism for production in society.  Among other things, markets promote economic 
efficiency associated with resource allocation and production.  Whereas firms centralize 
production under a manager-entrepreneur who directs the effort of his employees, 
markets utilize the price mechanism to coordinate production in a decentralized manner 
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(Coase 1937).  This decentralized coordination grants the market an important advantage 
for resource allocation.  Because each individual has localized knowledge about his or 
her circumstances, relying on individuals to make allocative decisions within their 
particular contexts leads to greater aggregate social welfare than a centralized mechanism 
for coordination (Hayek 1945).  Moreover, markets also promote the efficiency of 
production by supporting the division of labor.  The division of labor into specialized 
functions drastically increases productivity – and thus wealth and welfare – in society 
(Smith 1776).  Without a robust market, however, economic actors would not be able to 
specialize in producing a particular good because they would also need to focus on 
producing the wide variety of goods needed for their survival.  By providing avenues to 
trade for the diversity of goods that we need to survive, markets allow us to focus on 
increasing the productivity of our labor through specialization. 
Given the advantages of allocating resources through markets, the question goes, 
why should firms exist at all?  Why do firms persist in floating separately in a sea of 
market contracting like “butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk” (Coase 1937: 388)?  
An important precursor to theories of the firm focused largely on the effect that 
uncertainty in the market has on the division of labor (Knight 1921).  The future is 
riddled with both risk and uncertainty.  Risk refers to the ways in which future outcomes 
are indeterminate in probabilistic – and thus calculable – ways.  Uncertainty, on the other 
hand, refers to the indeterminacies in the future that cannot even be calculated.  Under 
uncertainty, the importance of execution fades into the background, and “the primary 
problem or function [becomes] deciding what to do and how to do it” (Knight 1921: 268).  
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Because a multitude of factors on both the demand and supply side rest largely on an 
uncertain future, Knight argues that economic life is fraught with uncertainty.  Under this 
theory, markets and firms both exist as successful adaptations to deal with uncertainty.  
The production of goods and services to a market is a useful method of dealing with the 
uncertainty of demand because it consolidates a large segment of potential customers 
who do not always know what they want in the future.  Within such an arrangement, 
however, judgment about anticipating future demand under conditions of uncertainty 
become extremely important.  And because there are some people who possess superior 
economic judgment than others, the increased importance of economic judgment confers 
an advantage to the centralization of production under the authority of a specialized class 
of manager-entrepreneurs (Langlois and Cosgel 1993).  What results, then, is the rise of 
firms controlled by manager-entrepreneurs who believe that they can anticipate the 
aggregation of future demand within a market better than others. 
The first major theory of the firm is a response to Knight’s argument.  Ronald 
Coase argues in his seminal essay that Knight’s argument about the firm does not explain 
why firms exist at all (1937).  If the firm exists simply because a certain class of 
manager-entrepreneurs who believe that they are better at others at anticipating the 
future, there is no reason to think that a contractual arrangement could not produce the 
same results.  Rather than consolidating in a firm, the confident entrepreneur could 
simply enter into contracts with suppliers of goods and labor to profit from their abilities.  
A theory of the firm must explain why a firm exists in the first place and, if there are 
good reasons why it exists, why there isn’t one giant firm.  In other words, it must 
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provide an account of the reason for the firm’s existence and its boundaries.  Coase’s 
famous argument addresses both of these points.  He argues that the firm exists because a 
hierarchical power structure for allocating goods and labor in production for the market 
can be more efficient than market contracting under certain circumstances and that the 
boundaries of the firm can be explained by the relative difference in efficiencies.  The 
crucial insight here is that economic activities in markets and hierarchies are subject to 
different types of costs.  Transactions in markets have marketing costs, which include 
costs associated with discovering relevant prices, negotiating and executing contracts, 
and entering into long-term relationships in light of an uncertain future.  Production in 
hierarchies, on the other hand, have organizing costs, which include costs associated with 
bureaucracy, managerial mistakes, and the loss of independence experienced by 
employees.  Within this line of analysis, firms are hierarchies that exist when marketing 
costs exceed organizing costs for a particular business.  In other words, the nature of the 
firm is a hierarchy, and its purpose is cost reduction. 
It was not until the 1970s when academics began to notably challenge the 
traditional assumption that firms are hierarchies that exist distinctly apart from markets.  
In one of the earliest attempts to blur the strict distinction between firms and markets, 
Alchian and Demsetz emphatically argued that viewing the firm as a hierarchy is a 
“delusion” and that the firm “has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action 
any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two 
people” (1972: 777).  Jensen and Meckling took this insight in one further direction and 
made the now influential claim that firms are “simply legal fictions which serve as a 
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nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” that are employed to 
depict ordinary market relations as a matter of convenience (1976: 310).  Depicting the 
firm as a nexus of contracts rather than a hierarchy had an important influence within the 
field of microeconomics.  The traditional neoclassical economic account of the firm was 
a “black box” production function that unilaterally converted inputs into outputs in the 
market.  The theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts transformed this view by bringing 
market principles inside the firm.  Rather than a unilateral hierarchical relation that 
converted inputs into outputs, the firm was reconceived as a complex set of bilateral 
exchange relations among inputs to the firm, thus making it possible to apply 
microeconomic tools to organizational analysis (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983a; 1983b; 
Gibbons 2005).  Furthermore, the nexus-of-contracts view of the firm quickly began to 
have significant influence outside the field of economics.  In law and corporate 
governance, for instance, scholars quickly adopted the nexus-of-contracts view and 
argued that corporate law should exist simply as default rules that instantiate “contract 
terms” that a majority of firm participants would wish to adopt (e.g., Easterbrook and 
Fischel 1991).  And although earlier works typically argued that a majority of firm 
participants would wish to establish a shareholder primacy norm, later works drawing on 
the nexus-of-contracts tradition utilized the same contractual insight to argue that 
managers and Boards of Directors ought to promote the interests of all of the firm’s 
stakeholders rather than merely its shareholders (e.g., Blair and Stout 1999; Freeman and 
Evan 1990). 
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The success of the contractual metaphor in economics and organizational studies 
quickly led to the adoption of the contractual metaphor within the hierarchical theory of 
the firm itself.  As a result, the view that a firm is a nexus of contracts is now the 
dominant view of the firm.  Nevertheless, underneath the semantic commonality lies a 
crucial difference in both the nature and purpose of the firm depending on whether the 
metaphor of contract or hierarchy dominates.  For economic theories of the firm in which 
the metaphor of contract dominate, the nexus of contracts is merely an overlap of 
contracts that differ in no way to market contracts.  Some views within this group of 
theories even go as far as to argue that the firm itself is not a very helpful category for 
examining complex phenomena in the markets (e.g., Gulati et al. 2000).  Within this 
view, the nature of the firm is merely an aggregation of market contracting at best, and 
the purpose of such an aggregation lies solely in the desires of firm participants 
themselves, subject only to the demands of the market for corporate governance.  On the 
other hand, economic theories of the firm in which the metaphor of hierarchy dominates 
understand the nexus of contracts as a vertical power relation between contracting parties 
that is separate from the contract itself.  Within these views, the firm is a nexus of 
contracts only to the extent that firm participants contract into the power relationship.  
The most prominent example of such a view is that of Oliver Williamson, who argues 
that the firm is an institutional structure in which organizing decisions are made by fiat 
rather than through an on-going negotiation (1975; 1985; 2002).  Other views within this 
group of theories shift the locus of power from the manager within the firm to the Board 
of Directors who govern the firm (e.g., Bainbridge 2003; Blair and Stout 1999), but the 
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key insights are essentially the same.  Within this view of the firm, the nature of the firm 
is a hierarchical power relationship between the manager-entrepreneur, and, as will be 
seen in a later section of this paper, the traditional purpose of such a power relationship is 
to minimize the costs associated with transacting in the market. 
Given the crucial differences in economic theories of the firm as a nexus of 
contracts depending on whether the metaphor of contract or hierarchy dominates, a moral 
examination of economic theories of the firm requires disaggregating the metaphors of 
contract and hierarchy.  Take, for instance, John Boatright’s argument that the normative 
justification for the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm ultimately rests on the mutual 
agreeability of the economic organization to all firm participants, assuming a fair 
bargaining process and internalization of costs to third parties (2002).  By conflating 
theories that emphasize the element of hierarchy with those that emphasize contracts, 
Boatright focuses on the moral issues associated with contracting even though his 
discussion centered primarily on economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy.  However, 
as the next sections will attempt to show, overlooking the importance of hierarchies 
within these theories can lead to a lack of attention to the ways in which the power 
structure of the firm can result in the treatment of employees as a mere means, even if the 
employee voluntarily agrees to such an arrangement ex ante. 
III. THE IMPLICIT MORALITY OF CONTRACTS 
This section begins the moral examination of economic theories of the firm by 
focusing on the metaphor of contract.  Although lawyers refer to contracts as legal 
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enforcement mechanisms that must meet certain doctrinal criteria, economists have a 
much broader understanding of contracts since they are not as concerned with legal 
enforceability.  For economists, contracts refer to all types of voluntary exchanges for 
mutual benefit (e.g., Buchanan 1975).  Thus, within economic theories of the firm, a 
contract can refer not only to the mechanism for governing an exchange (e.g., Williamson 
1979) but also to the very exchange relationship itself (e.g., Gibbons and Henderson 
2012).  However, as this section will argue, the requirement for voluntariness in 
economic accounts has an important yet often overlooked moral feature.  By drawing on 
Kant’s moral philosophy, this section will argue that a contract cannot contradict or 
ignore the will of a party to it because a truly voluntary action must respect humanity as 
an end and not a mere means. 
When considering contracts, economists almost always invoke the concept of 
voluntariness as a requirement or a fundamental assumption.  The reason for the 
importance of voluntariness in economic exchange has its roots in the ultimate moral 
justification of economics.  Some economists explicitly appeal to a libertarian view of 
freedom and self-interest to support the claim that a contract must be voluntary (e.g., 
Friedman 1962).  From this view, voluntariness is obviously crucial because coercing 
others into exchanges against their will would directly threaten their freedom and self-
interest.  For most economists, however, the appeal to voluntariness is more indirect.  
Despite the development of the concept of utility as a derived ordinal ranking of 
preferences rather than a cardinal ordering of happiness, most modern economists still 
implicitly rely on the concept of welfare as the ultimate value for justification (Dasgupta 
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2005).  Voluntariness is crucial to welfare maximization within these accounts due to the 
impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons.  Because increases in welfare depend 
on each person’s individualized set of preferences, it is impossible to know whether or 
not a non-voluntary transfer of resources will lead to a net increase in welfare.  On the 
other hand, when individuals act on their knowledge of their own preferences to 
exchange with each other voluntarily, we can confidently assume that the exchange will 
have increased the welfare of at least one party to the exchange without harming the 
other.  As a result, voluntariness is practically taken as a given among economists.  For 
instance, James Buchanan, a Nobel-prize winning economist, criticizes game theory by 
appealing to the “mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange,” which he takes as a 
given to be “the most fundamental of all the understandings in economics” (2001: 29).  
The emphasis on voluntariness is especially strong in economic theories of the firm.  
Oliver Williamson, another Nobel-prize winning economist, builds on Buchanan’s 
assumption to argue that private ordering, which entails efforts by transacting parties to 
voluntarily craft mechanisms that align their incentives, is a key to understanding the 
governance of economic exchanges, including the firm itself (2002).  Other theorists of 
the firm that emphasize the metaphor of contract also emphasize the need for 
voluntariness in exchange (e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel 1991). 
However, hidden in the requirement for voluntariness in economic theories of the 
firm lies a need to consider the morality of exchange.  One might think that economists 
simply understand voluntariness in a thin, instrumental way.  If voluntariness has value 
only as a condition to ensure that exchanges lead to increases in welfare, wouldn’t it be 
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sufficient for exchanges to simply be consistent with the preferences of economic actors?  
However, even such a thin account of voluntariness requires considerations of morality.  
At a superficial level, an evaluation of whether an exchange is consistent with our 
preferences requires considerations of morality because normative concepts are 
embedded within our preferences (e.g., Sen 1977).  If, for instance, the preferences of 
economic actors include the preference for fairness and respect, the requirement for 
voluntariness will also impose a requirement for fairness and respect within the 
exchange.  More importantly, the consideration of preferences without reference to 
objective – and thus normative – standards leads to an unacceptable account of welfare 
and/or voluntariness.  If economists allow for a purely subjective understanding of 
welfare, they will fail to account for the distortion of preferences that are commonplace 
in the market (e.g., Sen 1985).  A compulsive smoker or a prisoner suffering from 
Stockholm syndrome may prefer the status quo, but it would be unacceptable to think that 
their actual welfare is enhanced by addiction or captivity.  Similarly, a purely subjective 
account of preferences leads to an unacceptable account of voluntariness itself (Olsaretti 
2004).  To exclude objective considerations from the requirements of voluntary action 
would yield bizarre results, including the characterization of actions constrained by 
mistakes of fact as nonvoluntary actions.  What is needed, then, is the consideration of 
normative standards to distinguish between preferences that should count and those that 
should not, even for those who place a purely instrumental value on voluntariness of 
exchange (Olsaretti 2006). 
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One possible approach to articulating the connection between morality and 
voluntariness is to look to Kant’s argument that a voluntary action proceeds from a free 
will and thus requires respect for humanity as an end not a mere means (1785).  For Kant, 
to say that an exchange is voluntary is to say that it was freely made in accordance with 
the will of each party.  And the very idea of action that proceeds from a free will leads to 
a moral requirement to respect humanity as an end and not a mere means.  How could 
this be the case?  Kant argues that we can say that an action proceeds from a free will 
only when it is caused by the exercise of reason.  For Kant, our will is free because we 
can exercise our reason to determine our action independently from our impulses.  When 
we tell the truth even when we desire to tell a lie, we exercise our freedom in being able 
to will an action independently from our desires.  A voluntary action, then, is an exercise 
of our free will only to the extent that it is caused by our reason rather than our desires.  
Lastly, for Kant, because the exercise of our practical rationality requires reasons for 
acting, we must act for a reason that exists independently from our desires if we are to act 
freely.  The only reason that can exist apart from our desires, according to Kant, is our 
own rational nature.  Whenever we desire something, it is a necessary feature of our 
rationality that we desire it for the sake of our selves.  Therefore, acting freely requires 
acting for the sake of our rational nature, and when we interact with other rational beings, 
we must act for the sake of their rational nature as well.  The Kantian respect for persons 
expressed in the moral requirement to treat the humanity in ourselves and in others as an 
end and not as a mere means encapsulates this requirement of the free will to act for the 
sake of the rational nature in ourselves and in others. 
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From a Kantian point of view, then, the requirement that contracts entail 
voluntary exchanges for mutual advantage simultaneously imposes a significant moral 
requirement for contracting parties to treat the humanity in themselves as ends and not as 
a mere means.  A contract that treats humanity as a mere means is not truly voluntary, 
even if both parties consent to it.  Voluntary contracting cannot consist of a brief moment 
of mutual exploitation in which one uses the other as a mere instrument to get what one 
wants nor be consistent with allowing one’s self to be exploited.  Instead, a contract must 
be consistent with the will of each party involved.  Of course, it is unavoidable that we 
treat each other as a means for achieving our ends when we contract with each other.  If I 
contract with you to buy ice cream, for instance, I am treating you as a means for getting 
ice cream.  However, I cannot treat the humanity in you as a mere means when we 
contract with each other.  To treat the humanity in myself and in others as a mere means 
is to relate to myself and to others as if we did not each have independent ends of our 
own by acting on terms that are not acceptable to everyone involved (O'Neill 1989).  If, 
for instance, a group of farmers enter into a contract to share a plot of land despite the 
unwillingness of the landowner to allow them to use it, the contract is not a voluntary 
exchange because its terms are not acceptable to the landowner.  In such a case, the 
farmers would be treating the humanity in the landowner as a mere means for the 
achievement of their own ends. 
Because a contract that respects the humanity of contracting parties must be 
consistent with their free wills, a contract cannot contradict or ignore the wills of either 
contracting party.  In one family of contracts, I treat the humanity in you as a mere means 
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by contradicting or ignoring your will.  I contradict your will when I use a contract to 
achieve a purpose you did not will.  If I contract with you to sell you a barrel of oil and 
then deliver a barrel full of water topped with a thin layer of oil, I act in a way that 
contradicts your will to buy a barrel of oil and thus treat you as a mere means for my own 
ends.  I ignore your will when I effectuate an exchange unilaterally without taking your 
will into consideration.  If I choose to leave a barrel of oil and then take money from you 
without knowing whether or not you consented to such an exchange, I wrong you by 
treating you as a vending machine for my own purposes, even if you would have 
consented to an exchange.  In another family of contracts, I treat the humanity in myself 
as a mere means by contradicting or ignoring my own will.  I contradict my own will 
when I act inconsistently with the very principle of willing itself.  If I enter into a slavery 
contract, I contradict my own will by exercising my will to act as if I could not exercise 
my will at all (Kant 1797).  A rock cannot enter into a contract because it cannot will 
itself to do so.  Contracting to become like a rock thus contradicts the very principle of 
willing since it treats the idea of willing as something that negates itself.  This is why the 
libertarian argument that slavery contracts ought to be allowed actually represents an 
illiberal position (Freeman 2001).  I ignore my own will when I simply acquiesce to the 
will of another in a contract.  I treat the humanity in myself as a mere means for you if 
you offer terms on a contract that I never really consider in light of my own will.  A 
contract requires that both parties will the exchange.  The absence or the contradiction of 
the will of either party to the exchange renders it morally impermissible. 
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Nevertheless, the prohibition against contradicting or ignoring the will of 
contracting parties does not imply that one cannot limit one’s own freedom through 
contracts.  Contracts are useful because they can help us manage the uncertainties of the 
future by limiting our future actions.  For instance, suppose that I run a transportation 
business and would like to protect myself against the possibility of a prohibitive increase 
in the price of oil in the future.  I can promote my interests in a way that is consistent 
with my will today by contracting with you to buy oil from you a year from now for $50 
per barrel.  When we enter into such a contract, we both limit the freedom of our future 
selves by willing in the present to determine our actions in the future.  Such a limitation 
of our future selves does not contradict or ignore our wills because it is an exercise of our 
own wills to limit our actions.  When you act today to determine your actions tomorrow, 
you are the one who determines your actions.  For instance, if the price of oil increases in 
the future, you are still obligated to sell oil to me at $50 per barrel because you willed it at 
the time of contracting.  And when I insist on performance from you in the future, I 
would not be treating you as a mere means because I would be respecting the exercise of 
your will today to determine your actions in the future.  On the other hand, if you sell 
yourself to slavery or simply acquiesce to my will, you are exercising your will to grant 
me the right to determine your actions.  In such an instance, you would be acting 
inconsistently with the principle of voluntary action, and I would be treating you as a 
mere means since I would be agreeing to value you in the future only as an instrument for 
my own purposes.  And as the next section will explain, the very purpose of the firm in 
economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy is to grant the employer the unilateral right 
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to determine the employee’s actions in the future.  Therefore, it will argue, the idea of a 
hierarchy within such theories is inconsistent with the idea of voluntary contracting. 
IV. CONTRACTING INTO A HIERARCHY 
This section discusses the attempt to justify the economic theory of the firm as a 
hierarchy on contractual grounds and argues that it ultimately falls short.  Some defenders 
of the hierarchical theory of the firm argue that its conception of the firm is not 
problematic because it presents the firm as merely an arrangement inside the firm with 
functionally defined roles into which economic actors contract (e.g., Boatright 2012).  
Within this view, the hierarchical theory of the firm is merely one variant of the theory of 
the firm as a nexus of contracts (Bratton 1989).  Putting aside semantic commonalities 
and differences, however, it becomes evident that the theory of the firm as a hierarchy is 
inconsistent with truly voluntary contracts.  Because the very reason for a hierarchy is to 
override the will of the employee when contracts run out, the employee cannot be said to 
be placing limits on her future self when she contracts into a hierarchy.  Instead, she 
would be undermining her future capacity to exercise her free will and thus treating the 
humanity in herself as a mere means.  Furthermore, attempting to rescue the hierarchical 
theory by granting the employee the right of free exit fails because it would collapse the 
hierarchy back into a contract.  In other words, the economic theory of the firm as a 
hierarchy is either morally unacceptable or logical inconsistent. 
Modern economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy build on the Coasian 
intuition about the costs of contracting by recognizing that asset specificity and bounded 
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rationality lead to hold-up problems that can frustrate market transactions.  Asset 
specificity refers to the ways in which investments made in an asset within the context of 
a particular exchange relationship make the asset more valuable within that relationship 
than in other relationships (Williamson 1985).  Investments that lead to asset-specificity 
are relationship-specific investments.  For instance, suppose that it takes time to learn and 
perfect the skill required for a manufacturer’s proprietary process of assembling widgets.  
The efforts that the manufacturer expends to train the employee is a relationship-specific 
investment.  Learning this skill increases the asset-specificity of the employee to the firm 
because the investment required to teach the employee will make her more valuable to 
this particular manufacturer than to other firms.  Asset specificity introduces the 
possibility that, once a relationship-specific investment is made, parties to an exchange 
relationship will engage in opportunistic behavior to appropriate the difference between 
the value of the asset within the relationship and the value outside the relationship.  For 
instance, if the manufacturer values a trained worker at $25 whereas the labor market 
values generic workers at $20, an employee may contract with the manufacturer at $19 to 
beat out other competitors and then hold up the manufacturer by demanding $25 once it 
expends the resources to train her.  The possibility of being held up can lead to parties not 
making relationship-specific investments, which would undermine economic efficiency, 
and it can even prevent parties from entering into a contract at all if the fear of being held 
up is large enough. 
Asset-specificity would not lead to a hold-up problem if the manufacturer and the 
worker could sign a contract that precludes any opportunistic behavior once relationship-
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specific investments have been made.  Unfortunately, bounded rationality renders such 
contracts extremely costly and difficult, if not impossible, to make.  Bounded rationality 
refers to the finite condition of human rationality (Simon 1955).  It describes the ways in 
which decision making is a burden on our cognitive capacities, which leads to our 
inability to process the near-infinite amount of current data points to make a perfectly 
rational decision, let alone begin to even anticipate and process future events.  The upshot 
of bounded rationality for contracting is that all of our contracts are necessarily 
incomplete (Williamson 1985).  Because it is impossible to anticipate at the time of 
contracting all the various ways we may need to govern our exchange relationship in the 
future, there will inevitably arise a situation in the future that presents an opportunity for 
at least one party to take advantage of another party once a relationship-specific 
investment has been made.  For instance, suppose that the manufacturer and the worker 
agree to a contract in which it pays her $19 to assemble widgets in accordance with its 
proprietary assembly technique.  To protect herself against possible exploitation in the 
future, the worker will not agree to any economically feasible deal unless the contract 
specifies which tasks she will be performing.  But after some time, suppose that the 
manufacturer wishes to alter its specified assembly technique that will double the speed 
of manufacturing.  Unfortunately, the new technique will require the worker to perform 
an action that was not specified in their contract.  The need for this change could not have 
been foreseen at the time of contracting because both parties entered into their contract 
under bounded rationality.  The contract they signed was incomplete with respect to the 
possible range of tasks that the manufacturer would want the worker to perform in the 
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future.  As a result of the incompleteness of the contract, the worker stands in a position 
to extract more payment from the manufacturer in exchange for her compliance with the 
new manufacturing technique.  In fact, the costs of the negotiation and the possible pay-
out to the worker may even force the manufacturer to abandon the new process 
altogether.  Lastly, because both parties know that they cannot cover all situations in the 
future at the time of contracting, they may be discouraged to form a contract at all 
because they are concerned about similar costs and difficulties in the future. 
Modern economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy argue that the firm is an 
arrangement that can preempt opportunistic behavior and thus enable mutually beneficial 
exchanges and the making of relationship-specific investments to take place.  Given that 
the hold-up problem resulting from asset specificity and bounded rationality makes 
market contracting inefficient, difficult, or impossible, it is in the economic interest of 
both parties to agree to a hierarchy when contracts “run out” ex post (e.g., Blair and Stout 
1999; Williamson 2002).  Within a hierarchical firm, when unanticipated circumstances 
arise, the incomplete nature of ex ante contracting will not raise concerns about one party 
holding the other hostage because the power structure of the firm will have already 
entitled one party – the manager-entrepreneur or the Board of Directors – to make a 
unilateral decision as to how to allocate productive resources.  This arrangement will 
allow both parties to enter into economic transactions without the fear of being held up 
and will allow the manager-entrepreneur to make an efficient amount of relationship-
specific investments in the employee once they enter into a relationship.  For instance, the 
manufacturer in the example above does not need to worry about the worker holding up 
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its implementation of a new manufacturing process within a hierarchy because it entitles 
the manufacturer to tell the worker what to do and obligates the worker to act under the 
manufacturer’s direction.  This will allow the manufacturer to not only hire the worker in 
the first place but also to make an efficient amount of investment into her to make her a 
more productive worker for his factory. 
Unfortunately, contracting into a hierarchical firm for the reasons outlined above 
treats the employee as a mere means because the purpose of the hierarchical firm is to 
impose the employer’s will on the employee to compel her to perform an action that she 
neither willed at the time of contracting nor willed at the time of performance.  Imagine 
that Alfred would like his employee, Betty, to perform an action today.  His request and 
her action would respect her humanity as an end if she exercises her will to perform the 
action by agreeing to his request today or if she had previously exercised her will in the 
past by promising to perform such an action today.  Yet, there would be no need for a 
hierarchy in either of these scenarios because a contract formed either today or in the past 
would be sufficient to govern their interaction.  If it weren’t for bounded rationality, both 
Alfred and Betty would be able to prevent the hold-up problem by exercising their wills 
at the time of contracting to completely determine the full range of possible actions.  And 
if it weren’t for Betty’s unwillingness to perform today, she would agree to Alfred’s 
request even if it falls outside the bounds of their incomplete contract.  The need for a 
hierarchy only arises because it would be efficient for both parties to agree ex ante that 
Alfred will be able to exert his will unilaterally over and against Betty’s will in 
circumstances where the contract governing their relationship has “run out.” 
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Unlike contracting to limit one’s freedom in the future by determining one’s 
future actions at the time of contracting, contracting into a hierarchy to prevent hold-up 
problems results in a contradiction of the will.  When a worker contracts to perform a 
service for a counterparty, she binds her future self to her current will.  She never acts to 
give up her capacity to exercise her will because how she acts in the future will have 
already been determined by her will at the time of contracting.  Similarly, when a worker 
enters into a unilateral contract with a hirer of her services, he grants her the option to 
perform actions that both parties anticipated and specified before she takes any action.  
The granting of such an option entails that both parties have willed both the possibility of 
her performing the specified action and of her not performing the specified action.  On 
the other hand, when a worker contracts into a hierarchy, she agrees to an arrangement 
within which another person has a right to demand her to act against the will of her future 
self without knowing at the time of the agreement what that action will be.  By giving up 
her capacity to govern her own actions and transferring it to someone else, she essentially 
agrees to become a mere instrumentality of the employer in exchange for money.  In this 
sense, such a contract does not differ much from a contract to enter into slavery.  In both 
cases, the subordinate is exercising her will to enter an arrangement within which she can 
no longer exercise her own will to determine her actions.  Such an exercise of one’s will 
contradicts the very idea of a free will and thus treats the humanity of the subordinate as a 
mere means by treating her as someone who did not have a free will. 
At this point, defenders of the hierarchical theory of the firm may argue that 
employees retain their capacity to exercise their will because they never give up their 
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right to freely exit the relationship at any time of their choosing.  However, these 
arguments overlook the fact that the right of exit undermines the very reason for 
imposing a hierarchy in the first place.  Once employees are given the right of free exit, 
the hierarchical firm quickly collapses into a set of contracts.  Again, as noted above, the 
hierarchical firm exists as an efficient alternative to markets because it eliminates the 
possibility of the employee holding up the employer in an attempt to appropriate the 
value that exists within their exchange relationship.  The right of free exit in a hierarchy 
reintroduces this possibility because the very reason why the employee can hold up the 
employer is because the employer has already made relationship-specific investments in 
the employee that makes her more valuable than other potential employees.  The right to 
quit gives the employee enough leverage to engage in opportunistic behavior, which is 
the very problem that the hierarchy was supposed to prevent. 
As an illustration of the way the right of free exit undermines the very purpose of 
the hierarchical firm, suppose that Betty agrees to contract into a hierarchical 
arrangement within Alfred’s widget-making factory.  Alfred hires Betty to assemble 
various parts to produce widgets at Alfred’s direction and pays her the going rate of an 
assemblyperson, which is $25 an hour.  Alfred spends a significant amount of time 
training Betty and teaches her his proprietary manufacturing method.  Betty is a quick 
learner, and, after some time, she becomes a productive worker who is worth $35 to 
Alfred.  Assuming that the price of a replacement worker in the labor market is still $25, 
the right of free exit gives Betty an opportunity to extract more money out of Alfred.  He 
could pay her $5 more for several months and still be better off than if he hires someone 
26 
 
 
new.  The contract that Betty signed doesn’t protect Alfred since it gave her the right to 
quit, and the hierarchy does Alfred no good since he cannot force Betty to keep working 
for him for $25 once she decides that she does not want to do so anymore.  In other 
words, Betty’s right of free exit puts Alfred right back in the place where he would have 
been if he entered into a service contract with Betty outside of the firm.  The right of exit 
reintroduces within the firm the very thing that the firm is intended to eliminate, i.e., the 
economic inefficiencies associated with opportunistic behavior after relationship-specific 
investments have been made.  But what good is a firm if it does not differ from contracts 
in governing the economic relationship? 
To be fair, the intended level of analysis for economic theories of the firm is 
organizational, where the option to exit does not exist.  Most economic theories of the 
firm are concerned with transaction costs at the firm level, and they offer answers to 
questions that relate to market competition.  Thus, the primary question for most 
applications of theories of the firm is whether a firm should acquire a supplier, as GM did 
with Fisher Body in 1926, or maintain a contractual relationship with it (e.g., Klein et al. 
1978).  And when firms purchase other firms, the purchased firm has no option to exit.  
At the intended level of analysis, then, economic theories of the firm do not have much of 
a problem with logical consistency when they argue that the purpose of the firm as a 
hierarchy is to prevent the hold-up problem by granting the acquirer a unilateral right to 
control the other party.  However, insofar as theories of the firm also explain why firms 
exist at all, they must be able to account for the genesis of firms.  But at the individual 
level of analysis, the requirement to respect the humanity of firm participants presents a 
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stark choice of either denying them the right to exit for the sake of economic efficiency or 
granting them the right and thus undermining the very purpose of the hierarchy.  Once 
taken out of the limited context of market competition and applied to broad areas of 
policy, law, and morality, economic theories of the firm can offer no satisfying 
explanation for the nature and purpose of firms since they must look not only at the 
organizational level but also the individual level of analysis. 
When economic theories of the firm appeal to a hierarchy, they are referring to 
more than just an authority relation that establishes a line of command.  Instead, the idea 
of a hierarchy refers more specifically to a power relation within which one can override 
the will of the other in effectuating the allocation of resources as one sees fit without 
engaging in any inefficient renegotiation.  Without this power for the 
manager/entrepreneur to override the will of the employee, the idea of the firm as a 
hierarchy does not offer an economic advantage over markets at all.  Yet, this right to 
direct the employee’s labor in accordance with the employer’s will rather than the 
employee’s will goes at the heart of what it means to treat her as a mere means.  When 
the employer exercises his right to unilaterally direct the employee’s labor against her 
wishes, she is no longer exercising her own will to determine her actions.  Instead, he 
treats her as a mere input for his own purposes and thus as an instrumentality of his will, 
and the employee treats the humanity in herself as a mere means when she agrees to such 
an agreement ex ante.  Moreover, if the purpose of the firm is to minimize transaction 
costs through the imposition of a hierarchy, the employee cannot contract into a hierarchy 
while retaining the option to exit it because it would eliminate the very purpose of the 
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hierarchy altogether.  Adding the right of free exit to what seems like a hierarchical 
employment contract would allow economic theories of the firm to present a picture of 
the firm that approximates real life.  Within the United States, for instance, the 
employment relationship is typically characterized as an at-will master-servant 
relationship.  Unfortunately, this modification would turn the hierarchy into something 
else altogether.  A theory of the firm as a hierarchy that is constituted by employment 
contracts with a right of exit is nothing more than a theory of the firm as a nexus of 
contracts in disguise. 
V. DISCUSSION 
The scope of this paper is limited to pointing out the problems with how 
academics and practitioners often understand the nature and purpose of the firm as a cost-
minimizing hierarchy.  Nevertheless, if the idea of contracting into a hierarchy to 
minimize transaction costs is inconsistent with the moral requirements implicit within the 
idea of contracting, where can we go from here?  Firms are riddled with authority 
relationships.  Many also take as a given that some type of command hierarchy is needed 
to effectively coordinate the allocation of resources for many types of production in the 
modern economy (e.g., Anderson 2008).  If the economic theory of the firm as a 
hierarchy were correct, the seeming necessity for hierarchies would imply that we either 
give up the idea that participation in firms is a voluntary activity or simply tolerate an 
economic arrangement that undermines our free will because the perceived gains 
outweigh the cost.  Fortunately, however, there is no need to choose between these two 
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options because the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy is not correct, even at a 
descriptive level.  As noted above, the real-life phenomenon does not match the theory at 
the individual level.  Although firms have no right of exit, respect for human autonomy 
has led to accommodations that grant employees the right to exit at any time and only 
require those who breach contracts to pay damages rather than to perform what they 
promised. 
One possible path forward might be to take a closer look at principles of agency 
within the firm.  Rather than hierarchies that reduce transactions costs, authority 
relationships within the firm are more accurately characterized as agency relationships.  
Currently within the United States, for instance, the relationship between the corporation 
and its directors are governed by the legal principles of agency.  Traditionally, the agency 
relationship between the corporation and the manger has been understood to represent an 
underlying agency relationship between the firm’s owners and its managers (e.g., Jensen 
and Meckling 1976).  From this point of view, managers, as agents, have a fiduciary 
obligation to act on behalf of the interests of their principals, the shareholders 
(Goodpaster 1991).  But many have also argued that these agency relationships extend 
even further out.  For instance, when stakeholder theorists appeal to fiduciary duties to 
argue that managers have a duty to a firm’s stakeholders beyond just its shareholders 
(e.g., Freeman 1994), they implicitly draw on an understanding of authority relationships 
between firm participants based on the principles of agency.  In fact, given the 
complexity of agency relationships that can exist within the firm, some have even 
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suggested that the firm is best described as a nexus of agency relationships (Orts 1998; 
2013). 
Unlike hierarchical relationships, which are characterized by the exercise of 
power over a person, agency relationships are characterized by the exercise of power that 
is granted by a person.  Of course, the two can coincide when one wields power over 
another – legitimate authority in wielding power over another person might require that 
one only exercise power over someone who has granted it, for instance – but they are 
distinct concepts.  As discussed above, economic theories of the firm argue that the 
authority within the hierarchical firm exists to grant the hierarch a unilateral right to exert 
his will over the subordinate against her will.  On the other hand, agency authority only 
applies to actions taken by the agent that enable the principal’s will.  Thus, whereas 
hierarchical power is exercised in instances that could not have been anticipated by the 
contracting parties, authority in agency relationships only extends to actions that are 
reasonably foreseeable by the principal (Dalley 2011).  Whereas hierarchies involve the 
unilateral exercise of one party’s will, then, authority exercised through agency 
relationships stems from the will of both the principal and agent.  An account of the firm 
that incorporates the element of reasonable foreseeability along with the right of exit, 
then, could go a long way toward a morally satisfactory theory of the firm. 
Nevertheless, appeals to agency relationships are not sufficient to form a true 
theory of the firm because a true theory of the firm must explain why firms exist at all.  
Suppose, for instance, that egalitarians and other political philosophers who concede the 
necessity of authority within the firm are correct.  Suppose that authority relations exist in 
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firms because they are somehow necessary to coordinate the complex allocation of goods 
and labor within the firm.  From this perspective, it may seem as if the purpose of the 
firm is to provide a coordinating mechanism that is analogous to the price mechanism 
within the market.  Perhaps firms offer an advantage over markets because the 
hierarchical authority of the manager-entrepreneur is superior than the price mechanism 
in certain circumstances.  But recall Coase’s criticism of Knight and his explanation for 
why the hierarchical firm can be more efficient than markets.  Even if the manager-
entrepreneur could perform as a better coordinating mechanism than the price 
mechanism, why couldn’t those who would otherwise participate within the firm simply 
enter into contractual arrangements to confer the manager with sufficient authority of 
command to coordinate their labor?  Why is a firm necessary at all?  And if one were to 
reply that the firm is merely a convenient shorthand for these contractual relationships, 
why is there any need to appeal to a hierarchy?  If the hierarchy does not exist to reduce 
transactions costs by granting the manager-entrepreneur with the power to override the 
will of the employee, why does it need to exist at all?  The reason why a theory of the 
firm must explain firms exist and what are its boundaries is because a theory that avoids 
these answers provides no theory of the firm whatsoever.  If one appeals simply to 
pragmatic considerations for the need for authority in allocating firm resources, one does 
not yet have a theory of the firm.  And without a theory, one has no theoretical basis to 
articulate the purpose of the firm. 
Yet, if the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy does not sufficiently respect 
the humanity of firm participants, what, if anything, can be salvaged from nearly a 
32 
 
 
century of theorizing about the nature and purpose of the firm?  This paper has examined 
both the metaphors of contract and hierarchy because there is still much to be reclaimed 
from the aspects of economic theories that look to contracts as constitutive elements of 
the firm.  As noted above, the universally recognized importance of voluntariness to 
contracts and its connection to respect for humanity provides a strong moral foundation 
for constructing a theory of the firm that treats its participants as ends and not as mere 
means.  Furthermore, it is pragmatically advisable that business ethicists continue to 
utilize the language of contracts when discussing the nature and purpose of the firm.  The 
usage of the metaphor of contract is solidly entrenched not only within economics but 
also the study of organizational theory and corporate governance more broadly.  Business 
ethicists face a steep uphill climb if they seek to reinvent the wheel and offer an entirely 
new account of the firm.  Yet, once the moral implications of voluntariness in contract is 
made explicit, there is no need to throw out the baby with the bath water.  Rather than 
alienating business ethics from organizational studies, both disciplines can build on a 
shared foundation to construct theories and yield applications that are both normatively 
and descriptively right and powerful. 
To be clear, the reliance on the contractual metaphor cannot be the whole story.  
Aside from the minority of extreme theorists who claim that the very construct of a firm 
is harmful for understanding and governing various modes of economic production, many 
organizational scholars fully accept and utilize the contractual metaphor as a central 
building block without denying the existence of firms.  The team production theory of the 
firm, for instance, views the firm as a distinct entity apart from markets even while 
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“locat[ing] the… model… within the nexus of contracts tradition” (Blair and Stout 1999: 
254).  One particularly promising line of thinking about the nature and purpose of the 
firm builds on the insight that the firm is comprised of not only complete but also 
incomplete contracts (e.g., Coff 1999; Zingales 2000) and argues that the firm exists as a 
distinct entity apart from the market because it allows for greater value to be unlocked 
from combining various bundles of property rights held by firm participants (Asher et al. 
2005; Kim and Mahoney 2010).  Although there is more work to be done to flesh out a 
theory of the firm that incorporates elements of property rights without undermining the 
freedom and equality of firm participants, such theories point to such a possibility, given 
the extent to which property rights are evolving and “embedded in human rights,” as 
some business ethicists have claimed (Donaldson and Preston 1995: 83). 
Building on the contractual metaphor of intrafirm relationships can also lead to a 
variety of practical applications.  For instance, the “master-servant” model of hierarchical 
control is still considered to be the distinguishing factor of the employment relationship 
within the law.  The contractual metaphor can provide a critique to such characterizations 
and point to the need for new theories of employment relationships in the law that better 
respect the freedom and equality of employees.  Furthermore, corporate governance 
theories still often focus primarily on the principal-agent problem between shareholders 
and management, both as a matter of law and practice.  Because it requires that all 
participants in the firm treat each other as ends in themselves rather than as mere means, 
the contractual metaphor can provide reasons for not only including labor within the 
governance of the firm but also for a bilateral interpretation of shareholders, 
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management, and labor as all being principals and agents of each other.  Lastly, viewing 
employees as free and equal counterparties to a contractual relationship can change 
managerial behavior because the manager and the employee must continually share 
information, negotiate, and come to a shared understanding of each other’s rights and 
obligations.  Workplace civility, for instance, might need to be improved to better reflect 
the equal and reciprocal relationship if intrafirm relationships were interpreted to be 
contractual rather than hierarchical. 
Lastly, to describe intrafirm relations as contractual does not necessarily exclude 
considerations of efficiency in economic coordination either.  There is significant reason 
to think that complex forms of contracting – which include not only formal but also 
informal and/or relational contractual relationships – can minimize, if not eliminate 
altogether, the inefficiencies associated with market contracting (Bernstein 1992; Gilson 
et al. 2009; 2010; Scott 2003).  These complex forms of formal and informal contracting 
have also made their way into how we describe intrafirm relationships.  The emphasis on 
informal and relational contracts between managers and employees has led to new 
insights within theories of the firm as a nexus of contracts on how firms can leverage 
intrafirm relationships to increase economic output and increase competitiveness (e.g., 
Baker et al. 2002; Gibbons 2005; Gibbons and Henderson 2012).  To describe intrafirm 
relationships as informal and/or relational contracts is to deny a hierarchical 
characterization of the manager-employee relationship.  Rather than the manager 
commanding the employee from above, the manager continually negotiates with the 
employee to structure their relationship in accordance with terms to which both parties 
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agree.  Thus, there is no need to give up on efficiency as an important value within the 
firm when one incorporates the metaphor of contracts into theories of the firm because 
many existing theories of the firm already utilize a robust conception of contracts to 
construct efficient solutions to the problems of coordinated production.  Again, contracts 
cannot tell the entire story, and there is much more work to be done on this front.  But 
future work examining the core building blocks of the firm such as agency, property, and 
contracting can build a morally acceptable theory of the firm that does not ignore 
considerations of efficiency. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Theories of the firm matter because they articulate the nature and purpose of the 
firm.  If we view the firm as a hierarchy that exists to reduce transactions costs by giving 
the hierarch a unilateral right to exert his will over his employees, it becomes much easier 
to treat what amounts to a threat to human dignity and freedom as a mere cost of doing 
business.  If we wish to retain the idea that market activity consists of voluntary actions 
taken by individuals for their own benefit, we must revisit the idea that the firm exists as 
a hierarchy.  Unfortunately, we do not have a sufficiently developed theory of the firm 
that stands as an alternative to the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy.  For those 
who wish to retain the hierarchical element within the firm, they must be able to explain 
why firms exist as hierarchies and what are their boundaries.  As of now, no such theory 
exists. 
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Yet, given the availability of alternative concepts like contracts, agency and 
property, it is unclear why we would want a theory of the firm to incorporate hierarchies 
at all.  Why shouldn’t business ethicists and organizational theorists work together to 
construct a new theory of the firm that looks to contracts as foundational elements that 
constitute the firm?  By looking to agency relationships and property rights to supplement 
the idea that firms are constituted by contracts, we may be able to articulate a new 
purpose of the firm that is consistent with the dignity and freedom of all of its 
participants.  And once a new purpose is articulated, we will be able to take the next steps 
in aligning our reality and practice with our new theory.  We may even be able to 
contribute to new legal frameworks, arrangements for corporate governance, and 
managerial practices that are consistent with our moral intuitions about how we organize 
into firms to coordinate our productive activities. 
  
37 
 
 
ESSAY 2: 
 
Profit and Fair Play: How Economic Theories Of Entrepreneurship Can Help Us 
Recognize An Employee When We See One 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Distinguishing employees from independent contractors and other types of 
workers is not an easy task.1  Nevertheless, employee status is a necessary and important 
category in legal analysis in a variety of ways.  First, employee status plays an important 
role in demarcating the tort liability of the employer.  Because employees are considered 
to be agents of employers in ways that are mostly not the case for other types of workers 
and service providers, employers are often held liable for the actions of their employees 
even though they would not be liable for the same actions of others working on their 
behalf.2  The primary rationale for imposing liability on employers in this way is because 
employees are assumed to be acting as an extension of the employer, whereas non-
employees are not.3  Second, employee status subjects the employer to a variety of 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It 
Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295 (2001). 
2 This doctrine is known as the doctrine of respondeat superior.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY §219(1) (“A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the 
scope of their employment.). 
3 To say that employees are acting as extensions of the employer can be interpreted differently within 
different tort theories.  For instance, corrective justice theories of tort law view employees as moral 
extensions of employers when respondeat superior applies.  See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW, 187 (1995) (“Where the faulty actor is sufficiently integrated into the enterprise and where 
the faulty act is sufficiently close to the assigned task, the law constructs a more inclusive legal persona, 
the-employer-acting-through-the-employee, to whom responsibility can be ascribed.”).  On the other hand, 
economic theories of tort law are likely to view employees as extensions of the employer as a risk-taking 
enterprise, at least insofar as efficient risk-taking is concerned.  See, e.g., Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in 
Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir. 1987) (“All the details of 
the common law independent contractor doctrine having to do with the right to control the work are 
addressed to identifying the best monitor and precaution-taker.”).  Regardless of the finer differences, 
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statutory obligations spanning virtually every aspect of the employer-employee 
relationship, including those pertaining to wages, hours, benefits, retirement, and taxes.4  
Although the specific reasons for imposing a statutory obligation differs from one statute 
to another, the general principle that underlies most of employee protection laws is the 
protection of workers who are vulnerable and disadvantaged.5  For instance, the preamble 
to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) points to the “inequality of bargaining 
power between employees… and employers” and states that one of its purposes is to 
protect workers by “restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees.”6  Third, employee status can play an important role in delineating the 
employer’s rights to resources and opportunities that can be exploited for business 
purposes.  For instance, employers have property rights over work products created by 
their employees whereas they do not have such rights over similar products of non-
employees.7  Similarly, some employees have fiduciary duties to respect the business 
                                                          
however, the central ideas that motivate the justifications is that there is some important connection 
between the employer and employee that, for the most part, does not exist between a business entity and its 
contractual partners. 
4 For instance, only employees are protected by many significant federal laws, including the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §152(2)-(3); the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§158(b)(4)(i); the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §1002 (5)-(6); the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §201(2); the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §2611(3); the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §630(f); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f); and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 19990, 42 U.S.C. §1211(3). 
5 See, e.g., Carlson supra note 1, at 354 (“statutory purpose nearly always leads in the same direction: 
broad statutory coverage of economically dependent workers”). 
6 29 U.S.C. §151 
7 For instance, although ownership of a copyright typically resides in the author of the work, ownership of a 
work created by an employee vests in the employer.  See, e.g., Natkin v. Winfrey, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1003 
(N.D. Ill. 2000); 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title.”). 
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interests and opportunities of their employers in ways that independent contractors do 
not.8 
However, despite the legal importance of distinguishing employees from other 
types of workers, there is a significant lack of clarity or consensus on how the law ought 
to do so.9  The control test rooted within the common law of agency is the oldest and 
most widely recognized legal test for determining employee status, and it largely 
emphasizes the control that an employer has over the employee.10  Because the doctrine 
of respondeat superior is predicated on the theory that employees are acting as an 
extension of their employer in some way, the focus on control is theoretically well-suited 
for adjudicating classification issues that pertain to tort liability.  Unfortunately, the test 
for control does not address all the relevant issues that motivate the myriad of statutory 
protections for employees.11  A widely accepted alternative is known as the “economic 
realities test,” and it emphasizes the economic dependence of employees to their 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Midwest Ink Co. v. Graphic Ink Sys., No. 98 C 7822, 2003 WL 360089 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2003) 
(ruling for the defendant, who argued that he did not owe any fiduciary duties to the plaintiff because he 
was an independent contractor rather than an employee). 
9 See, e.g., Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So.2d 143, 150 (Miss. 1994) (“various tests to 
determine the type of relationship are themselves generalities which can be viewed quite differently, 
depending upon which judge is applying them.”). 
10 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07(3)(a) (2006) (“an employee is an agent whose 
principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work”). 
11 See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2003); Carlson, supra 
note 1; Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 75 (1984); Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An 
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187 
(1999); Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for Amending 
Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239 
(1997). 
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employers.12  Unfortunately, although economic dependence of one party to another 
might signify some imbalance of bargaining power that motivates many employment 
protection statutes in theory, the economic realities test captures neither economic reality 
nor economic dependence.  It fails to capture economic reality because economic 
dependence does not really distinguish employees from other types of workers.  
Employers are just as likely to be economically dependent on employees, and many 
independent contractors are likely to be just as economically dependent on their clients as 
employees are to their employers.13  Furthermore, it fails to capture economic 
dependence because, in practice, the economic realities test often has no practical 
difference with the control test, with courts tending to focus on factors that are shared by 
both.14  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that both tests are too convoluted and 
involve so many different factors that they are very difficult to provide consistent 
guidance to courts, businesses, and workers.15 
As an alternative to both the control test and the economic realities test, there has 
been a recently growing acceptance of the view that an employee is someone who is not 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mares v. Marsh, 777 
F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985)) (the economic realities test focuses on “whether the employee realistically 
is dependent upon the business to which he or she renders service”). 
13 See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 479, 482 (2016) (noting that “plenty of classic contractors are economically 
dependent upon their clients, and employers are often economically dependent upon their employees.”); 
Linder, supra note 11; Maltby & Yamada, supra note 11. 
14 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §1.01 Reporters’ Notes (noting the “lack of any sharp 
distinction between the common-law test... and a multifactor economic-realities test”); Murray v. Principal 
Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “there is no functional difference between the 
three formulations” of employee status expressed by the common law agency test, the economic realities 
test, and a common law hybrid test). 
15 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1. 
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an working as an entrepreneur.16  The D.C. Circuit, in particular, has embraced this “shift 
of emphasis to entrepreneurialism”17 by endorsing a new test that focuses on the 
entrepreneurial opportunities of workers.18  Under what is now known as the 
entrepreneurial opportunities test, the court focuses “not upon the employer's control of 
the means and manner of the work but instead upon whether the putative independent 
contractors have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss” to determine 
whether or not a worker is an employee.19  The assumption that animates this focus on 
entrepreneurial opportunity is that an employee is not involved with the “opportunities 
and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism,”20 whereas an independent contractor “takes 
economic risk and has the corresponding opportunity to profit.”21  Although there is some 
concern that the entrepreneurial opportunities test is inconsistent with the Supreme Court 
precedent in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden,22 the D.C. Circuit has 
continued to look to it as a guidepost for other NLRA claims.23  And other courts, even as 
they decline to apply the entrepreneurial opportunities test, have begun to consider the 
                                                          
16 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §1.01(b) (“An individual renders services as an 
independent businessperson and not as an employee when the individual in his or her own interest exercises 
entrepreneurial control over important business decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign 
assistants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and when to provide service to 
other customers.”). 
17 Corp. Exp. Delivery Sys. v. N.L.R.B., 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Corporate 
Express Delivery Systems]. 
18 The court first articulated the “entrepreneurial opportunities” test in Corporate Express Delivery Systems 
and affirmed it in FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) [hereinafter FedEx 
Home Delivery]. 
19 Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20 FedEx Home Delivery, at 497. 
21 Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780. 
22 503 U.S. 318 (1992).  For a discussion on the inconsistency of the entrepreneurial opportunities test with 
Supreme Court precedent, see, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 353, 357 (2011) (noting that the test “directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent”).  See also Judge 
Garland’s dissenting opinion in FedEx Home Delivery. 
23 See, e.g., Lancaster Symphony Orchestra v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 822 F.3d 563 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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availability of entrepreneurial opportunities as an important factor for determining 
employee status.24 
Unfortunately, what is missing from this recent focus on entrepreneurship is a 
theoretical understanding of what entrepreneurship actually is and why it matters.  Courts 
often seem to rely on common sense notions of entrepreneurship as profit seeking and/or 
risk taking.25  Scholars who look to economic theory to inform their arguments within 
this context only mention the entrepreneur tangentially as part of their examination of 
economic theories of the firm rather than as their main focus.26  Neither approach has had 
any traction with contemporary entrepreneurship research.  As a response to this lack of 
attention to the theoretical underpinnings of entrepreneurship, this paper looks to 
economic theories of entrepreneurship, which have been very influential for framing 
entrepreneurship research, to supply criteria for determining whether a worker is acting 
as an entrepreneur.  In doing so, it attempts to better inform the increased attention to the 
element of entrepreneurship and ground it within a scholarly tradition. 
                                                          
24 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In finding that the 
incidents of the relationship between Friendly and its drivers militate in favor of ‘employee’ status, we 
place particular significance on Friendly's requirement that its drivers may not engage in any 
entrepreneurial opportunities.”).  See also Doud v. Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (D. Nev. 
2015) and Crew One Prods., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 811 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2016). 
25 See, e.g., Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780. (“The full-time cook and the executive are 
employees and the lawn-care provider is an independent contractor not because of the degree of supervision 
under which each labors but because of the degree to which each functions as an entrepreneur — that is, 
takes economic risk and has the corresponding opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just 
harder.”). 
26 See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661 
(2013).  See also Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work contract as 
Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083 (2015). 
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Although contemporary theories of entrepreneurship abound in a variety of ways, 
almost all entrepreneurship scholars build on the following three classic theories of 
entrepreneurship – Frank Knight’s work on risk and uncertainty27, Joseph Schumpeter’s 
work on creative destruction28, and Israel Kirzner’s work on entrepreneurial alertness29.  
The foundational theory of entrepreneurship is that of Frank Knight.  Knight argues that 
entrepreneurs assume ultimate responsibility for the business enterprise – a concept that 
this paper will refer to as entrepreneurial responsibility.  Within Knight’s framework, 
entrepreneurial responsibility consists of both exercising control over the enterprise and 
assuming a type of risk he describes as uncertainty.30  Economic uncertainty refers to the 
type of risk that cannot be calculated or known in advance.31  It exists because supply and 
demand in the market is unpredictable, and entrepreneurs are those who assume liability 
for such unpredictability.  Joseph Schumpeter offers greater elaboration on the control 
                                                          
27 See, generally, FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921) [hereinafter RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT]. 
28 See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934) [hereinafter 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]; Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Creative Response in Economic 
History, 7 J. ECON. HIST. 149 (1947) [hereinafter Creative Response]; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942) [hereinafter CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY]. 
29 See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973) [hereinafter COMPETITION 
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP]; Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market 
Process: An Austrian approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT 60 (1997) [hereinafter Entrepreneurial Discovery]; Israel 
M. Kirzner, The Alert and Creative Entrepreneur: A Clarification 32 SMALL BUS. ECON. 145 (2009). 
30 See, e.g., RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 271 (“The essence of enterprise is the specialization of the 
function of responsible direction of economic life, the neglected feature of which is the inseparability of 
these two elements, responsibility and control….  Any degree of effective exercise of judgment, or making 
decisions, is in a free society coupled with a corresponding degree of uncertainty-bearing, of taking the 
responsibility for those decisions.”). 
31 See RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 233 (“To preserve the distinction… between the measurable 
uncertainty and an unmeasurable one we may use the term ‘risk’ to designate the former and the term 
‘uncertainty’ for the latter….  The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is 
that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through 
calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the 
reason being in general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is 
in a high degree unique.”). 
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element of entrepreneurial responsibility.  He argues that entrepreneurship is the creative 
destruction of an existing economic equilibrium through the introduction of a new good, 
method of production, market, source of supply of materials, or organization of 
industry.32  Entrepreneurs are those who exercise their right to control such means of 
production, which is necessary for taking productive assets out of their existing usage, to 
allocate them for new ways of usage.33  Israel Kirzner, on the other hand, emphasizes a 
different – yet ultimately complementary – view of the entrepreneur.  He argues that 
entrepreneurship consists of bringing the market closer to equilibrium by discovering and 
exploiting previously overlooked opportunities to profit from an existing market 
inefficiency.34  The Kirznerian entrepreneur is alert to potential inefficiencies and acts 
boldly to correct the market by buying where prices are too low and selling where prices 
are too high.35 
Taken together, the three classic theories of entrepreneurship can yield a 
justifiable and workable three-part test – which I will refer to as the entrepreneurial 
responsibilities test – for courts to determine whether or not a worker is an employee.  
Rather than control, economic dependence, or the existence of entrepreneurial 
opportunities, the entrepreneurial responsibilities test focuses on whether or not the 
worker assumes entrepreneurial responsibility for her work.  Economic theories of 
                                                          
32 See, generally, THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. 
33 Id., at 68 (“command over means of production is necessary to the carrying out of new combinations.”). 
34 See, generally, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP. 
35 See, e.g., Entrepreneurial Discovery, at 70 (“The daring, alert entrepreneur discovers these earlier errors, 
buys where prices are ‘too low’ and sells where prices are ‘too high.’ In this way low prices are nudged 
higher, high prices are nudged lower; price discrepancies are narrowed in the equilibrative direction.”). 
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entrepreneurship can supply courts with three elements that are necessary for workers to 
assume entrepreneurial responsibility.  The first element is the Knightian element, and it 
looks to whether or not the worker assumes liability for economic uncertainty.  The 
second element is the Schumpeterian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker 
exercises control over the allocation of resources being combined to sell in the market.  
The third element is the Kirznerian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker 
participates in the market process by buying resources to sell in the market to earn a 
profit. 
Aside from its simplicity and wide-ranging applicability, the entrepreneurial 
responsibilities test is superior to other existing tests for employee status because it 
corresponds with the principle of fair play and the very reasons why we organize our 
economic activities within markets and firms.  The principle of fair play holds that, 
“when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus 
restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a 
right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission.”36  Both 
markets and firms are such joint enterprises that offer benefits and restrictions.  Markets 
subject economic actors to high-powered incentives, where the market actor is exposed to 
the entirety of full potential gains or losses that accompany a transaction.  The firm is an 
alternative arrangement that can shield economic actors from the incentive structure of 
the market by offering low-powered incentives, where the firm actor, i.e., the employee, 
                                                          
36 H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185 (1955).  See also John Rawls, 
Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (Sidney Hook, ed. 1964). 
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captures neither the full gains nor bears the full losses associated with her economic 
activity.37  Within such a scheme, I will argue, the principle of fair play suggests that it 
would be unfair for economic actors to benefit privately by circumventing the bifurcation 
of work into markets and firms in our economic system, which are intended for the 
benefit of all participants.  This principle can explain and justify a wide variety of the 
need for distinguishing employees from independent contractors in a parsimonious and 
unified way.  From traditional grounds of inquiry like vicarious liability and various 
worker protections to other tangentially related topics like owner property rights, the 
entrepreneurial responsibilities test can provide a principled way for courts to distinguish 
those who require the protection of the law. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I outline both the control test and the 
economic realities test and assess the underlying rationales that animate the tests and 
employee status.  I also discuss the entrepreneurial opportunities test as articulated by the 
D.C. Circuit and point to the need to examine the concept of entrepreneurship more 
closely and to justify it in a principled way.  In Part III, I provide the theoretical 
underpinning of the entrepreneurial responsibilities test by describing economic theories 
of entrepreneurship provided by Knight, Schumpeter, and Kirzner.  In Part IV, I 
introduce the entrepreneurial responsibilities test and connect the test’s three elements 
                                                          
37 High-powered incentives in markets can lead to costly transactions because they can encourage 
opportunistic behavior between transaction parties.  From a transactions cost economics perspective, firms 
offer an advantage over markets in reducing the costs associated with opportunism by substituting out high-
powered incentives for low-powered ones.  For more on the relative differences in the intensity of 
incentives within markets and firms and how it leads to the relative advantages of each arrangement, see, 
e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). 
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with the three theories of entrepreneurship described above.  I also apply the proposed 
test to worker misclassification in the sharing economy by showing how it fares better 
than other existing tests in classifying Uber drivers differently from taxi drivers.  Then, in 
Part V, I justify the entrepreneurial responsibilities test by describing the principle of fair 
play, discussing the distinction between markets and firms as alternate systems of 
economic organization, and connecting the structure of our economic system with the 
various ways in which worker misclassification can lead to unfairness.  I close in Part VI. 
II. EXISTING TESTS FOR EMPLOYEE STATUS 
Although distinguishing employees from other types of workers is critical for 
determining coverage under a variety of federal and state employment statutes, most 
statutes do not offer a satisfactory definition of who is an employee.  The Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA)38, for instance, simply defines a non-governmental employee as 
“any individual employed by an employer,”39 an employer as “any person acting directly 
or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,”40 and to employ 
as “to suffer or permit to work.”41  Other federal and state statutes have also typically 
followed the tactic of leaving the definitions open.42  As a result, courts have often looked 
                                                          
38 29 U.S.C. §§ 209-219 
39 Id. § 203(e)(1) 
40 Id. § 203(d) 
41 Id. § 203(g) 
42 For other federal statutes, see, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“The 
term “employee” means an individual employed by an employer”), the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (“The term “employee” means any individual employed by an 
employer”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (“The term 
“employee” means an individual employed by an employer.”).  For the vacuous definitions of employees in 
state statutes and the need for a legal test in such contexts, see, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 296 n.5, along 
with infra notes 63, 79, 80, and accompanying texts. 
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to a confusing and uncertain set of common law tests to determine whether a worker is an 
employee or an independent contractor.43 
This section assesses the two most commonly used tests for determining 
employee status – the control test rooted within the common law of agency and the 
economic realities test – and introduces the entrepreneurial opportunities test, which is a 
more recently articulated standard under the NLRA.  It will argue that the control test, 
while well-suited for adjudicating classification issues that pertain to tort liability, does 
not account for the myriad of purposes that motivate the various statutory protections for 
employees.  Furthermore, despite its purported focus on economic dependence, it will 
argue that the economic realities test corresponds to neither economic reality nor 
economic dependence.  Lastly, it will discuss the emergence of the entrepreneurial 
opportunities test and argue that it requires a greater examination of entrepreneurship and 
why it should matter for determining employee status. 
A) Assessing the control test 
The control test has its origins within the common law governing the master-
servant relationship in England.44  Under the English common law, “the master is 
answerable for the act of his servant, if done by his command, either expressly given, or 
                                                          
43 See, e.g., Kisner v. Jackson, 132 So. 90, 91 (Miss. 1931) (“There have been many attempts to define 
precisely what is meant by the term ‘independent contractor’; but the variations in the wording of these 
attempts have resulted only in establishing the proposition that it is not possible within the limitations of 
language to lay down a concise definition that will furnish any universal formula, covering all cases.”) 
44 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 302 (“The "master-servant" relationship… is widely regarded as the 
pre-industrial precursor of the "employer-employee" relationship”).  See also Gerald M. Stevens, The Test 
of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. R. 188 (1939). 
49 
 
 
implied.”45  The rationale for holding the master liable for the servant’s actions stemmed 
from the master’s oversight of his servants.  If an innkeeper’s servant robs a customer, for 
instance, the innkeeper is liable for the robbery because “there is a confidence reposed in 
him, that he will take care to provide honest servants.”46  And despite the dramatic 
change in labor relationships during the Industrial Revolution, English courts continued 
to look to the master-servant relationship as a guide for determining whether an employer 
or a worker was to be held liable for the torts of the worker.  And in looking to the 
master-servant relationship, English courts focused primarily on whether the employer 
exercised control over the worker’s actions.47 
The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor within the 
United States first became important as courts struggled to apply the common law 
governing the master-servant relationship within the context of worker’s compensation 
laws during the Industrial Revolution.48  As a result, American jurisprudence for 
classifying employees also relied on the English master-servant model predicated on 
whether the employee was acting under the employer’s command to determine the 
                                                          
45 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 417 (1765). 
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., Sadler v. Henlock, 119 Eng. Rep. 209, 212 (1855) (“The test here is, whether the defendant 
retained the power of controlling the work.  No distinction can be drawn from the circumstance of the man 
being employed at so much a day or by the job.  I think that here the relation was that of master and 
servant, not of contractor and contractee.”). 
48 See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 44, at 189 (“The relation of employer and employee is, of course, that 
formerly known under the title of master and servant.  The shift to the first terminology seems to have 
accompanied the development of workmen's compensation legislation, which makes clear the substantial 
identity of the two.  And it was in determining the scope of vicarious liability under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior that definition of this relation became important.”). 
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employer’s liability for the employee’s actions.49  And even today, the test for 
determining whether an employer ought to be liable for the employee’s actions typically 
rests on the principles of agency, which emphasize the element of control that the 
principal has over the agent.50  For instance, in Carter v. Reynolds, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court looked to the common law principles of agency to rule that an accounting 
firm was liable for the negligent driving of a part-time worker on her way home from 
work because its requirement that she drive her personal vehicle amounted to an exercise 
of control over her.51  Similarly, in St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff, the Texas Supreme Court 
ruled that a surgical resident involved in a malpractice case was an employee of a health 
organization formed for the purpose of operating a residency program based primarily on 
the degree of control that the foundation had over the resident.52 
Given its origins, the control test intuitively seems well-suited for determining 
whether or not the employer should be held vicariously liable for the actions of the 
worker.  Under the laws of agency, the employer is liable for the consequences of his 
                                                          
49 See, e.g., Pelow v. Oswego Const. Co., 162 A.D. 840, 841 (1916) (“an employer is made liable for 
personal injuries… by reason of the negligence of any person intrusted with authority to direct, control, or 
command any employe in the performance of the duty of such employe.”). 
50 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (“A servant is a person employed to perform 
services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the 
services is subject to the other's control or right to control.”).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 7.07(3)(a) (“an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and 
means of the agent’s performance of work”). 
51 Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 416, (2003) (“When an employer requires an employee to use a 
personal vehicle, it exercises meaningful control over the method of the commute by compelling the 
employee to foreswear the use of carpooling, walking, public transportation, or just being dropped off at 
work.”) 
52 St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 541 (Tex. 2002) (“The above discussion makes clear there are 
a number of factors affecting whether and when vicarious liability is appropriate. Paramount among those 
factors, however, is whether the person being held responsible can be said to have had a right to control the 
activities of the wrongdoer.”). 
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employee’s actions undertaken during the course of her employment,53 whereas he is 
generally not liable for the actions of an independent contractor.54  The reason for such a 
distinction is often thought to rest on the relative difference in the degrees of control 
exercised by the employer over the worker.55  When an employer sufficiently controls the 
worker, it seems intuitive that it is the employer and not the worker who is responsible 
for mitigating the harm to others.  When there is no such control, however, the worker 
can be thought to be acting independently from the employer and thus personally 
responsible for the harms caused to others.  Furthermore, when a worker acts under the 
control of the employer, the worker can be thought to be sufficiently connected to the will 
of the employer so as to express the employer’s will in his actions.56  And insofar as the 
worker is an instrumentality of the employer, it does not seem unreasonable to treat the 
two parties as one composite entity for apportioning liability.57 
However, the application of the control test is no longer limited to determining 
whether or not the employer ought to be vicariously liable for the actions of the worker.  
                                                          
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (“An employer is subject to liability for torts committed by 
employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”). 
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (“the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for 
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410 – 429 for exceptions to this general rule, which include various 
circumstances related to the wrongful actions or omissions of the employer. 
55 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt b (“The explanation for it most commonly given 
is that, since the employer has no power of control over the manner in which the work is to be done by the 
contractor, it is to be regarded as the contractor's own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the 
proper party to be charged with the responsibility of preventing the risk, and bearing and distributing it.”). 
56 See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 417 (“[the master’s] negligence is a kind of implied consent to 
the robbery”). 
57 See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, at 187 (1995).  See also Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 
P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) (“Employees' acts sufficiently connected with the enterprise are in effect 
considered as deeds of the enterprise itself.”). 
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In fact, unless otherwise specified by statute or case law, courts will typically default to 
the common law of agency to determine whether a worker is an employee or an 
independent contractor.58  For instance, federal courts focus on  thirteen factors that 
pertain to “the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product 
is accomplished”59 for the purposes of determining employee status under a variety of 
federal statutes, including the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA),60 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)61, and the NLRA.62  State courts have also 
followed suit and typically rely on the federal common law test for a wide variety of state 
statutes involving employee protections that mirror the federal statutes as well.63 
Unfortunately, the focus on the employer’s control over the worker does not make 
much sense when applied outside the vicarious liability context.  For instance, the 
purpose of ERISA is, among others, to protect “the interests of participants in private 
                                                          
58 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (“In the past, when 
Congress has used the term “employee” without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to 
describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”). 
59 Id., at 751-752 (“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of 
agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished.  Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring 
and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the 
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
60 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
61 See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003). 
62 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968). 
63 See, e.g., Strother v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1996) (“we look to 
federal cases in those areas that have addressed whether an individual labeled as a partner can be 
considered an employee for the purpose of employment discrimination laws.”).  See also Frishberg v. 
Esprit De Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 793, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Since New York law distinguishes between 
employees and independent contractors in a sufficiently similar manner, the court will use the federal test 
for both state and federal claims.”). 
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pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the 
soundness of such plans.”64  It is difficult to imagine a justifiable connection between the 
employer’s control over the worker and the fairness of worker retirement plans.  
Nevertheless, the control test allows employers to deny revoke employment benefits for a 
long-time worker who would have otherwise been protected under ERISA.65  The 
connection between control and the aims of other statutes for which the control test is 
used – whether it is the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities66 or the correction of the inequalities of bargaining power between capital and 
labor67 – are similarly too attenuated to justify the control test as an appropriate rule for 
determining employee status. 
Furthermore, the very notion of control is problematic for courts attempting to 
distinguish employees from independent contractors.  What does it mean for an employer 
to control an employee?  Within the control test, the traditional meaning of control 
pertains to the employer’s supervision of the means and manner of production in addition 
                                                          
64 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c). 
65 In the events leading up to Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, the trial court first granted summary 
judgment to the employer after determining that the worker did not qualify for employee status under the 
control test.  The rationale for the holding can be found in an opinion that overturned it.  Darden v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Under such traditional common law 
principles, Darden most probably would not qualify as an employee.”). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (“It is the purpose of this chapter--(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;(2) to provide 
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities”). 
67 29 U.S.C. § 151 (“The inequality of bargaining power between employees… and employers… 
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce….  It is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to 
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing”). 
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to its results.68  However, because the distinction between the means and results of a task 
depends on how narrowly the task is defined, control test can yield different results 
purely based on the definition of the worker’s task.69  Furthermore, because a narrow 
specification of the results of a task can lead to an effective control over the means of 
carrying it out, the control test allows for a great deal of manipulation by clever 
employers.70  Lastly, because control can be exercised in subtle and informal ways, it is 
difficult for courts to determine whether or not the employer exercised control or had the 
right of control over the worker, particularly when control determines employee status 
across the board rather than within the particular context of the legal dispute.71  Given not 
only the misfit between the purpose of the control test and its subsequent application but 
also issues with taking control as a primary determining factor for employee status, then, 
it comes as no surprise that courts have continued to look for other options. 
                                                          
68 See, e.g., C.C. E., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Although this right-to-control 
test requires an evaluation of all the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the company and 
the worker, the extent of the actual supervision exercised by a putative employer over ‘the means and 
manner’ of the workers' performance is the most important element to be considered.  It is important, 
however, to distinguish such company supervision from company efforts merely to monitor, evaluate, and 
improve the results or ends of the worker's performance.  Supervision of the means and manner of the 
worker's performance renders him an employee, while steps taken to monitor, evaluate, and improve the 
results of his work, without supervision over the means by and manner in which he does his work, indicates 
that the worker is an independent contractor.”) (citations, italicization, and internal quotation markets 
omitted). 
69 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 340 (“A plumber, for example, might be a contractor if installing good 
plumbing is a discrete end the parties seek to achieve, and where the owner or general contractor wishes to 
have no involvement in the details of the plumbing.  Conversely,… [i]f building a house is the goal,… there 
is an argument that the plumber's entire work is but a detail under the general contractor's control, and the 
plumber is therefore an employee.”). 
70 See, e.g., Tomassetti, supra note 26, at 1099 (“the means-ends standard is amenable to nearly infinite 
manipulation. Courts can always find some residual discretion left to the putative contractor, and they can 
describe the "ends" at the level of detail necessary for the employer to maintain complete control.”). 
71 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 340-342. 
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B) Assessing the economic realities test 
Even while courts were frequently looking to the master-servant model and its 
emphasis on control, some courts were looking at a more expansive set of criteria to 
distinguish employees from independent contractors.  In Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. 
Yensavage, for instance, a coal mine refused to pay statutorily required compensation to 
its miners for work-related injuries because its miners were merely independent 
contractors who wholly assumed the risk of their activities.72  In holding that the mine 
owed “the duties of a master to a servant” to its miners, Judge Learned Hand looked to 
the economic disadvantage of the miners relative to the mine along with the purpose of 
the statute.73  Since Lehigh Valley, courts have attempted at times to look to the purpose 
of the relevant statute to hold that the determination of employee status ought to look to 
the economic relationship between the employer and the worker rather than to the formal 
elements of control and the common law of agency, with limited success.74 
And despite the focus on the control test in the past few decades, the part of the 
Lehigh Valley approach that looks to the economic relationship between the employer 
                                                          
72 218 F. 547 (2d Cir. 1914). 
73 Id., at 552–53 (“the whole purpose of such statutes… are meant to protect those who are at an economic 
disadvantage….  It is absurd to class such a miner as an independent contractor in the only sense in which 
that phrase is here relevant. He has no capital, no financial responsibility. He is himself as dependent upon 
the conditions of his employment as the company fixes them as are his helpers.”). 
74 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (“Whether, given the intended 
national uniformity, the term ‘employee’ includes such workers as these newsboys must be answered 
primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation.”) and United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 
713 (1947) (“We concluded that, since that end was the elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife, 
‘employees' included workers who were such as a matter of economic reality.”).  Both Hearst and Silk, 
along with their focus on statutory purpose, were later overturned in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 
503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
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and the worker – now known as the economic realities test – has persisted within a 
narrow range of cases that arise out of FLSA’s definition of employees.  As noted above, 
FLSA defines the verb “to employ” to include “to suffer or permit to work.”75  Due to 
this expansive definition, federal courts have applied what is now known as the economic 
realities test to determine employee status for claims arising out of FLSA76 and, because 
it utilizes FLSA’ definitions of employ and employee,77 the Family Medical Leave Act of 
1993 (FMLA).78  Many state courts have also followed suit and applied the economic 
realities test for claims relevant to wage and hour protections.79  Other states adopt the 
economic realities test for other claims as well.80 
The exact application of the economic realities test varies depending on 
jurisdiction.  Some jurisdictions look to a limited set of factors such as “(1) control of a 
worker's duties, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the right to hire and fire and the right to 
discipline, and (4) the performance of the duties as an integral part of the employer's 
                                                          
75 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
76 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (U.S. 1992) (FLSA’s expansive 
definition “stretches the meaning of “employee” to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under 
a strict application of traditional agency law principles.”).  See also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y 
of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (“The test of employment under the Act is one of economic reality”) 
(quotations omitted). 
77 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (“The terms ‘employ’, ‘employee’, and ‘State’ have the same meanings given such 
terms in subsections (c), (e), and (g) of section 203 of this title.”). 
78 See, e.g., Nichols v. All Points Transp. Corp. of Michigan, 364 F. Supp. 2d 621, 630 (E.D. Mich. 2005) 
(“Because the statutory definition of FMLA, unlike the definition found in ERISA, incorporates the FLSA's 
broader definition of ‘employee’ and ‘employ,’ the court will continue to apply the “economic realities” 
test as described by the Sixth Circuit”). 
79 See, e.g., Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Case Farms, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 312, 314, (1997) 
(“The North Carolina Wage and Hour Act is modeled after the Fair Labor Standards Act…. Several factors 
used by federal jurisdictions to determine ‘employee’ status under the FLSA are equally useful in the 
context of the Wage and Hour Act”). 
80 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Mobil Oil Corp., 827 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (“Michigan courts 
rely on the ‘economic realities test’ to establish the existence of an employer/employee relationship.”). 
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business towards the accomplishment of a common goal.”81  Other jurisdictions take a 
more expansive approach to cover factors such as “1) the nature and degree of the alleged 
employer's control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged 
employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; 3) the 
alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his 
employment of workers; 4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 5) the 
degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; 6) the extent to which the 
service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.”82  Whatever the 
specific test, however, the general thrust of the economic realities test is intended to look 
beyond a formal specification of factors to determine the employee’s economic 
dependence on the employer.83 
One rationale offered to justify the economic realities test is that those who are 
economically dependent on their employers are particularly vulnerable in the market due 
to their lack of bargaining power, whereas those who have greater bargaining power 
would only be limited by mandatory regulation on what they can negotiate in light of 
their preferences.84  For instance, low-skilled laborers are dependent on their employers 
                                                          
81 Askew v. Macomber, 398 Mich. 212, 217–18, (1976). 
82 Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987). 
83 See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 11, at 112-113 (“Control of employment opportunities is the linchpin of the 
economic realities test, viewed from the perspective of the employee's dependency on the employer and 
vulnerability to discriminatory conduct.  This focus requires an analysis of the economic terms of particular 
relationships on a case-by-case basis, rather than on the basis of a catalogue of immutable factors.  The 
flexibility of this analysis is essential to avoid the rigidity of the common law test and to accommodate the 
present range of employment relationships and the new patterns that may evolve in the future.”). 
84 See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (J. 
Easterbrook concurring) (“Indeed, the details of independent contractor relations are fundamentally 
contractual.  Firms can structure their dealings as ‘employment’ or ‘independent contractor’ to maximize 
the efficiency of incentives to work, monitor, and take precautions….  The FLSA is designed to defeat 
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because they lack the ability to obtain higher paying jobs elsewhere.  This lack of 
bargaining power makes them vulnerable to an employer who wishes to maximize his 
profits by forcing his workers to endure long hours for little pay.  Since low-skilled 
laborers would have no choice but to accept such an arrangement, it might be appropriate 
for the law to institute minimum standards out of respect for worker rights, dignity, or 
autonomy.  A more skilled worker, on the other hand, has sufficient bargaining power to 
walk away from such an arrangement.  If a more skilled worker agrees to work long 
hours for little pay, the theory goes, it must be because he enjoys the work or has other 
valid reasons that courts ought to respect.  Mandatory standards will only frustrate the 
high-skilled worker’s ability to negotiate for what she prefers. 
In theory, a test for employee status that emphasized the economic dependence of 
a worker to the employer could go a long way to address a variety of purposes that 
animate the patchwork of labor and employment law in the United States.  For instance, 
FLSA addresses substandard labor conditions,85 and for reasons mentioned above, the 
economic dependence of a worker could be a good proxy for those who lack the 
bargaining power to negotiate for better working conditions.  Similarly, the NLRA, 
which directly addresses the inequality of power between employers and workers,86 could 
benefit from limiting required collective bargaining rights to those who lack the market 
power to demand favorable terms on their own.  Even cases involving vicarious liability 
                                                          
rather than implement contractual arrangements….  In this sense ‘economic reality’ rather than contractual 
form is indeed dispositive.  The migrant workers are selling nothing but their labor.  They have no physical 
capital and little human capital to vend.”). 
85 29 U.S.C. § 202. 
86 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
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could benefit from a focus on the relative lack of bargaining power among workers.  A 
worker with relatively high bargaining power could demand that the employer indemnify 
her for potential harms caused by her actions.  The structure of the allocation of risk 
within such a context could depend on the particular context to lead to the most efficient 
outcome.  A worker with little bargaining power, on the other hand, has no ability to 
bargaining for indemnification.  Since an employer would always prefer to protect 
himself against liability for the actions of his workers, economically dependent workers 
would be forced to agree to a contract that indemnifies the employer, even if it would be 
socially inefficient to do so.  Furthermore, since workers with little bargaining power 
often have little resources to pay damages, victims of their torts would also have little 
recourse if the law allowed employers to shield themselves through such indemnification 
contracts. 
Unfortunately, there is a significant difference between economic dependence and 
economic reality.  Many low-wage laborers have little bargaining power but are not 
particularly dependent on one employer precisely because they must often go from one 
employer to another just to find work.87  Contingent workers and others on the fringes of 
the labor market are often particularly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, yet they 
would not be covered under the economic realities test because they are not dependent on 
any one employer either.88  Conversely, a highly skilled independent contractor could be 
                                                          
87 See, e.g., Baker v. Flint Eng'g & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1443 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (“For example, a 
low-skilled worker who regularly shifts jobs (e.g., fast food jobs) would never be dependent upon a single 
employer, or even a single industry, for annual subsistence.  The worker would necessarily be classified as 
an independent contractor for purposes of the FLSA and would not be entitled to overtime pay.”) 
88 See, e.g., Befort, supra note 11. 
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very dependent on one employer, and an employer can come to depend significantly on a 
worker.89  A supplier of a specialized part for a large manufacturer, for instance, could 
become economically dependent on the manufacturer if the orders are so large that he has 
no time or capacity for any other clients.  And the manufacturer could become dependent 
on the supplier if there are no other substitutes immediately available.  In fact, economists 
argue that the very purpose of integrating into a firm, i.e., to turn an independent 
contractor relationship into an employment relationship, is to eliminate the economic 
dependence of the employer on the supplier.90 
More importantly, the economic realities test does not really capture economic 
dependence nor economic reality.  In practice, the economic realities test does not operate 
much differently from the control test.91  The economic realities test is almost always 
formalized into discrete factors for analysis.  But both the control and economic realities 
tests tend to share similar factors for analysis.  Of the six factors to be examined within 
the economic realities test used by federal courts, for instance, at least five of them are 
also considered within the thirteen-factor control test used by the federal courts as well.92  
                                                          
89 See supra note 13. 
90 Because economic relationships often require making an investment that is specific to the relationship, a 
worker can hold up the employer for more money once the relationship-specific investment has been made.  
For instance, a supplier could obtain the reliance of a large manufacturing company by undercutting 
competitors and then demand more money from the manufacturer at some time later once it has developed 
much of its manufacturing processes around the supplier.  Employing the supplier as a part of the 
manufacturing company, i.e., to hire her as an employee, on the other hand, eliminates the risk of being 
held up in this way.  See, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975).  See also 
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
91 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
92 See supra note 82 for the six factors of the economic realities test and supra note 59 for the thirteen 
factors of the control test.  The only factor within the economic realities test arguably not covered by the 
control test refers to the employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill.  The 
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Furthermore, reducing the test into discrete factors has often lead to courts conducting a 
factor analysis without examining the facts comprehensively, thus neglecting the very 
point of the economic realities test, which is to look beyond formal elements of 
employment to capture the underlying economic relationship for each particular case.93  
Lastly, insofar as the economic realities test is a formal factor test, most courts continue 
to look to the element of managerial control as an important – and often the first – factor 
to be considered.94  Given the traditional importance of the control test, inclusion of the 
control element can often influence courts to focus on it rather than on the broad 
economic dependence of the worker.95 
In general, there is a tension that is inherent within a legal test that asks judges to 
look beyond formalistic elements and, instead, look to some underlying economic reality 
of the relationship without any further guidance.  On one hand, formalism can undermine 
the expansive aim of the economic realities test, as noted above.  On the other hand, a test 
that asks courts to conduct a case-by-case analysis of the economic relationship without 
                                                          
lack of overlap is arguable because the skill required for the job is one of the thirteen factors of the control 
test. 
93 See, e.g., Linder, supra note 11, at 208 (“Instead of becoming the centerpiece of purpose-driven 
interpretation under the FLSA, this ‘economic reality of dependence’ test has itself degenerated into a 
disembodied laundry list of factors.  Judges, regardless of whether they wish to include or exclude the 
workers in question, unimaginatively check off these factors without embedding the test in the act's 
purpose”) (footnotes omitted).  See also Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 
1543 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“We should abandon these unfocused ‘factors’ and start 
again.”). 
94 See, e.g., supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.  See also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 
338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008) (“To aid us in this inquiry, we consider five non-exhaustive factors: (1) the degree 
of control exercised by the alleged employer”). 
95 See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 11, at 110 (“The court's elevation of the control factor to a position of critical 
importance, however, suggests that this analysis easily could be oversimplified to an examination of this 
factor alone, thus overshadowing the court's effort to suggest a broader framework of analysis.”). 
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any reliance on formal guidance risks increasing the levels of unpredictability and 
variation across jurisdictions.  Both the control and the economic realities tests are 
already bloated with too many factors, and they have led to significant uncertainty over 
how a judge will actually adjudicate a particular case.96  If a test for employee status is to 
strike the balance between economic reality and formal guidance, it must rely on simple 
criteria that reflect the actual economic reality of employee relationships. 
C) The emergence of the entrepreneurial opportunities test 
One recent response to the limitations of the control and economic realities tests 
discussed above has been an increased focus on entrepreneurship as a litmus test for 
employee status.  To be sure, courts have looked to entrepreneurship as a guidepost for 
employee classification for as long as there has been a need for employee classification.97  
But these cases almost always understood the entrepreneurial element as a proxy for 
employer control.  For instance, The Restatement of Employment Law interprets the 
element of employer control as important to distinguish employees from independent 
contractors because it precludes the worker from being able to exercise entrepreneurial 
control to further her interests.98  Under this formulation, entrepreneurial control pertains 
                                                          
96 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1. 
97 See, e.g., Barnes v. Indian Ref. Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S.W.2d 620, 624 (1939) (noting that the lack of 
employer control over the worker indicated that he was “to all intents and purposes an entrepreneur”); 
N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few problems in the law have given greater 
variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly 
an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.”). 
98 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt d (“the employer's power to control the manner and 
means by which an individual renders services is sufficient to make the service provider an employee.  
Where the employer exercises such power, the service provider generally cannot further his or her 
economic interest by exercising entrepreneurial authority”). 
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to the typical employer’s control over his business, “including whether to hire and where 
to assign assistants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether 
and when to provide service to other customers.”99  As a result, much of the attention to 
entrepreneurship had, until recently, been on the element of employer control and the 
ways in which it impacted workers.100 
However, a recent line of employee classification cases within the D.C. Circuit 
has resulted in what has come to be known as the entrepreneurial opportunities test.  
Under this inquiry, the focus is placed on whether or not the worker has an 
entrepreneurial opportunity to profit.  An entrepreneurial opportunity refers to a worker’s 
“opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just harder” by taking on economic 
risk.101  An opportunity arises from a realistic right to exercise discretion for potential 
profit, and the actual exercise of the right is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether the 
opportunity exists.102  Thus, the D.C. circuit found that delivery drivers for FedEx Home 
Delivery were independent contractors “by evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity” 
because they possessed the contractual right to hire drivers for their routes and sell their 
routes, despite the fact that only a few drivers actually ever did so.103  On the other hand, 
                                                          
99 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01(b). 
100 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 Reporters’ Notes (“The requirement that the 
employment relationship effectively prevent the employee from rendering services as part of an 
independent business ties the entrepreneurial-control test to the right-to-control test.”). 
101 Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780. 
102 FedEx Home Delivery, at 502 (noting that “the failure to take advantage of an opportunity is beside the 
point.”).  See also C.C. E., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 60 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Likewise it is the worker's 
retention of the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity rather than his regular exercise of that right that is 
most relevant for the purpose of determining whether he is an independent contractor.”). 
103 FedEx Home Delivery, at 504.  Of the 36 drivers working for the two terminals in FedEx Home 
Delivery, only three drivers had multiple routes, and there have ever been two sales of routes. See FedEx 
Home Delivery, Brief for the National Labor Relations Board, 2008 WL 4425831 (C.A.D.C.), at 6 and 21. 
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the court ruled that drivers in a different context “lacked all entrepreneurial opportunity” 
and were thus employees because, although they owned their vehicles, they were not 
permitted to hire other drivers or use their vehicles for others jobs.104 
On its face, the entrepreneurial opportunities test is a “subtle refinement” of the 
traditional control test rooted in the common law of agency.105  Under the test, “all the 
considerations at common law remain in play,” and it is only “in cases where some 
factors cut one way and some the other” that entrepreneurial opportunities provide “an 
important animating principle by which to evaluate those factors.”106  However, since 
almost all cases will involve some factors cutting one way and some the other, the 
entrepreneurial opportunities test effectively constitutes a significant departure from the 
control test rather than a mere refinement.  Previous explicit inclusions of the element of 
entrepreneurship in the control test, to the extent that it was included at all, was as one 
among many factors to interpret the facts in light of the test’s overall emphasis on 
employer control.107  On the other hand, the entrepreneurial opportunities test treats the 
element of entrepreneurship as the primary theoretical lens itself through which courts 
should interpret all of the common law factors.108  In other words, the entrepreneurial 
                                                          
104 Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780-781. 
105 FedEx Home Delivery, at 497. 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 580 F.2d 966, 972–73 (9th Cir. 1978) (“In 
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, the Board and the courts apply general 
agency principles….  Other factors which this court has considered are the entrepreneurial aspects of the 
individual's business”).  See also N.L.R.B. v. Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912, 919–20 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (“Stated somewhat differently, whether agents are employees or independent contractors 
requires application of a control test which takes into account the degree of supervision, the entrepreneurial 
interests of the agent and any other relevant factors.”). 
108 See, e.g., Judge Garland’s dissent in FedEx Home Delivery, at 508-509 (J. Garland dissenting) (“My 
colleagues cite only one case from this (or any) Circuit, our 2002 opinion in Corporate Express, for the 
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opportunities test effectively abandons control as the primary focus of the test for 
employee status and looks to the element of entrepreneurship as a replacement for 
control.109 
Yet, despite this recent interest in entrepreneurship, there has been very little 
discussion about what entrepreneurship is and why it ought to matter for employee status.  
The D.C. Circuit seems to understand entrepreneurship as economic risk taking, where 
the entrepreneur assumes both the potential profits and losses associated with running a 
business.110  But risk taking cannot be the sole defining characteristic of an entrepreneur 
because all economic activity involves risk.  All investors take economic risk and stand to 
profit or suffer losses from their investment, but to call every person who makes 
investments for a living an entrepreneur would dilute the term into uselessness.  Even 
more importantly, virtually all workers take economic risks regularly.  A worker takes a 
risk when making a bold proposal to his employer.  He stands to gain from his actions in 
the way of a promotion and/or a raise if his proposal is a good one, and he will suffer 
losses in the form of a pay cut or company discipline if his proposal turns out to be a dud.  
Since the very question the courts must answer is whether a worker is an employee or an 
                                                          
proposition that entrepreneurial opportunity has… become the emphasis of the independent contractor 
test….  I do not dispute that theirs is one fair reading of that opinion….  But Corporate Express did not 
purport to overrule Supreme Court, Circuit, and Board precedent….  Corporate Express can also be read as 
merely holding that the Board was reasonable in determining that entrepreneurial opportunity tipped the 
balance in that case….  There was certainly nothing in the NLRB's opinion in Corporate Express to suggest 
that entrepreneurial opportunity had become the focus of the Board's own analysis.  To the contrary, the 
Board simply followed its traditional approach of examining the common-law factors.”). 
109 See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, at 497 (“In other words, ‘control’ was close to what we were trying to 
capture, but it wasn't a perfect concurrence.  It was as if the sheet music just didn't quite match the tune.”). 
110 See, e.g., supra note 25. 
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independent contractor, how is the court to distinguish whether an economic risk involves 
profits and losses or raises and pay cuts?  Without more elaboration on what kind of 
economic risk counts and why, the simple evocation of economic risk taking cannot 
distinguish independent contractors from employees. 
What is needed, then, is an examination of the concept of entrepreneurship itself 
along with what, if anything, can be gained from its use in employee classification.  
Luckily, there is a century’s worth of material that examines the concept of 
entrepreneurship.  The next section will draw on these theories of entrepreneurship to 
sharpen the understanding of what constitutes entrepreneurship.  Once the concept of 
entrepreneurship is clarified, we will be in a better position to assess its usefulness for 
employee classification. 
III. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
This section links together three classic economic theories of entrepreneurship to 
show their potential for informing legal tests for employee status.  The overarching 
framework is provided by Frank Knight’s theory that entrepreneurship refers to a 
specialized economic function that bears entrepreneurial responsibility, which refers to 
the entrepreneur’s ultimate responsibility for a business enterprise in light of economic 
uncertainty.  Unlike other types of risk, economic uncertainty refers to the risks 
associated with future supply and demand in the market, which is not knowable in any 
probable sense.  In a world full of uncertainty, the entrepreneur is someone who 
possesses superior confidence and/or knowledge about market conditions and exposes 
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himself to potential losses in the market so that he may be in a position to realize a pure 
profit from his risk-taking. 
From this overall view of the entrepreneur, three insights can be gleaned from the 
economic theories of entrepreneurship provided by Knight, Joseph Schumpeter, and 
Israel Kirzner.  First, an important insight from Knight’s account of economic uncertainty 
is that the entrepreneur provides a guarantee to others for potential losses associated with 
the business enterprise.  Whereas laborers and investors forgo the opportunity to earn a 
pure profit by accepting a fixed wage and a market-determined return on investment, 
respectively, entrepreneurs expose themselves to potential losses in pursuit of profit.  
Second, Schumpeter’s account of the entrepreneur emphasizes the control element of 
assuming entrepreneurial responsibility.  The entrepreneur within the Schumpeterian 
account disrupts the status quo by carrying on new combinations of resources.  And 
because control over resources is necessary to combine them in new ways, the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur must exercise control over the allocation of resources being 
combined to sell in the market.  Third, Kirzner argues that entrepreneurs bring the market 
closer to equilibrium by discovering and exploiting potential opportunities for arbitrage.  
Within this view, the entrepreneurial function consists of exposing a previously unnoticed 
potential for a more efficient allocation of resources by buying resources to sell in the 
market in the pursuit of profits. 
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A) Knight and uncertainty 
Despite the importance of and frequent references to the entrepreneur in 
economics and economic history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were no 
notable contributions in economic theory about the entrepreneur until Frank Knight and 
Joseph Schumpeter in the early 20th Century.111  Knight’s work on the entrepreneur was 
concerned primarily with what he calls “the problem of profit.”112  Economic theory 
postulates that competition should have the tendency to bring the allocation of resources 
to an equilibrium, i.e., a condition where the value of resources is equal to their cost, and 
thus bring profits to zero.  Nevertheless, Knight recognized that profit never disappeared 
in real life.  Why do entrepreneurs continue to profit from their activity when economic 
theory postulates that they should not? 
One important aspect of the problem of profit is how it is defined.113  Profit is 
often used to describe the residual between the total revenues and costs of a business.  
This, however, is accounting profit, and its existence does not necessarily pose a problem 
for economists because it can encompass not only profit but also the entrepreneur’s 
                                                          
111 See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory, 58 AM. ECON. R. 64, 64 (1968) 
(“The entrepreneur is at the same time one of the most intriguing and one of the most elusive characters in 
the cast that constitutes the subject of economic analysis….  Only Schumpeter and, to some degree, 
Professor Knight succeeded in infusing him with life and in assigning to him a specific area of activity to 
any extent commensurate with his acknowledged importance.”).  See also James H. Soltow, The 
Entrepreneur in Economic History, 58 AM. ECON. R. 84, 84 (1968) (“Economic historians of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries devoted considerable attention to businessmen and firms….  But 
they did not attempt to define explicitly the role of the entrepreneur in economic change, although they 
appear to have implicitly assumed that he was an important agent.”). 
112 RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 18-19. 
113 For more on Knight’s distinction between accounting profit and pure profit within the context of his 
discussion on the problem of profit and entrepreneurship, see, Frank H. Knight, Profit and Entrepreneurial 
Functions, 2 J. ECON. HIST. 126 (1942).  See, more generally, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT. 
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wages and the return on the entrepreneur’s capital investment.  An entrepreneur’s wage is 
the rate of compensation set ex ante by the market for the cost of the entrepreneur’s 
services.  The return on capital investment is the cost of capital that is set by the market.  
For instance, suppose that you made a $1,000,000 investment in your own business last 
year.  In the past year, the total revenues for your business reached $2,000,000, you paid 
$1,800,000 in expenses, and the depreciation on your assets were $100,000.  In such a 
scenario, you would have realized $100,000 in accounting profit.  However, the $100,000 
that is left over to you is commingled with your own wages and return on capital.  
Suppose that, when you started your business, the expected rate of return for a 
$1,000,000 investment was $50,000.  Suppose further that the yearly salary for someone 
with your skillset was $80,000 when you started your business.  In such an instance, by 
running your own business, you lost $30,000 since you could have earned $130,000 by 
investing your money elsewhere and working for someone else.  The problem of profit 
arises from the existence of pure profit, which is a portion of accounting profit that 
cannot be attributed to the entrepreneur’s wages or return on capital.  For instance, if the 
total revenues of your business reached $2,500,000 rather than $2,000,000, your 
accounting profit would have been $600,000, with $470,000 in pure profits.  The problem 
of profit, then, is explaining why the market allows for the extra $470,000 because the 
margin implies an inefficiency in the market for allocating capital and/or labor.  Why are 
workers and/or investors unable to demand higher compensation until pure profits reach 
zero if there is competition among entrepreneurs for labor and/or capital? 
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Knight’s answer to the problem of profit was that competition in the real market is 
imperfect due to a limitation of human knowledge stemming from economic 
uncertainty.114  Economic uncertainty refers to a special type of risk in the market.  
Normal risk follows a known distribution of potential outcomes and thus can be insured 
against.  The risk of a fire in one’s warehouse, for instance, is a normal risk, and the 
compensation that an insurance company receives from taking on the risk of a warehouse 
fire consists of a return on the capital it has available to pay out claims for warehouse 
fires and is not a form of pure profit.  Uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to risks 
associated with circumstances for which there is no known distribution of potential 
outcomes.  Economic uncertainty refers to the risks associated with the need to plan ex 
ante for a production process aimed to satisfy future demand in the market.115  Knight 
argued that a market devoid of economic uncertainty would result in no pure profit since 
the probable losses associated with anticipating future supply and demand could be 
quantified into known fixed costs that others can use to bring the costs of the 
entrepreneur’s wages and investment into equilibrium with the rest of the market.  Under 
uncertainty, however, there can be no known cost of anticipating future supply and 
demand in the market.  As a result, the market cannot accurately price the wages and 
                                                          
114 See, generally, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT.  For a detailed discussion of risk and uncertainty, see 
Chapters VII and VIII. 
115 Id., at 237-238 (“At the bottom of the uncertainty problem in economics is the forward-looking 
character of the economic process itself.  Goods are produced to satisfy wants; the production of goods 
requires time, and two elements of uncertainty are introduced, corresponding to two different kinds of 
foresight which must be exercised….  The producer, then, must estimate (1) the future demand which he is 
striving to satisfy and (2) the future results of his operations in attempting to satisfy that demand.”). 
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investment of the entrepreneur,116 and the entrepreneur has a chance to earn pure profit 
by taking on the responsibility of anticipating future supply and demand. 
Under Knight’s theory, the entrepreneur is someone who attempts to earn a pure 
profit by assuming the responsibility for economic uncertainty.  If the markets were 
absent of uncertainty, even workers who help to anticipate future supply and demand by 
allocating capital and labor would only be considered laborers – and not entrepreneurs – 
since they would only be earning a wage for their work.  The existence of economic 
uncertainty, however, makes unknowable what will be the efficient allocation of 
resources for future consumption.  Under such conditions, there will be some who, for 
reasons of superior knowledge, judgment, and/or confidence, are willing to assume the 
responsibility of forecasting future demand in the pursuit of pure profit.  The resulting 
arrangement will be a “system under which the confident and venturesome ‘assume the 
risk’ or ‘insure’ the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income in 
return for an assignment of the actual results.”117  Those in the former group, according to 
Knight, are known as entrepreneurs, and they assume the responsibility for confronting 
economic uncertainty by guaranteeing others a specified return for their investment or 
effort.  And by providing such a guarantee, the entrepreneur stands to gain pure profits 
when market conditions are more favorable than anticipated and to suffer financial losses 
when market conditions are less favorable than anticipated. 
                                                          
116 Id., at 284 (noting that pure profit is “a margin of error in calculation on the part of the non-
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who do not force the successful entrepreneurs to pay as much for 
productive services as they could be forced to pay.”). 
117 Id., at 269-270. 
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B) Schumpeter and creative destruction 
While Knight was examining the entrepreneur through the lens of uncertainty and 
profit, Joseph Schumpeter was concurrently examining the entrepreneur as part of his 
inquiry into economic development.118  If the market process consists of reaching an 
equilibrium of efficient resource allocation, how and why does the economy undergo 
development and change?119  Schumpeter criticized existing economic theory as static 
and only capable of analyzing what he called the circular flow of economic life.120  
Within the circular flow, the market adjusts to new information and tends to bring 
resource allocation to an equilibrium.  What static theories do not capture, though, is the 
element of dynamism within economic development.  Economic development consists of 
a disruption to the existing circular flow by the adjustment of the very channels of the 
circular flow itself.  When cars change lanes to adjust to an accident on a highway, for 
instance, they are adjusting to changes in information within the circular flow of traffic.  
Similarly, the circular flow in the economy adjusts to changing conditions of supply and 
demand.  Economic development, on the other hand, is akin to a change in the highway 
itself, and it proceeds by what Schumpeter famously described later as an ongoing 
                                                          
118 THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT was first published in German in 1911 and translated into English 
in 1934.  RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT was published in 1921.  Schumpeter’s work on the entrepreneur 
continued through CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (published in 1942), the Creative Response 
(published in 1947), and others. 
119 See, e.g., THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, at 64 (“Development in our sense is a distinct 
phenomenon, entirely foreign to what may be observed in the circular flow or in the tendency to 
equilibrium.  It is spontaneous and discontinuous change in the channels of the flow, disturbance of 
equilibrium, which forever alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing.”). 
120 See, e.g., id., at 66 (Arguing that existing theory “describes economic life from the standpoint of the 
economic system's tendency towards an equilibrium position...and may be described as an adaptation to 
data existing at any time...  These tools only fail...where economic life itself changes its own data by fits 
and starts.”). 
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process of creative destruction, where the existing circular flow is disrupted and then 
replaced with a new circular flow.121 
For Schumpeter, the central player within economic development is the 
entrepreneur.  The entrepreneur’s unique role within the process of economic 
development is to disrupt the existing circular flow and replace it with a new one by the 
carrying out of new combinations of resources.122  All economic production, according to 
Schumpeter, consists of combining resources,123 and the carrying out of new 
combinations can consist of a variety of activities, including the introduction of goods or 
methods, the exploitation of new resources, or creating/organizing a market or an 
industry.124  By innovatively carrying out new combinations, the entrepreneur drives 
economic development through a process of creative destruction.  Thus, Schumpeter’s 
definition of the entrepreneur is functional.  An entrepreneur is defined not by who a 
person is but by what a person does, and the mere possession of a right or the opportunity 
to carry out new combination does not make one an entrepreneur.125  Furthermore, the 
                                                          
121 See, e.g., CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY at 83 (“The opening up of new markets, foreign or 
domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate 
the same process of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes 
the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. 
This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism”). 
122 See, e.g., THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, at 74 (“The carrying out of new combinations we call 
‘enterprise’; the individuals whose function it is to carry them out we call ‘entrepreneurs.’”).  Schumpeter 
also defines entrepreneurs in a slightly different way in Creative Response, at 151 (“Seen in this light, the 
entrepreneur and his function are not difficult to conceptualize: the defining characteristic is simply the 
doing of new things or the doing of things that are already being done in a new way”).  But since all 
economic production consists of carrying out combinations, the entrepreneur, at least within the context of 
the production process, can be understood to simply be someone who carries out new combinations. 
123 See, e.g., THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, at 73 (“To produce means to combine materials and 
forces within our reach.”). 
124 Id., at 66. 
125 See, e.g., id., at 74 (noting that his definition of the entrepreneur is both broader and narrower than 
traditional ones “because in the first place we call entrepreneurs not only those ‘independent’ business in an 
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entrepreneurial function is contextual.  An action is entrepreneurial only as part of the 
overall context of economic development.  The same action that was entrepreneurial at 
the onset of the process of creative destruction can cease to be entrepreneurial once a new 
circular flow is established.  Lastly, entrepreneurship is often commingled with other 
economic functions in real life.  When one starts one’s own business, for instance, he 
often acts not only as an entrepreneur but also as a manager, an investor, and an inventor.  
Nevertheless, the entrepreneurial function is distinct from all of these other roles and 
should be considered separately from them.126 
Upon first glance, Schumpeter seems to disagree with Knight on what makes 
someone an entrepreneur.  Knight’s entrepreneur is responsible for economic uncertainty, 
and many interpreters of Knight assume that responsibility for economic uncertainty must 
come in the form of ownership.127  The entrepreneur, according to this view, is one who 
owns the means of production and stands exposed to potential gains and losses associated 
with their investment.  On the other hand, Schumpeter argued that the entrepreneurial 
function of carrying out new combinations did not need ownership of the means of 
production at all.  All that was needed was control.128  Only by exercising his command 
                                                          
exchange economy who are usually so designated, but all who actually fulfil the function by which we 
define the concept…  [and] narrower than the traditional one in that it does not include all heads of firms or 
managers or industrialists who merely may operate an established business, but only those who actually 
perform that function.”).  See also id, at 78 (“everyone is an entrepreneur only when he actually 'carries out 
new combinations,' and loses that character as soon as he has built up his business, when he settles down to 
running it as other people run their businesses.”). 
126 See, e.g., Creative Response, at 151-152. 
127 See, e.g., Richard N. Langlois and Metin M. Cosgel, Frank Knight on Risk, Uncertainty, and the Firm: 
A New Interpretation, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 456 (1993). 
128 THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, at 68 (“The next step in our argument is also self-evident: 
command over means of production is necessary to the carrying out of new combinations.”). 
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over productive resources can the entrepreneur take them out of their current use within 
the circular flow – or take them out of their non-use – and re-allocate them for new 
combination.  Furthermore, Schumpeter argued that financiers, not entrepreneurs, bear 
the risks associated with entrepreneurship and that although the capitalist and 
entrepreneur functions are usually commingled in real life, they are distinct and can be 
separated.129  What some interpreters assume, then, is that Knight’s entrepreneur is a 
capitalist whereas Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is someone who borrows credit from the 
capitalist to carry out new combinations. 
However, these differences are superficial, and Knight and Schumpeter do not 
fundamentally disagree.  Once one recognizes that Schumpeter uses the term ‘risk’ in 
different ways and that Knight’s conception of responsibility encompasses more than 
capital investment, it becomes easy to reconcile both views as emphasizing different 
aspects of the same economic function.  First, Schumpeter uses the term risk to refer both 
to normal risk and economic uncertainty.  Like Knight, Schumpeter argues that profit is 
distinct from wages and return on capital and that an entrepreneur is someone who earns 
a profit.130  Furthermore, he argues that whereas income for assuming risk entails a return 
on capital rather than profit, profit and loss do have their source in risks when they are 
                                                          
129 Id., at 75 and 137. 
130 See, e.g., id., at 153 (“Entrepreneurial profit is not a rent…; nor is it a return to capital….  We want 
finally to emphasize that profit is also not wages…; it is the expression of the value of what the 
entrepreneur contributes to production in exactly the same sense that wages are the value expression of 
what the worker ‘produces.’  However, while wages are determined according to the marginal productivity 
of labor, profit is a striking exception to this law: the problem of profit lies precisely in the fact that the 
laws of cost and of marginal productivity seem to exclude it.”). 
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“not foreseen or at any rate are not taken account of in the economic plan.”131  When he 
refers to financiers as bearers of risk, then, he has in mind someone who earns an income 
from her capital by assuming responsibility for a risk that is different from the kind of 
risk that leads to profits.  In other words, he views the capitalist function as bearing 
normal risk and the entrepreneur as being responsible for economic uncertainty.  Second, 
Knight does not argue that responsibility requires capital investment.  He is clear that 
although the vast majority of entrepreneurship entails at least a partial investment of 
capital, it is possible “[i]n some instances, though perhaps a relatively small proportion of 
real enterprises and those probably of small average size, [that] the independent 
entrepreneur may have no property investment in his business, furnishing labor services 
only.”132  Furthermore, Knight argues that “the rare and improbable case of a man who 
owns nothing in a particular business and contributes nothing to it but responsibility” is 
nevertheless an instance of a “pure form” of entrepreneurship.133  What matters is 
assuming entrepreneurial responsibility.  Of course, the entrepreneur in this case still 
stands to suffer a financial loss from his activity since he will need to borrow the 
resources necessary to conduct his business and will need to repay to the extent that he is 
able to do so.134  But so does the Schumpeterian entrepreneur.  What matters for Knight is 
                                                          
131 Id., at 33. 
132 RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 306. 
133 Id., at 299. 
134 Given the current structure of limited liability and our bankruptcy laws, then, responsibility for 
economic uncertainty is diffused within the organization between shareholders and managers.  Knight 
argues that such a diffusion of responsibility is common within modern enterprises and locates the 
entrepreneurial function widely across the organization.  See, e.g., RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 300 
(“The natural result is a complicated division or diffusion of entrepreneurship, distributed in the typical 
modem business organization by a hierarchy of security issues carrying every conceivable gradation and 
combination of rights to control and to freedom from uncertainty as to income and vested capital.”).  See 
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that the entrepreneur expose himself to potential loss, and what matters for Schumpeter is 
that the entrepreneur carry out new combinations.  Both of these elements are 
complementary and can be subsumed under Knight’s broad conception of entrepreneurial 
responsibility. 
C) Kirzner and alertness 
As was the case with Knight and Schumpeter, Israel Kirzner’s examination of the 
entrepreneur was also grounded in a critique of existing economic theory about markets, 
prices, and equilibrium.  For Kirzner, existing economic theories placed too much 
importance on the conditions for equilibrium.135  Existing notions of perfect competition 
and general equilibrium rely on the assumption of perfect information.  But since 
knowledge and competition are imperfect in the real world, economics must supply an 
account of how the market “supplies new information to the participants.”136  Kirzner 
provides such an account by highlighting what he calls the market process.  Rather than 
understanding the market as a place where economic exchanges take place, Kirzner 
argues that the market is a process that consists of “a series of systematic changes in the 
interconnected network of market decisions… generated by the flow of market 
information released by market participation.”137  As economic actors participate in the 
                                                          
infra Section IV.D for a discussion on such a diffusion leading to the conclusion that there is often no 
entrepreneur but the firm itself in a modern economy. 
135 See, e.g., COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, at 26 (The failure of the dominant approach… seems 
a direct implication of its stress on equilibrium situations and its view of price theory as explaining the 
conditions for equilibrium.”). 
136 Id., at 38. 
137 Id., at 10. 
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market process, they scan and process existing information in an attempt to bid or offer 
better opportunities than their competitors.  The discovery and exploitation of such 
opportunities drives the market process and helps to bring it closer to the theoretical 
equilibrium. 
For Kirzner, entrepreneurship is an economic function that plays a central role in 
driving the market process.  Entrepreneurs help to bring the market closer to equilibrium 
by discovering new opportunities for arbitrage in the market.  An opportunity exists when 
market participants are ignorant of the fact that sellers are willing to sell for less and/or 
buyers are willing to buy for more than the existing price.138  Entrepreneurs exploit such 
opportunities by discovering buyers to whom they can sell for slightly more than the 
existing price and/or sellers from whom they can buy for slightly less than the existing 
price.139  Thus, unlike standard economic actors who maximize their preferences while 
taking the price and/or output data as a given, entrepreneurs act on their discovered 
opportunities to change the price and/or output data to profit from them.140  And in the 
process of changing price and/or output data, entrepreneurs help to bring the market 
closer to equilibrium by exposing the previous ignorance among market participants of 
opportunities to allocate resources more efficiently. 
                                                          
138 See, e.g., id., at 14-15. 
139 See, e.g., id., at 41 (noting that pure entrepreneurship consists of a decision-maker who needs nothing 
except “to discover where buyers have been paying too much and where sellers have been receiving too 
little and to bridge the gap by offering to buy for a little more and to sell for a little less.”). 
140 See, e.g., Entrepreneurial Discovery, at 70 (“Whereas each neoclassical decision maker operates in a 
world of given price and output data, the Austrian entrepreneur operates to change price/output data.”). 
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Key to the ability to discover previously unrecognized opportunities for market 
arbitrage is the element of entrepreneurial alertness.  Entrepreneurial alertness refers to 
“an attitude of receptiveness to available (but hitherto overlooked) opportunities.”141  
Alertness is similar to – yet ultimately different from – knowledge.  Rather than 
knowledge of market information, alertness refers to the knowledge of where to look for 
knowledge.142  Knowledge of market information is a resource and can be purchased in 
the factor market.  For instance, if I would like to set up a fast food franchise in St. Louis, 
I can hire someone who is knowledgeable about the industry and the specific location that 
I am considering.  If the knowledge about the Saint Louis fast food market were the key 
aspect of knowledge required for entrepreneurship, the person I would hire could be the 
entrepreneur herself rather than work for me.  According to Kirzner, assuming that the 
opportunity for profit truly exists, the fact that the knowledgeable worker would be 
willing to work for me rather than pursue the opportunity for entrepreneurial profit for 
herself shows that she lacks the alertness to the opportunity for market arbitrage, even if 
she possesses deep knowledge of the market.143  Because I am the one who recognizes 
the opportunity for profit and exploits it by hiring someone who does not recognize it, the 
ultimate knowledge of market conditions, at least in the sense that matters for bringing 
                                                          
141 Id., at 72. 
142 See, e.g., COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, at 68 (“Ultimately, then, the kind of ‘knowledge’ 
required for entrepreneurship is ‘knowing where to look for knowledge’ rather than knowledge of 
substantive market information.  The word which captures most closely this kind of ‘knowledge’ seems to 
be alertness.”). 
143 Id. (“The entrepreneur is the person who hires the services of factors of production.  Among these 
factors may be persons with superior knowledge of market information, but the very fact that these hired 
possessors of information have not themselves exploited it shows that, in perhaps the truest sense, their 
knowledge is possessed not by them but by the one who is hiring them.”). 
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the market closer to equilibrium, resides with me and my alertness to the opportunity.  In 
other words, entrepreneurial alertness refers to not knowledge of market conditions itself 
but rather a higher-order knowledge that can recognize market opportunities and exploit 
them by obtaining the appropriate resources to do so. 
Kirzner’s account of the entrepreneur has generated considerable debate as to 
whether he agrees or disagrees with Schumpeter.  One interpretation of Kirzner argues 
that he offers a competing perspective to Schumpeter’s view.144  Whereas the 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur disrupts the market out of equilibrium, the thinking goes, the 
Kirznerian entrepreneur brings the market to equilibrium.  However, these contrasts 
between Kirzner and Schumpeter are overblown.  Even in his early work, Kirzner saw his 
account of the entrepreneur to describe the same economic actor as Schumpeter with only 
a different emphasis in relation to the entrepreneur’s impact on economic equilibrium.145  
Later on, Kirzner explicitly subsumed the Schumpeterian entrepreneur within his model 
by arguing that the creative destruction unleashed by the entrepreneur is a response to an 
opportunity for arbitrage that entrepreneurial alertness discovers.146  As a result most 
                                                          
144 For modern scholars who assume that Kirzner and Schumpeter represent competing and/or 
irreconcilable positions, see, e.g., Brian J. Loasby, The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory, 29 SCOTTISH J. 
POL. ECON. 235 (1982), and Luke Pittaway, Philosophies in Entrepreneurship: A Focus On Economic 
Theories, 11 INT’L. J. ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAV. & RES. 201 (2005). 
145 See, e.g., COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, at 72-73 (noting that “Schumpeter’s entrepreneur and 
the one developed here can be recognized – and let me add, reassuringly recognized – as the same 
individual.  But there is one important aspect – if only in emphasis – in which Schumpeter’s treatment 
differs from my own.  Schumpeter’s entrepreneur acts to disturb an existing equilibrium situation….  By 
contrast my own treatment of the entrepreneur emphasizes the equilibrating aspects of his role.”). 
146 See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, The Alert and Creative Entrepreneur: A Clarification, 32 SMALL BUS. 
ECON. 145 (2009) (“It is not merely the case that Schumpeterian creativity can be comfortably subsumed 
under the category of alertness….  It can be suggested, I will maintain, that a focus on the ‘alertness’ aspect 
of (all) entrepreneurship can help us understand how public policy may help promote that very 
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modern scholars view the Kirznerian and Schumpeterian accounts of the entrepreneur as 
complementary or even identical.147 
In addition to Schumpeter, Kirzner also saw a great deal of consistency between 
Knight’s account of the entrepreneur and his own.148  In his earlier work, Kirzner argues 
that Knight’s focus on economic uncertainty masks the extent to which the entrepreneur 
discovers an actual opportunity that exists, regardless of the uncertainty associated with 
it.149  In other words, Kirzner and Knight disagree on the ontology of entrepreneurial 
opportunity.  Whereas the Knightian opportunity is uncertain and something to be 
grasped only ex post, the Kirznerian opportunity is real and can be discovered with 
certainty ex ante.  Nevertheless, even early on, Kirzner agreed with almost everything 
else that Knight observed about the entrepreneur.  For instance, Kirzner writes that “his 
identification of where entrepreneurship is located is superb”150 and that Knight’s 
conception of responsibility for economic uncertainty “is immediately identifiable with 
[his] own notion of ‘ultimate knowledge’ – that is, with entrepreneurial alertness.”151  
                                                          
Schumpeterian creativity (which I certainly do acknowledge must be the major component of future 
dramatic leaps in economic development).”). 
147 See, e.g., ROBERT F. HEBERT and ALBERT N. LINK, THE ENTREPRENEUR, MAINSTREAM VIEWS AND 
RADICAL CRITIQUES (1982), and Young Back Choi, The Entrepreneur: Schumpeter vs. Kirzner, In PETER J. 
BOETTKE and MARIO J. RIZZO (eds.), ADVANCES IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, Vol. 2 (Part A) 55 (1995). 
148 See, e.g., Entrepreneurial Discovery, at 70 (After connecting his view of entrepreneurship within the 
larger context of Austrian economics, Kirzner notes that, “[i]n focusing upon the entrepreneurial decision 
in a Knight-uncertain world, Austrian theory thus diverges sharply from the notion of the individual 
decision that constitutes the analytical building block of neoclassical microtheory.”). 
149 See, e.g., COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, at 83 (“What does not come through in the Knightian 
exposition is the active, alert, searching role of entrepreneurial activity.  Treating profit as a residual fails to 
disclose that from the point of view of the prospective entrepreneur the profit opportunity is, with all its 
uncertainty, there.”). 
150 Id. 
151 Id., at 84. 
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And in his later work, Kirzner explicitly saw himself as working from within the tradition 
started by Knight that emphasizes the central importance of economic uncertainty in 
entrepreneurship.152 
Thus, although the three classic theories of Knight, Schumpeter, and Knight seem 
to identify different aspects of entrepreneurship as a central defining characteristic, many 
entrepreneurship scholars now see them as merely emphasizing different aspects of the 
same entrepreneurial process.  Overall, many see Schumpeter and Kirzner’s theories as 
providing complementary views that elaborate on Knight’s fundamental assertion that 
entrepreneurs assume the risks associated with economic uncertainty.153  As will be seen 
in the next section, the entrepreneurial responsibilities test follows the same line of 
interpretation and looks to the three different accounts of entrepreneurship provided by 
Knight, Schumpeter, and Kirzner as giving an account of the same phenomenon of 
entrepreneurship, with three different emphases.  Furthermore, it will look to the 
Knightian emphasis on the entrepreneur’s assumption of entrepreneurial responsibility as 
                                                          
152 See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Creativity and/or Alertness: A Reconsideration of the Schumpeterian 
Entrepreneur, 11 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 5, 12 (1998) (“Were we to be able to imagine a world without 
uncertainty in regard to the future, we would… be unable to find scope in that world for pure 
entrepreneurship”). 
153 See, e.g., Jeffery S. McMullen and Dean A. Shepherd, Entrepreneurial Action and the Role of 
Uncertainty in the Theory of the Entrepreneur, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 132, 133 (2006) (noting that “it is no 
surprise that uncertainty constitutes a conceptual cornerstone for most theories of the entrepreneur” and 
arguing that research streams that emphasize a Kirznerian understanding of entrepreneurship and those that 
emphasize a Schumpeterian understanding “merely emphasizes a different aspect of the uncertainty 
experienced in the decision to act entrepreneurially.  Therefore, each conceptualization of uncertainty is 
representative of a construct that is not only reconcilable with its counterpart but also necessary for further 
theorizing about entrepreneurial action.”). 
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the lens through which courts should assess the extent to which workers act in ways that 
correspond to the three different points of emphasis. 
IV. THE ENTREPRENEURIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TEST 
The entrepreneurial responsibilities test draws from the classic theories of 
entrepreneurship discussed above to define the entrepreneur as someone who assumes 
entrepreneurial responsibility.  It can be seen as a modification of the entrepreneurial 
opportunities test in that it considers whether or not a worker is an independent contractor 
by looking to whether she is an entrepreneur.  Like all tests for employee status discussed 
above and for reasons that will be discussed in the next section, the entrepreneurial 
responsibilities test also operates within the binary dichotomy between independent 
contractors and employees.  Thus, under the proposed test, courts should look to the 
worker’s assumption of entrepreneurial responsibility for her work to determine whether 
she is working as an entrepreneur.  And unless the court determines that the worker is 
working as an entrepreneur, she should be considered an employee. 
But what does it mean for workers to assume entrepreneurial responsibility?  The 
entrepreneurial responsibilities test draws on economic theories of entrepreneurship to 
provide three elements that workers must meet to be considered an entrepreneur.  The 
first element is the Knightian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker assumes 
liability for economic uncertainty in the pursuit of profit.  The second element is the 
Schumpeterian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker exercises control over 
the allocation of resources being combined to sell in the market.  The third element is the 
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Kirznerian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker participates in the market 
discovery process by buying resources to sell in the market in the pursuit of profit.  The 
entrepreneurial responsibilities test classifies a worker as an employee unless her work 
responsibilities satisfy all three elements of the test. 
A) Assumption of liability for economic uncertainty 
The first element of the entrepreneurial responsibilities test draws from Knight’s 
theory of entrepreneurship and considers whether or not the worker assumes liability for 
economic uncertainty in the pursuit of profit.  As noted above, the Knightian entrepreneur 
provides a guarantee to other workers for the economic uncertainty associated with the 
business enterprise by assuming liability for potential financial losses.154  However, the 
assumption of liability in the entrepreneurial sense is different from the assumption of 
liability in general.  An indemnification agreement that only shifts tort liability to the 
employer, for instance, has no bearing on the entrepreneurial responsibilities test because 
the assumed risk pertains to harms caused to others.  Such risk is merely normal risk, and 
it can be insured against.  Economic uncertainty, on the other hand, pertains to the risks 
associated with market conditions.  The only type of risk that the entrepreneurial function 
assumes is that of economic uncertainty, i.e., the risk that accompanies forecasting future 
supply or demand in the market. 
The assumption of liability for economic uncertainty will typically involve 
ownership of the means of production involved within the enterprise.  When a worker 
                                                          
154 See supra Part III.A. 
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makes a capital investment in resources required for the job, she assumes some 
responsibility for economic uncertainty associated with the investment.  If I purchase a 
car to use as a driver for Uber, for instance, I may find myself with a potential loss if 
automation significantly reduces the demand for Uber drivers in the near future.  Thus, 
existing tests do capture some entrepreneurial element to the extent that they look to the 
ownership of or investment in tools and materials required for the work.155 
However, as discussed above,156 ownership of the means of production is not 
necessary to assume liability for economic uncertainty.  Imagine, for instance, a car 
dealer who sells delivery trucks to several different drivers but grants the buyers an 
option to sell the trucks back to him at a set price.  In such a scenario, the fact that the 
drivers own the trucks would not have any bearing on whether or not they assume 
entrepreneurial responsibility because their purchase would not assume any liability for 
economic uncertainty.  It is the car dealer who provides the ultimate guarantee for 
potential downturns in market conditions, and he should be considered the entrepreneur 
within the overall enterprise.  To the extent that there are pure profits to be made from 
this enterprise, they would accrue to the car dealer in the form of a premium he charges 
the drivers for the option.  Any profits that drivers earn would be a form of wages for 
their labor and/or a return on their investment in the cars, not pure profit. 
                                                          
155 The federal control test typically takes the provision of tools and materials is as one of the factors for 
consideration.  See, e.g., supra note 59.  The economic realities test often takes into consideration 
ownership of equipment and materials required for the job.  See, e.g., supra note 82. 
156 See supra Part III.B. 
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Lastly, the assumption of liability for economic uncertainty must be connected 
with an entrepreneurial pursuit of profit.  Mere exposure to potential loss for a financial 
decision made for reasons other than the pursuit of pure profit does not qualify one as an 
entrepreneur.  Imagine, for instance, a homeowner who begins to rent out her spare 
bedroom on AirBnB after having owned her home for forty years.  Although she owns 
the most critical resource needed for operating her enterprise, it cannot be said that her 
actions entail assuming liability for economic uncertainty because her investment in the 
home was not made in pursuit of profits related to a forecasted future demand for AirBnB 
rentals.  Of course, most financial decisions are made with multiple motivations, so the 
extent to which the entrepreneurial element is present in a worker’s situation will depend 
on the extent to which the worker stands exposed to potential loss associated with her 
pursuit of profit.  Thus, investments in education will help determine independent 
contractor status only to the extent that the investment was made for profit-seeking 
reasons.  The employer of an enterprising individual who obtains a student loan to attend 
plumbing school should be able to argue that the worker should be classified as an 
independent contractor, whereas an employer of an individual with student loans from 
her liberal arts college degree should have a difficult case to make.  Of course, if the 
employer offers any tuition assistance for continuing education, it is the employer and not 
the worker who assumes liability for the economic uncertainty associated with the 
investment in human capital. 
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B) Allocative control over resource combination 
The second element draws from Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship and 
considers whether or not the worker exercises control over the allocation of resources 
being combined to sell in the market.  Allocative control of resource combination differs 
from the traditional indicators of control within tests for employee status in a variety of 
ways.  First, the allocative control factor looks at the worker’s relationship to the 
resources required for the business.  Thus, the controlling person is the worker, whereas 
the traditional control and the economic realities tests attempt to determine whether or 
not the employer exercises control over the work and/or the worker.157  Second, the 
allocative control element looks at control over the allocation of resources for the 
carrying on of new combinations.  Thus, what is crucial is whether or not the worker 
exercises control over the allocation of resources being combined for sale in the market 
and not just the resources themselves.  Also, since the control must be exercised over the 
allocation of resources, it is not enough that a worker exercises control over just some of 
the resources.  Instead, the worker must be able to control the allocation of the entire 
range of resources that are being combined.  Third, the allocative control element looks 
to whether or not the worker actually exercises control over the combination of resources.  
The Schumpeterian entrepreneur is defined by her actions rather than her rights.158  The 
right of control does not turn a worker into an entrepreneur unless it is exercised to carry 
                                                          
157 The control test looks to the employer’s control over the worker by examining a variety of factors, 
including whether the employer has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party.  See supra note 
59.  The economic realities test also considers the employer’s control of a worker’s duties or the manner of 
performance.  See supra notes 81 and 82. 
158 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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out new combinations.  Thus, an owner of an enterprise who might have the right to 
control the allocation and combination of resources within the business will still not be 
acting as an entrepreneur as if she defers to an employee to control her enterprise. 
Within a corporate environment, it will typically be the case that a key signpost 
for whether or not the worker exercises allocative control will be the exercise of 
managerial responsibility over the enterprise.  For instance, the manager of a factory acts 
as an entrepreneur when she exercises control over how resources are to be allocated and 
how materials and labor are to be combined for assembly.  On the other hand, if the 
manager of the factory defers to the foreman’s judgment about allocation and 
combination, it would be the foreman rather than the manager who would be acting as an 
entrepreneur within the enterprise.  Nevertheless, it would be nearly impossible for a line 
worker within the factory to exercise allocative control since entrepreneurial control 
within a factory pertains to control over the allocation of the entire range of resources that 
are being combined within the factory. 
As is implied with the factory example above, whether or not the worker exercises 
allocative control will depend significantly on how one defines the level at which the 
resource combination is being carried out.  Imagine, for instance, that a farmer delivers 
wheat to a bread factory.  Whether or not the farmer exercises allocative control over 
resource combination will depend on whether or not the relevant level of resource 
combination within his work is bread baking or wheat growing.  At the bread baking 
level, wheat is one among many resources being combined to bake and sell bread, and the 
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farmer has no allocative control over the range of resources being combined.  At the 
wheat growing level, on the other hand, wheat is the final product being delivered to a 
customer, and the farmer has allocative control over land, water, and other resources that 
are combined to grow and deliver wheat. 
Because the entrepreneur assumes entrepreneurial responsibility by participating 
in the market,159 the relevant level of resource combination should be the level at which 
the market transaction occurs.  The entrepreneurial exercise of allocative control over 
resources occurs up until the result of resource combination is sold to a buyer.  If a 
resource is purchased for use in a new combination, it is the purchaser of the resource 
rather than its seller who exercises allocative control over how the purchased resource 
will be used.  For instance, in the wheat farmer example above, the farmer’s allocative 
control over resources occurs until the wheat is sold to the bread factory.  Once the 
factory purchases wheat, it exercises allocative control over wheat, along with other 
resources, to produce bread for sale.  On the other hand, if there is no market transaction 
for the wheat, it will be the factory rather than the farmer who exercises allocative control 
over wheat growing.  Thus, if the factory hired the farmer to grow its wheat for them, the 
farmer would not be acting as an entrepreneur since the factory is paying for his labor 
rather than purchasing the wheat from him.  Furthermore, as will be seen with the third 
element of the entrepreneurial responsibilities test, the fact that the transaction occurs 
within the market context matters quite a bit as well.  If the factory enters into an 
                                                          
159 See, e.g., supra Part III.C and infra Part IV.C. 
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exclusive contract with the farmer to purchase wheat from him in such a way that the 
farmer could not meaningfully engage in the market to sell his wheat, the farmer would 
not be considered an entrepreneur either. 
C) Buying to sell for profit 
The third element draws from Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship and considers 
whether or not the worker buys resources to sell in the market in the pursuit of profits.  
As noted above, the Kirznerian entrepreneur is alert to opportunities for bringing the 
market closer to equilibrium.160  Market disequilibrium exists when there are 
opportunities to allocate resources more efficiently.  Since the market comes to an 
equilibrium once all resources are allocated to their highest valued use, a market in 
disequilibrium contains within it at least some type of an imbalance between supply and 
demand.  Markets utilize the price mechanism to correct such imbalances.  When there 
are more potential sellers than buyers, prices should drop, and prices should rise when 
there are more potential buyers than sellers.  However, the movement in prices is not a 
mechanical response to underlying market conditions.  Neither do prices adjust magically 
on their own.  Instead, it is the entrepreneur who recognizes the imbalance and helps to 
correct the market by buying from the surplus of sellers for a little less than the market 
price to sell to potential buyers at the market price and/or buying from sellers at the 
market price to sell to the surplus of buyers for a little more than the market price. 
                                                          
160 See supra Part III.C. 
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When examining the buying and selling activities of the worker under the 
entrepreneurial responsibilities test, it is important to connect these activities to the 
worker’s pursuit of profits.  After all, all workers need to buy resources to support their 
work in some way, and they often participate in the labor market as sellers of labor.  But 
whereas normal workers sell their labor to obtain a wage and buy resources to sustain 
their capacity to live and work, entrepreneurs look to earn a pure profit by buying to sell.  
As noted above, pure profit refers to the remainder of an enterprise that cannot be 
attributed to wages or a return on investment.161  By definition, what a worker earns as 
compensation for her labor does not constitute a profit.  Furthermore, within Kirzner’s 
theory, profit arises only when there is a discrepancy between the market price and 
underlying market conditions due to the mismatch in supply and demand.162  The 
entrepreneur can be identified by his buying resources for the purposes of attempting to 
sell them – as they are or as part of a new combination – for a profit.  Thus, even if it 
were the case that compensation for labor could somehow count as a profit, the typical 
worker is not buying resources in an attempt to combine them with her labor for a higher 
price.  And to the extent that a worker purchases resources to sell in the market, she will 
likely be acting as an entrepreneur. 
                                                          
161 For more on pure profit, see supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, at 48 (“The pure entrepreneur… proceeds by his 
alertness to discover and exploit situations in which he is able to sell for high prices that which he can buy 
for low prices.  Pure entrepreneurial profit is the difference between the two sets of prices.  It is not yielded 
by exchanging something the entrepreneur values less for something he values more highly.  It comes from 
discovering sellers and buyers of something for which the latter will pay more than the former demand.”). 
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To illustrate the buying-to-sell-for-profit element, imagine three different 
examples.  The first example is a worker who uses the TaskRabbit platform to sell his 
services for interested buyers.  He also optimizes his time by shopping for his own 
groceries when he runs an errand for a TaskRabbit customer to pick up the customer’s 
groceries.  Although this individual is engaged in both buying and selling, he would 
likely not be considered an entrepreneur under the entrepreneurial responsibilities test 
because he is not buying groceries to sell them or to combine them into a product to sell.  
The buying of his own groceries has the purpose of consumption, not sale.  Furthermore, 
as discussed above, compensation for his sale of labor will result in wages, not profit.  
The second example is a manager of a local outpost of a national grocery store chain.  
This individual likely purchases goods directly from the national chain.  Suppose, for the 
sake of the argument, that his purchases also constitute a buy-for-sale activity.  Yet, even 
if the grocery store manager buys goods from the chain to sell to customers, he would 
still likely not be considered an entrepreneur under the entrepreneurial responsibilities 
test because the difference between the prices that he pays and the prices that he charges 
will not yield him any profits.  He does not realize any gains from the buying and selling, 
except perhaps a bonus for a job well done.  If anyone realizes a profit, it will be the 
owner of the grocery store.  The third example is the owner-operator of a small, 
independent convenience store.  The store owner would likely be considered as an 
entrepreneur under the entrepreneurial responsibilities test because he purchases goods 
from suppliers in an attempt to sell them to his local customers for a profit.  His business 
operations are likely the result of his recognition that there was a mismatch between 
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supply and demand within the particular location he serves.  Perhaps he recognized that 
there were not enough convenience stores to provide goods to the local population, or 
perhaps he felt that he could offer lower prices and/or better products than other stores in 
the area.  In recognizing the opportunity, he exercised entrepreneurial alertness to the 
potential for profit.  And he is attempting to exploit the opportunity by setting up shop 
where he did. 
The example of the grocery store owner above also illustrates the importance of 
market engagement within the entrepreneur’s buy-to-sell-for-profit activities.  Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship requires profit-seeking through engagement with the market process.  
The entrepreneur exploits previously undiscovered opportunities for arbitrage in the 
market by discovering buyers and sellers,163 and he can only discover buyers and sellers 
through a learning process generated by the unfolding experience of market activity.164  
As a result, a worker acts as an entrepreneur only by engaging with the market process as 
both a buyer and a seller.  For instance, the grocery store manager may engage with the 
market on the demand side by selling purchased goods to customers, but he does not 
engage with the market with his buying because he is not free to choose another supplier 
from whom he wishes to buy his items.  Without the freedom to evaluate his purchasing 
                                                          
163 See, e.g., COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, at 48 (“Pure entrepreneurial profit… comes from 
discovering sellers and buyers of something for which the latter will pay more than the former demand.”).  
See also id., at 44 (“This absence of coordination will express itself in price differences….  The profit 
opportunities represented by such price differences open up a dimension for purely entrepreneurial activity 
which… will consist exclusively in buying resources and selling products.”). 
164 Id., at 36 (“[O]nce we become sensitive to the decision-makers’ alertness to new possibly worthwhile 
ends and newly available means, it may be possible to explain the pattern of change in an individual’s 
decisions as the outcome of a learning process generated by the unfolding experience of the decisions 
themselves.”). 
94 
 
 
options, he has no ability to bring the market closer to equilibrium because he has no 
ability to change the way the market allocates resources.  On the other hand, if the owner 
of a small independent grocery store chooses suppliers from whom he will purchase his 
inventory, he engages in the market process even if he cannot change the prices at which 
he purchases the items.  Even if he lacks the ability to negotiate for a discount, he 
influences the allocation of resources in the market by choosing his supplier.  This 
influence will lead to a change in prices in the overall market.  Other suppliers, for 
instance, may decide to lower prices to compete with the chosen supplier.  Or prices for 
goods may increase for the grocery store’s owners because his purchases decrease the 
supply of goods for others.  In the same way, an entrepreneur in a highly-regulated 
industry where the government sets prices for goods engages with the market process by 
choosing his customers.  His discovery of customers and the act of selling, even without 
the ability to change prices, nevertheless influences the allocation of goods within the 
regulated market and thus influences how the price mechanism responds to his activity. 
D) Applying the test 
The entrepreneurial responsibilities test can provide guidance for courts even in 
controversial and/or new fact patterns that would lead to uncertainty under other tests.  
Rather than applying a wide array of factors that can cut a variety of ways, the 
entrepreneurial responsibilities test simplifies the inquiry into three discrete elements that 
are necessary for a worker to act as an entrepreneur.  Under the test, only when a 
worker’s responsibilities meet all three elements will the worker be considered an 
95 
 
 
entrepreneur.  For reasons provided in the next section, the entrepreneurial 
responsibilities test also treats all non-entrepreneur workers as employees.  Thus, a 
worker would be considered an employee under the proposed test unless her work 
responsibilities meet all of its three elements. 
Take, for instance, fact patterns involving platform companies in the new sharing 
economy.  The most prominent example of controversial worker classification concerns 
Uber and its drivers.  In employment law cases, Uber has typically maintained that it is 
merely a technology provider that helps to connect drivers working as independent 
contractors with customers looking for a ride.165  And under the control, economic 
realities, and entrepreneurial opportunities tests, there is considerable uncertainty as to 
whether Uber has an employment relationship with its drivers.  Under the thirteen-factor 
Federal control test, four factors support the existence of an employment relationship, six 
factors support Uber’s case, and three factors are unclear.166  Things are even murkier 
under the economic realities test.  Under the narrower test, two of the four factors are 
unclear, with one factor in favor of each side.167  The same goes for the more expansive 
                                                          
165 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Uber passes 
itself off as merely a technological intermediary between potential riders and potential drivers.”). 
166 See supra note 59 for the thirteen factors.  Driving for Uber requires little skill, makes assistants 
superfluous, and is a part of Uber’s regular business as a business.  However, drivers are free to choose 
where, when, and how long to work, and they often have short and temporary relationships with Uber.  
Uber also lacks the ability to assign additional projects to its drivers, takes a percentage of the driver’s 
profits rather than paying them wages, and treats drivers as independent contractors.  What is unclear 
are the other three factors.  Uber can control the manner and means of work, but only indirectly.  
Although drivers provide their own cars, Uber provides the app, which is an arguable even more valuable 
tool.  And although Uber doesn’t pay any benefits, it provides insurance and conducts background checks. 
167 See supra note 81 and accompanying text for the four-factor economic realities test.  Although driving 
is an integral part of Uber’s business, Uber does not pay its drivers wages.  The extent of Uber’s control 
over its drivers and its right to discipline its workers are unclear.59 
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test, where three factors are unclear, with a mix of factors supporting each side.168  The 
same uncertainty extends to the entrepreneurial opportunities test.  Although Uber drivers 
have an opportunity to earn more or less based on when and how they work, it is not clear 
whether this opportunity is the same kind of opportunity possessed by FedEx drivers who 
have the right to hire drivers for their routes and even sell their routes.169 
Under the entrepreneurial opportunities test, on the other hand, determining the 
employee status of Uber drivers is simpler and more predictable.  The first element 
counts in Uber’s favor.  Uber drivers assume at least some liability for economic 
uncertainty, since they own or lease their own vehicles and often spend gas and put wear 
on their vehicles driving to places where they anticipate can bring them larger fares.  The 
second element counts against Uber if courts take Uber’s position at face value, i.e., that 
it is merely a third party service provider in a transaction between the driver and the 
rider.170  As noted above171, the level at which allocative control is exercised occurs at the 
level of the transaction, and within the Uber driver context, the relevant transaction 
occurs between the rider and the driver.  Yet, when the rider purchases driving services 
through Uber, the transaction involves not just the ride but also the smooth efficiency 
with which the ride is provided, including the driver-rider match, directions over the 
route of the ride, the means of payment, etc.  It is Uber, not the driver, that controls the 
                                                          
168 See supra note 82 and accompanying text for the six-factor economic realities test.  Again, although 
driving is an integral part of Uber’s business, it requires little skill, and the Uber-driver relationship is 
impermanent.  What is unclear is the nature of Uber’s control over its drivers, the driver’s investment in 
tools and equipment, and the driver’s opportunity for profit and loss depending on his managerial skill. 
169 See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the entrepreneurial opportunities test. 
170 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
171 See supra Part IV.B. 
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allocation of various technological resources required to combine the Uber ride 
experience into a single product.  Although the Uber driver controls, to a certain extent, 
his hours and his vehicle, he does not exercise allocative control over much of the 
relevant resources that go into selling the Uber ride to the rider.172  Lastly, the third 
element definitively counts against Uber.  Although Uber drivers engage the market to 
purchase a vehicle and other equipment related to their work, they do not engage the 
market to sell their services.  It is Uber’s app, not the driver, that discovers drivers willing 
to sell their services and riders willing to buy their services at prices that Uber sets.  Thus, 
drivers engage the Uber app rather than the market to sell their services.  The market 
actor that performs the entrepreneurial function of bringing the market closer to 
equilibrium by discovering buyers and sellers, then, is Uber and not the driver. 
A comparison of Uber drivers with taxi drivers helps to accentuate the nuanced 
economic logic that the entrepreneurial opportunities test can bring to worker 
classification.  On their face, taxi drivers seem to be performing similar services as Uber 
drivers.  But outside of those who rely on a dispatcher to find a majority of their 
customers, taxi drivers will often be classified as independent contractors under the 
entrepreneurial opportunities test.  Like Uber drivers, most taxi drivers assume liability 
for economic uncertainty by leasing their vehicles along with their medallions.  And 
                                                          
172 Interestingly enough, the second element becomes a more difficult question if courts do not accept 
Uber’s account at face value.  If it were the case that Uber functions as an intermediary that purchases 
driver services and sells them to riders, it can make a plausible case that its drivers do exercise allocative 
control over the sale of their services to Uber.  Of course, this element will not be dispositive in the Uber 
case because the driver also fails to meet the third element. 
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unlike an Uber ride, the transaction for a taxi ride usually consists of not much more than 
the combination of the driver’s resources and labor, albeit often strictly regulated 
environment.  And lastly, the absence of an intermediary interface like Uber requires that 
drivers discover buyers of their services on their own.  By exercising their alertness to 
profit opportunities by making their own judgments about when, where, and for whom to 
work based on their anticipation of supply and demand, taxi drivers engage in the market 
for ride services and influence the allocation of rides within the market, even if price 
regulation prevents them from setting their own prices. 
Lastly, as the Uber example shows, most applications of the entrepreneurial 
responsibilities test involving firms involving multiple workers will yield what seems like 
a counter-intuitive conclusion for some: there is no entrepreneur except the firm itself.  
However, the attribution of the entrepreneurial role to the firm rather than to any 
individual worker is the natural result of viewing entrepreneurship as an economic 
function within the context of the modern economy.  All three economic theories 
discussed above view the entrepreneur as the embodiment of an economic function rather 
than a class or type of individual.173  The identification of the entrepreneur within these 
theories is thus a theoretical exercise intended to isolate the entrepreneurial element 
within a given action for the purposes of economic analysis.174  The same individual 
                                                          
173 See, e.g., Creative Response, at 151 (noting that “the entrepreneur and his function are not difficult to 
conceptualize….  It is but natural, and in fact it is an advantage, that such a definition does not draw any 
sharp line between what is and what is not ‘enterprise.’  For actual life itself knows no such sharp division, 
though it shows up the type well enough.”). 
174 See, e.g., COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, at 43 (noting that “although each human being acts in a 
wholly integrated manner which we analyze into two separate components…, it is analytically expedient 
99 
 
 
carrying on an economic task in the real world will typically be performing several 
functions at once, and the entrepreneurial function will also typically be distributed 
among a wide group of individuals in a business enterprise.175  When a worker is acting 
on her own behalf or as part of a sole-proprietorship, she may reasonably be viewed as 
assuming the entrepreneurial function all on her own.  Similarly, a high-level executive in 
small to medium-sized firms with a significant equity stake and direct managerial 
responsibilities over the firm’s resource allocation and buying and selling activities may 
also function as an entrepreneur.  But as firms increase in size and complexity, its 
entrepreneurial function will often be dispersed across a wide range of actors, and the 
only entrepreneur available to identify in such instances may be the legal person of the 
firm.176 
V. JUSTIFYING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TEST 
The bifurcation of workers into two main categories – independent contractors 
and employees – is widely established in U.S. law and also frequently criticized.  Many 
scholars have argued that the current framework excludes from legal protection a wide 
                                                          
to treat him as if he represented two entirely separate decision-makers, one a passive economizer, the 
other a pure entrepreneur.”). 
175 See, e.g., RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 299-300 (“It is impossible for entrepreneurship to be 
completely specialized or exist in a pure form….  The natural result is a complicated division or diffusion of 
entrepreneurship, distributed in the typical modem business organization”). 
176 In fact, it will sometimes be the case that the entrepreneurial function is dispersed over groups of 
firms.  When the conditions for production can benefit from the dispersion of the entrepreneurial 
elements of responsibility and control among groups of firms, what will result is a variety of ‘hybrid’ forms 
of economic organization that straddle the traditional bifurcation of markets and firms.  See, e.g., Claude 
Ménard, Hybrid Modes of Organization: Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and Other Strange Animals, in 
ROBERT GIBBONS and JOHN ROBERTS (eds.), THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 1066 (2012). 
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variety of atypical and/or contingent workers who do not fit neatly into either category.177  
A popular recommendation for reform has been to create new categories of workers that 
are not covered under the current framework.178  However, what these scholars often 
overlook is the fact that the current dichotomy in the law correctly – even if accidentally 
– reflects the efficient division of work into markets and firms within our economic 
system. 
This section argues that the entrepreneurial responsibilities test should be adopted 
because it corresponds to the principle of fair play and the organization of our economic 
activities into firms and markets for the benefit of all participants.  The principle of fair 
play imposes an obligation on participants of a cooperative enterprise to abide by the 
rules of the enterprise in exchange for receiving its benefits.  Our economic system is a 
cooperative enterprise within which we organize our economic activity into markets and 
firms so that we can all benefit from an efficient allocation of resources.  Entrepreneurs 
participate in the markets under the high-powered incentives of the price mechanism to 
facilitate the efficient allocation of resources.  Entrepreneurs then organize other workers, 
                                                          
177 See, e.g., Befort, supra note 11; Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1998); 
Linder, supra note 11; and Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment 
Law for Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
251 (2006). 
178 Several have argued that the U.S. might benefit from adopting Canada’s dependent contractor category.  
See, e.g., Brian A. Langille and Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View 
from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7 (1999); Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment 
Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357 (2002); 
Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights for “Dependent 
Contractors”, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2005). 
A more recent proposal is to create a new category called the independent worker.   See Seth D. Harris and 
Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The 
“Independent Worker”, HAMILTON PROJ. (Dec. 2015). 
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i.e., employees, into firms to avoid the costs of transacting in markets.  Benefiting from 
participating in our economic system, this section will argue, creates an obligation to 
maintain the calibration of prices at socially optimal levels and ensuring that employees 
are not exposed to the high-powered incentives in the market.  This is what the 
entrepreneurial responsibilities test helps to do. 
A) The principle of fair play 
The principle of fair play is typically evoked within discussions of political 
obligations between political philosophers.  The principle was introduced by H.L.A. Hart, 
who argued that “when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to 
rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when 
required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their 
submission.”179  For Hart, political obligations arise from a “mutuality of restrictions” 
within such a joint enterprise between cooperating members of a society.180  John Rawls 
drew on a similar principle of the same name by arguing that the moral obligation to obey 
the law can be grounded within the duty of fair play, subject to several conditions and 
modifications.181  In both cases, the main intuition at play is that a free rider within a 
                                                          
179 Hart, supra note 36. 
180 Id. 
181 Rawls, supra note 36, at 9 (“If one thinks of the constitution as a fundamental part of the scheme of 
social cooperation, then one can say that if the constitution is just, and if one has accepted the benefits of its 
working and intends to continue doing so, and if the rule enacted is within certain limits, then one has an 
obligation, based on the principle of fair play, to obey it when it comes one’s turn.”).  It is worth noting, 
however, that Rawls later changed his views on the principle of fair play and developed a much more 
developed – and influential – account of justice as fairness.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 97 
and 308 (1972). 
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cooperative scheme wrongs others who also participate within the scheme and do their 
part in following its rules. 
The principle of fair play has been met with both criticism and support among 
political philosophers.  M.B.E. Smith criticizes the principle by arguing that obligations 
of fair play disappear when the scale and complexity of the cooperative enterprise 
become large enough.  If other members of the enterprise do not benefit from one’s 
compliance with the rules and/or they are not harmed by one’s non-compliance, the 
unfairness of non-compliance would appear to apply only to the group and not to any 
individual, which Smith finds impossible.182  Defenders of the principle respond by 
arguing that non-compliance within a cooperative enterprise wrongs other participants 
even if it does not harm the participants or the enterprise.183  Robert Nozick criticizes the 
principle by arguing that merely conferring a benefit on someone does not then create a 
right to impose on the beneficiary an obligation to make a contribution.184  The argument 
that one has an obligation to obey the rules of a cooperative scheme merely because one 
benefits from it is flawed, he argues, because it ignores the element of consent.  Just as 
one may not give someone a book and just grab money from the person for 
compensation, a government cannot confer benefits on its members to create a “general 
floating debt which [it] can collect and use as it will.”185  A. John Simmons provides a 
response to Nozick’s criticism by arguing that one can not only receive but also accept 
                                                          
182 M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L. J. 950, 956 (1973). 
183 See, e.g., RICHARD DAGGER, CIVIC VIRTUES: RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN LIBERALISM 
(1997), at 71. 
184 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), at 93-95. 
185 Id., at 95. 
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benefits without consent, and he and others have argued that mere reception of a benefit 
does not make someone a participant within a cooperative enterprise.186  Nevertheless, 
Simmons criticizes the principle of fair play by arguing that not many people would meet 
the conditions for the acceptance of benefits in most political societies.  Because 
acceptance of a benefit requires either that someone try and succeed in obtaining it or that 
one take it willingly and knowingly, Simmons argues, the principle of fair play would not 
apply to the vast majority of a country’s citizens since they either do not recognize the 
benefits of political membership and/or view the benefits as being purchased from 
government rather than the outcome of social cooperation.187  Defenders of the principle 
respond to Simmons by arguing that participation can occur without full awareness188 
and/or that acceptance is not necessary to incur an obligation to cooperate.189 
Regardless of its applicability for political obligations in general, however, the 
principle of fair play does not raise any similar concerns within the employer and worker 
context.  Smith’s concerns about the consequences of compliance and non-compliance do 
not apply because economic free-riding has a real impact on other economic actors.  If 
employers externalize the costs of their enterprise to their employees who lack the 
leverage to demand anything else, they would directly harm their workers in the form of 
lower wages and also indirectly harm other market participants by taking an inefficient 
                                                          
186 See, e.g., A. John Simmons, The Principle of Fair Play, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 307 (1979) and DAGGER, 
supra note 183. 
187 Simmons, supra note 186. 
188 See, e.g., SAMANTHA BESSON, THE MORALITY OF CONFLICT: REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT AND THE 
LAW (2005), at 487-489. 
189 See, e.g., GEORGE KLOSKO, THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1992). 
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amount of risk.  Nozick’s concerns about consent do not apply because the very nature of 
hiring and working requires participation within the economic system.  Nozick’s 
argument might hold some weight against taxing non-working members of society on the 
basis of the benefits they receive from the economic system.  But employers and workers 
are not bystanders to the scheme of economic cooperation.  Rather than passively 
receiving the benefits of the market, they actively participate within the system to earn 
wages and/or profits.  Thus, Simmons’ argument also does not apply.  Employers and 
workers clearly accept the benefits of participating in the economic system because they 
are trying to gain a benefit through their participation.  Although there are various “open” 
benefits that members cannot avoid receiving in a society with a functioning economic 
system, wages and profits are “readily available” benefits that can be easily avoided by 
refraining from working at all.190  As a result, there aren’t likely any good reasons to deny 
the validity of the principle of fair play in articulating a rule that enforces the division of 
work within markets and firms within the U.S. 
B) Markets and firms 
We organize our economic activity within markets and firms because they help us 
to efficiently allocate resources for the benefit of all in society.  At their best, markets 
enable us to coordinate our aggregate response to the scarcity of resources by putting 
them to their highest valued use.  Essential to the functioning of the market is the price 
                                                          
190 Simmons defines open benefits as those like security and clean air that cannot be avoided without 
considerable inconvenience.  Readily available benefits, on the other hand, can be avoided without 
inconvenience.  For more on the distinction, see, e.g., Simmons, supra note 186, at 327-329. 
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mechanism, which centralizes and translates the disparate and complex bits of 
information into a signal about local supply and demand across the entire market.191  The 
utilization of the price mechanism in the market incentivizes us with the potential to 
profit from making individual resource allocation decisions that correspond with overall 
supply and demand for resources in society.  When the supply of limes drops due to 
agricultural issues in Mexico, for instance, the price system helps us to collectively 
respond to the shortage by presenting to all of us an opportunity to profit from consuming 
limes less and selling them to those who need or desire them more. 
The opportunity to profit from changing prices in the market provides what is 
known as a high-powered incentive for market participants.  An incentive for an action is 
high-powered when the consequences of the action accrue directly to the actor.192  If a 
lime cost $1 yesterday but now costs $2 today, my incentive to sell the lime in the market 
is high-powered since I would realize the entire $1 gain from selling the lime.  On the 
flipside, if I purchased a lime for $2 yesterday and can only sell it for $1 today, I would 
bear the entirety of the $1 loss under a high-powered incentive system.  In order for us all 
to benefit from participating in the market, high-powered market incentives must be 
calibrated accurately to reflect the “true” cost of the activity, i.e., the price at which a 
given market activity would lead to an optimal allocation of resources within the market.  
If I can realize a 100% gain if the relative supply of limes drops by half but stand to lose 
                                                          
191 See, e.g., F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945); JOSEPH 
HEATH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM: THE MARKET FAILURES APPROACH TO BUSINESS 
ETHICS, at 205-229 (2014). 
192 See supra note 37. 
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only 25% of my investment if the relative demand of limes drops by half, market 
incentives would be over-powered since I would be incentivized to buy and sell more 
limes than I should.  Rather than efficiently allocating limes for the benefit of all, over-
powered incentives would lead to an overconsumption of limes in society and lead to a 
shortage.  Thus, taxes and other costs of doing business imposed by the law are supposed 
to calibrate the incentives of market activity at the socially-optimal level.  Rather than 
distorting the high-powered incentives of the market, they help us to keep them in 
calibration by attributing the social costs of an economic activity to the actor. 
Yet, despite the advantages of markets, we also need to organize some of our 
economic activities in firms if we are to benefit from an efficient allocation of resources 
in society.  Economists typically view the firm as “islands of conscious power” within the 
ocean of unconscious market coordination, “like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of 
buttermilk.”193  Rather than relying on the price mechanism, resource allocation within 
firms proceeds through managerial direction.  As mentioned above,194 leaving it up to the 
manager to decide how to allocate resources within the firm can have an efficiency 
advantage over the price mechanism in the market because there are a variety of costs 
associated with transacting in the market.  Central to these transactions costs is the ways 
in which the high-powered incentives of the market distort and prevent the making of 
enterprise-specific investments that would lead to a more efficient allocation of resources.  
When one makes an investment in the market to support one’s business, the resources 
                                                          
193 Coase, supra note 90, at 388, citing D. H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY, 85 (1923). 
194 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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into which the investment is made become more valuable to the investor than other 
similar resources in the market.  If an employer makes an investment in a worker by 
providing additional training specific to the employer’s business, for instance, the worker 
becomes more valuable to the employer after the investment than other potential workers 
in the market.  However, the investor has no incentive to make such enterprise-specific 
investments if the recipient of the investment can hold up the investor afterwards to 
extract the benefits of investment.  If an employer anticipates that a worker will refuse to 
cooperate with managerial direction unless the firm confers the benefits of the investment 
to the worker, the employer will not make an investment in the worker, even if it would 
lead to a better allocation of resources – and thus the benefit of all – if the employer were 
to make the investment. 
From the point of view of social efficiency, then, firms help to calibrate incentives 
in the market by eliminating the possibility for workers inside the firm to profit from 
exploiting their position over the firm’s resources.  When a firm’s workers follow 
managerial direction in allocating resources inside the firm, the firm realizes the potential 
gains and assumes the full costs associated with its workers’ activities.  Workers may 
benefit indirectly in the form of higher wages or other type of compensation, but the 
incentives of the price mechanism do not motivate them in the same way it would if they 
were operating directly in the market.  In other words, firms substitute the high-powered 
incentives of the market with low-powered incentives.  An incentive for an action is low-
powered when the consequences of the action do not accrue directly to the actor.  When a 
worker in a firm helps to combine resources to create a new product for the firm to sell on 
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the market, for instance, he works under low-powered incentives since the economic 
results of his actions will not accrue directly to him.  He is motivated, instead, by the 
prospect of internal discipline and other non-market-oriented factors to perform his 
resource allocation activities.  The substitution of high-powered incentives for low-
powered incentives help to encourage employers to make socially efficient levels of 
investment in labor and the means of production since the firm’s workers will not have 
the same incentive to profit from exploiting their position in the enterprise to extract the 
benefits of investment for themselves. 
The organization of our economic activity into markets and firms thus represents 
a joint enterprise where we all benefit from efficient resource allocation by accurately 
calibrating the high-powered incentives of the market and eliminating them altogether for 
certain types of activities by organizing them in firms.  This bifurcation of our economic 
activity results in a bifurcation of two different types of workers.  The first is the 
entrepreneur.  As seen above, entrepreneurs are essential to the functioning of the market 
and the price mechanism because they are the ones acting in markets based on the signals 
provided by the price mechanism to allocate resources and drive economic 
development.195  By assuming entrepreneurial responsibility for their economic activity, 
entrepreneurs operate under the high-powered incentives of the market, exposing 
themselves to financial liability for their activities, carrying out new combinations of 
                                                          
195 See, e.g., RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 271 (“Under the enterprise system, a special social class, 
the business men, direct economic activity; they are in· the strict sense the producers, while the great· mass 
of the population merely furnish them with productive services, placing their persons and their property at 
the disposal of this class; the entrepreneurs also guarantee to those who furnish productive services a fixed 
remuneration.”). 
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resources, and bringing the market closer to equilibrium in the pursuit of profits.196  The 
second is the employee.  By giving up entrepreneurial responsibility for their economic 
activity, employees operate under the low-powered incentives of the firm.  As Knight 
notes, employees essentially insure themselves against the high stakes of market activity 
by forgoing participation in the market altogether and, instead, choosing to enter into a 
contractual agreement with entrepreneurs to provide services in exchange for a fixed 
amount of compensation.197 
C) Profit and fair play 
The principle of fair play limits the ways in which economic actors pursue profit 
in society.  Our economic system is a cooperative enterprise through which everyone 
benefits from an efficient allocation of resources.  As seen above, the benefits of 
cooperation depend on entrepreneurs responding to well-calibrated incentives in the 
market and on shielding other workers from the high-powered incentives of the price 
mechanism.  The principle of fair play suggests that participants within our economic 
system have an obligation to act consistently with such an arrangement.  Entrepreneurs 
who are able to distort the prices of resources for their own advantage will wrong other 
participants in our economic system by interfering with the market’s resource allocation 
process.  Conversely, workers who are able to pursue individual profit opportunities 
while shielding themselves from the full risks and costs associated with market activity 
                                                          
196 See, e.g., Entrepreneurial Discovery, at 73 (“The competitive process is an entrepreneurial one in that it 
depends crucially on the incentives provided by the possibility of pure entrepreneurial profit.”). 
197 RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 269-270. 
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will wrong other participants in our economic system by making resource allocation 
inside the firm costlier than it should be.  The entrepreneurial responsibilities test helps to 
prevent unfairness in our economic system by eliminating opportunities for 
circumventing the terms of cooperation through worker misclassification. 
One potential area for worker misclassification pertains to apportioning tort 
liability.  Employers often attempt to benefit from the current legal framework by 
classifying their workers as independent contractors to avoid liability for damages 
attributable to their enterprise.  For example, in Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., two plaintiffs 
sued Uber under the theory of respondeat superior for sexual assault allegedly suffered at 
the hands of Uber drivers.198  In response, Uber moved for summary judgment on account 
of its position that no employment relationship exists between it and its drivers as a 
matter of law.199  And because it has a plausible claim that no employment exists under 
existing tests for employee status,200 Uber has the opportunity to benefit by distorting the 
price of ridesharing in our economic system by forcing its drivers (who would almost 
never have enough assets to cover for significant damages) and victims to bear the costs 
that should be built into its prices in the market. 
Under the entrepreneurial responsibilities test, Uber would be found as an 
employer of its drivers201 and thus held liable for the harms caused by its drivers, 
provided that other elements of the claim are met.  The principle of holding employers 
                                                          
198 184 F. Supp. 3d 774 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
199 See, e.g., supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra Part IV.D. 
201 See supra Part IV.D. 
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vicariously liable lies “in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot 
justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of 
its activities.”202  And although the risks associated with accidents are not the risks 
associated with economic uncertainty, the entrepreneurial responsibilities test 
nevertheless yields results that are consistent with this principle by helping to prevent 
employers from acting unfairly.  Uber should bear the costs associated with connecting 
drivers with riders because it – and not the drivers – is entitled to potential pure profits 
associated with the activity.  Within this framework, Uber has the responsibility to 
manage the costs associated with screening drivers and providing the infrastructure to 
prevent sexual assaults by its drivers.  These costs will likely be passed on to both riders 
in the form of higher prices and to drivers in the form of lower compensation, but these 
costs should nevertheless be managed by the enterprise that is ultimately responsible for 
the market consequences of the drivers’ activities.  Uber’s attempt to earn the profits 
associated with ridesharing services while circumventing the price mechanism’s function 
of forcing it to internalize the costs of ridesharing services wrongs other market 
participants by interfering with the efficient allocation of resources in society. 
Employers also frequently misclassify workers in an attempt to avoid compliance 
with a variety of federal and state statutory obligations associated with an employment 
relationship.  For example, FedEx was able to avoid compliance with the N.L.R.A. and 
prevent its workers from exercising their collective bargaining rights in FedEx Home 
                                                          
202 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) 
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Delivery because the D.C. Circuit ruled that its drivers were independent contractors 
rather than employees.203  The D.C. Circuit ruling thus allowed FedEx to manipulate the 
means-ends distinction the law over worker control and thus import and expose its 
drivers to the high-powered incentives of the market.204  If entrepreneurs are able to 
expose their employees to the risks associated with market participation while retaining 
the opportunity to profit from their enterprise, they wrong not only their employees but 
the rest of society by contributing to the misallocation of resources.  The entrepreneurial 
responsibilities test can prevent such an outcome by identifying the entrepreneur for all 
different types of regulatory purposes. 
As noted above, the government regulates the employment relationship for a wide 
variety of reasons.  And although some criticize courts for not paying enough attention to 
the purpose behind each statutory protection,205 instituting a variety of tests for employee 
status for each statutory purpose can lead to a confusing array of potential tests to 
navigate.  The entrepreneurial responsibilities test, on the other hand, can provide a single 
rationale for the wide variety of governmental regulation over the employment 
relationship.  The principle of fair play and the bifurcation of economic activity into 
markets and firms suggest that regulating the employment relationship should be 
motivated by the goal of shielding employees from the high-powered incentives of 
market participation and calibrating market incentives to the socially optimal level.  
                                                          
203 See supra Part II.C. 
204 See, e.g., Tomassetti, supra note 26.  For more on the ambiguity of the means-ends distinction in 
employment relationships, see also Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the 
Collapse of the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S. C. L. REV. 315 (2014). 
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Because the discipline of market participation will lead to employers attempting to 
extract as many concessions as possible from workers, allowing the high-powered 
incentives of the labor market to govern negotiations between employers and potential 
employees will result in terms of employment where workers bear the down-side costs of 
market participation without any opportunity to pursue entrepreneurial profits.  In 
essence, the incentives of the market are too powerful without statutory protections for 
employees, and the lack of employee protections will undermine the purpose of 
organizing some economic activity in firms.  Regulations that restrict the ability of 
employers to extract concessions regarding wages, hours, collective bargaining rights, 
and discriminatory practices help to calibrate the incentives of the labor market to a more 
socially efficient level by ensuring that employees can bargain to shield themselves inside 
the firm from the high-powered incentives of the market.  Taxes, retirement benefits, and 
other financial obligations incurred by the employer and independent contractors also 
should be motivated by the goal of calibrating the incentives of the market to ensure that 
entrepreneurs operate under a socially optimal cost structure. 
Lastly, worker misclassification can lead to the interference with the 
entrepreneur’s allocative control over productive resources.  One common area of 
concern pertains to property rights over work products.  For instance, in Natkin v. 
Winfrey, two photographers sued their employer after their photos were published in a 
book without their permission.206  Although the employer claimed that the photographers 
                                                          
206 111 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
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were its employees over whom they exercised significant control, the court applied the 
thirteen factor Federal control test to hold that the photographers had rights over the 
photographs because they were independent contractors.  Among other things, property 
rights over productive resources grants the right holder to extract additional concessions 
from the user of the resources. 
The entrepreneurial responsibilities test provides a rationale for determining 
property rights over productive resources by ensuring that the entrepreneur be given the 
right to exercise allocative control over them.  In the case of Winfrey, the court’s ruling 
gave the photographers a right over the photographs that could be used to extract 
additional compensation for their use by the employer.  However, it is important that only 
entrepreneurs be granted this right because it would otherwise privilege employees to 
partake in the profit opportunities of the market.  If employees were granted property 
rights over resources over which the entrepreneur exercises allocative control, they could 
disrupt the entrepreneurial process by appropriating some of the entrepreneur’s profits as 
compensation that cannot be attributed to the costs of their labor.  Such an arrangement 
would not only harm the entrepreneur but also interfere with the efficient allocation of 
resources by hindering the necessary movement and combination of resources in the 
market. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite its flaws, the central insight of the entrepreneurial opportunities test – that 
workers should be afforded the legal protection of employee status unless they have an 
opportunity to profit from their work – is sound.  What the D.C. Circuit has gotten wrong 
is what constitutes an entrepreneur.  A worker with a mere opportunity to profit by 
working smarter is not an entrepreneur.  What the classic three economic theories of 
entrepreneurship show is that the entrepreneur perform an economic function of 
assuming entrepreneurial responsibility for their economic activity.  The three markers of 
entrepreneurial responsibility are: (1) the assumption of liability for economic 
uncertainty, (2) the exercise of allocative control over productive resources, and (3) the 
buying of resources to sell in the market for a profit.  Only when a worker’s 
responsibilities correspond with all three markers should courts consider her an 
entrepreneur.  Otherwise, courts may contribute to perpetuating inefficiencies in society 
by allowing some parties to exploit opportunities to engage in worker misclassification in 
order to extract resources for themselves at the cost of everyone else in society. 
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ESSAY 3: 
 
Spontaneous Orders and Stakeholder Value Creation: Toward an Equilibration 
Model of Managing for Stakeholders 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Stakeholder theory operates on descriptive, instrumental, and normative levels 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995).  At the instrumental level, stakeholder theorists have long 
argued that managing for stakeholders is not only ethical but also conducive for firm 
success (e.g., Berman et al. 1999; Freeman 1984; Freeman et al. 2010; Hillman and Keim 
2001; Jones 1995).  A recent area of focus on this link between ethics and firm success 
has been the process of stakeholder management, typically described as the “managing-
for-stakeholders approach” (Freeman et al. 2007).  The managing-for-stakeholders 
approach emphasizes the responsibility of the manager/entrepreneur to create value for 
all of the firm’s stakeholders (Freeman 2010).  Within this view, stakeholder value is 
understood broadly as utility or happiness (Harrison and Wicks 2013; Jones and Felps 
2013), and value creation is thus implicitly understood as an increase in stakeholder 
utility/happiness.  As such, the managing-for-stakeholders approach argues that managers 
can help the firm succeed by intentionally increasing the utility/happiness of all 
stakeholders involved.  Some have operationalized this insight by focusing on how the 
manager can directly create value for stakeholders by taking actions that increase their 
utility/happiness.  By drawing on an often overlooked aspect of stakeholder theory that 
the firm is an equilibrating mechanism (Venkataraman 2002), this paper argues that the 
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managing-for-stakeholders approach should also focus on managing the process by which 
stakeholders create value for themselves. 
By emphasizing the managerial responsibility to increase the utility/happiness of 
stakeholders, the managing-for-stakeholders approach implicitly assumes three distinct 
necessary conditions for managerial knowledge within the process of stakeholder value 
creation.  First, the manager must know what are the stakeholder interests.  Second, the 
manager must know how his actions will actually advance the interests of his 
stakeholders and thus create value for them.  Third, the manager must know how to 
advance the interests of various stakeholder groups simultaneously without resorting to 
tradeoffs.  Unfortunately, most of the focus of the managing-for-stakeholders approach 
has been only on the third condition, with little attention having been paid to the first and 
second conditions.  Despite well-worn criticisms from shareholder-centric theorists (e.g., 
Jensen 2002; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004), stakeholder theorists have long emphasized 
that creating value for all stakeholders does not necessarily mean that shareholders will 
benefit less than they would under the traditional shareholder primacy approach.  Since 
stakeholder interests are joint rather than opposed to each other, stakeholder theorists 
argue, managers can and should create value for all stakeholders without resorting to 
tradeoffs (Freeman 2010; Porter and Kramer 2011).  The recent focus on stakeholder 
utility functions builds on this insight by arguing that synergy in stakeholder value 
creation is possible due to the multi-attribute nature of stakeholder utility functions 
(Tantalo and Priem 2016).  However, little attention has been paid to how much 
managers can actually access stakeholder utility functions and, even if they have 
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adequate knowledge of them, how they can know that their actions will actually increase 
the utility of any of their stakeholders, let alone all or most of them. 
This paper presents an approach to stakeholder management rooted within the 
theory of spontaneous order – what I will call the stakeholder-equilibration model – that 
addresses the first and second necessary conditions of managerial knowledge for 
stakeholder value creation.  To the extent that it recognizes the issue at all, the existing 
model of stakeholder management that asks managers to act in light of their knowledge 
of stakeholder utility functions to create stakeholder value – what this paper will call the 
top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model – is limited by the problem of managerial 
knowledge.  The stakeholder-equilibration model, on the other hand, involves managers 
attending to and reinforcing the conditions that allow stakeholders to create value for 
themselves.  The theory of spontaneous order (Hayek 1973) can explain why 
stakeholders pursuing their own interests can create stakeholder value in ways that can 
supplement – and sometimes limit – managerial efforts to directly create value for them.  
Rather than interfering with the spontaneous ordering of stakeholder interactions within 
the firm, managers can reinforce the conditions of stakeholder value creation by focusing 
on identifying and refining organizational norms, which can lead not only to stakeholder 
value creation but also to a sustainable competitive advantage for the firm. 
The paper is organized as follows.  First, I argue that the problems associated with 
localized knowledge, interpersonal comparison of utility, and bounded rationality impose 
significant limits on the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model.  Managers do not 
know enough nor process the knowledge that they possess to create as much stakeholder 
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value as possible.  Second, I present the theory of spontaneous order as an approach to 
overcome some of these limitations to managerial knowledge by relying on decentralized 
decision-making.  And because firms are riddled with spontaneous orders of stakeholder 
interactions, managers can look to them as sources of stakeholder value creation in 
addition to their own knowledge of stakeholder utility functions.  Third, I apply the 
insight of spontaneous ordering within firms to present a managerial approach to 
stakeholder value creation – the stakeholder-equilibration approach – that leverages the 
power of spontaneous orders.  By focusing on identifying and refining organizational 
norms, managers can encourage spontaneous ordering of stakeholder interactions, which 
can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage for the firm because it will help 
stakeholders create value for themselves, help achieve strategic fit, and foster the 
development of a valuable resource. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF MANAGERIAL KNOWLEDGE 
Managers who accept the managing-for-stakeholders approach attempt to create 
as much value as possible for stakeholders without resorting to tradeoffs.  But in order to 
create value for stakeholders, a manager must know what are the stakeholder interests 
and how his actions will advance them.  This section argues that the top-down-
stakeholder-utility-function model has significant limitations because it overlooks the 
problems of localized knowledge, interpersonal comparison of utility, and bounded 
rationality. 
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A) Limitations with the Stakeholder Utility Function Approach 
The top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model frames the issue of managerial 
knowledge to consist only of managerial access to multi-variate stakeholder utility 
functions (Harrison et al. 2010; Tantalo and Priem 2016).  Stakeholder utility functions 
represent the preferences of stakeholder groups with respect to a comprehensive set of 
goods, services, and other factors.  Within this view, managers gain access to stakeholder 
utility functions – and thus gain knowledge of what are the stakeholder interests – 
through two different mechanisms.  First, managers gain nuanced access to stakeholder 
utility functions by creating trust between the firm and its stakeholders, which induces 
stakeholders to reveal information about their preference orderings (Harrison et al. 2010).  
Second, managers discover the factors that drive stakeholder utility through the exercise 
of entrepreneurial judgment by continually and actively attending to the demands of 
stakeholder groups (Tantalo and Priem 2016).  Both of these accounts assume that 
managers will be able to translate their knowledge of the drivers of stakeholder utility 
into decisions that will actually create value for stakeholders and supply the firm with a 
competitive advantage. 
Unfortunately, the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model has significant 
limitations due to the problems of localized knowledge, interpersonal comparison of 
utility, and bounded rationality.  Firstly, the problem of localized knowledge refers 
generally to the fact that the information needed for rational resource allocation resides in 
the “dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess” (Hayek 1945: 519).  Because stakeholder utility functions 
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reside within the mind of each stakeholder, managers face an enormous challenge of 
obtaining the information needed to perform the calculations associated with creating 
value for stakeholders. 
Secondly, even if managers somehow gain access to the knowledge needed for 
stakeholder value creation, they have an impossible task of aggregating the knowledge 
into a coherent whole due to the problem of interpersonal comparison of utility.  The 
problem of interpersonal comparison of utility arises from the fact that modern theories 
of utility only represent an individual’s index of ordinal preference rankings (Binmore 
2009; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).  Since an individual’s utility function refers 
only to one’s preference orderings, it does not have any relation to the utility function of 
another person.  As a result, it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to compare 
the utility of different individuals in any meaningful way (Elster and Roemer 1991; 
Hausman 1995).  Managers who attempt to create value for stakeholders without 
tradeoffs by acting on their knowledge of stakeholder utility functions are likely to face 
serious problems because acting on their knowledge of stakeholder utility functions to 
increase stakeholder utility implicitly entails comparing the utility of different 
stakeholders to avoid tradeoffs and to know when value has been created. 
Lastly, even if it were somehow possible to obtain access to and make meaningful 
comparisons between stakeholder utility functions, attempts to process the information 
into actionable insights will be significantly limited by the problem of bounded 
rationality.  Bounded rationality refers to the fact that economic actors have limited 
cognitive resources and abilities (Simon 1955).  Managers are human and are subject to 
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the same limitations that constrain the rest of us, and it is simply asking too much of them 
to simultaneously process countless relevant variables associated with even simple 
stakeholder utility functions in ways that can lead to decisions that will optimally satisfy 
a maximal number of stakeholders at once. 
Taken together, the problems of localized knowledge, interpersonal comparison 
of utility, and bounded rationality create significant limitations to the efficacy of the top-
down-stakeholder-utility-function model.  The knowledge that managers need to create 
value for stakeholders is not only of local conditions, which theoretically could be 
obtained through third party observation, but also of incomplete and highly unstable 
subjective orderings of preferred states that reside only within the minds of individual 
stakeholders.  Furthermore, stakeholder analysis is necessarily a dynamic exercise 
(Windsor 2010).  Stakeholder utility functions are multi-attribute, extremely complex, 
and constantly under revision, and stakeholder groups are comprised of a diverse and 
often constantly changing flux of individuals and firms with varying interests.  It is 
practically impossible for managers to gain access to this information, aggregate or 
compare them in any meaningful way, and then evaluate a particular action in light of the 
effect that it would have on the utility of any stakeholder, let alone many of them at once.  
Instead, the practical implementation of the utility-function approach typically entails 
relying significantly on an implicit cognitive model where managers make intuitive 
judgments about what actions they feel will lead to greater value for stakeholders. 
Even a cursory example of a cartoonish simplification illustrates the difficulty of 
managers creating value for stakeholders based on any rational calculation of stakeholder 
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utility functions.  Suppose that stakeholders reveal their preferences to managers because 
they trust the firm.  Since stakeholder utility functions are multi-variate and 
extraordinarily complex, no stakeholder will be able to reveal his utility function in full.  
Instead, he will provide small insights about simple preferences.  For instance, Employee 
A may reveal that he is willing to trade off a slightly lower salary for a modern office 
space.  On the other hand, Employee B may reveal that she prefers an increase in salary 
over a more generous work-life balance.  How will the manager have any idea how a 
modern office space might impact the utility of Employee B or how a more rigorous 
schedule might impact the utility of Employee A?  What happens if Employee A changes 
his mind?  What if learning about Employee B’s salary makes Employee A jealous and 
decreases his utility?  What if Employee A’s preference for a modern office space is 
interrelated with firm prestige, which will decrease with lower salaries?  What happens if 
the manager hires Employee C after making changes, only to find out that Employee C 
prefers more flexible hours and is indifferent about the office space?  The problems for 
the manager are potentially never-ending, and one must also consider the decrease in the 
manager’s own utility as a result of attempting to juggle multiple demands at once. 
B) The Inadequacy of Stakeholder Group Utility Functions 
At this point, some stakeholder theorists might respond to the problems outlined 
above by arguing that top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model entails responsiveness 
to stakeholder groups rather than individual stakeholders (e.g., Jones and Felps 2013).  
But even after assuming that it is actually possible to segment stakeholders into 
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meaningful groupings, formulating an aggregation of individual stakeholder utility 
functions into a single stakeholder group function is bound to be just as difficult as 
attempting to work with individual stakeholder utility functions, if not more so.  Any 
attempt to formulate a group utility function in an informed manner will necessarily 
entail collecting and processing the underlying utility functions of individual 
stakeholders.  As a result, grouping stakeholder utility functions cannot avoid the 
problems outlined above.  Managers will still need access to the same localized and 
dispersed information about individual stakeholder utility functions, and utility will still 
need to be interpersonally comparable if individual utility functions are to be aggregated 
into a single group function.  And although it may require slightly less processing power 
for managers to calculate the effects on stakeholder utility functions in batches, doing so 
would also create additional layers of calculation that are likely to introduce serious 
problems, particularly since there is likely a high level of interactivity between various 
stakeholder interests. 
Alternatively, if the managing-for-stakeholders approach entails making 
reasonable assumptions about stakeholder groups in order to simplify the problem at 
hand, managers will run the risk of divorcing their decision-making from reality and thus 
undermining the very core of the managing-for-stakeholders approach.  Recognizing the 
impossibility of aggregating individual utility functions, welfare economists turn to a 
construct known as a social welfare function.  Although social welfare functions 
represent the preferences of society at large, they are actually abstractions that have very 
little to do with the actual utility of individuals in society.  Rather than reflecting 
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underlying conditions, social welfare functions merely reflect the theorist’s own ethical 
judgment about distributive concerns (Hammond 1991).  Managerial attempts to 
formulate a single utility function for each stakeholder group would be a similar analogue 
to the formulation of social welfare functions.  And as is the case with social welfare 
functions, the managerial formulation of stakeholder group utility functions also would 
be abstracted away from what individual stakeholders actually want. 
Regardless of whether or not a significant amount of abstraction poses a problem 
for welfare economics, it is certainly a significant problem for the managing-for-
stakeholders approach, which emphasizes the importance and efficacy of intentionally 
overinvesting in stakeholders, i.e., allocating resources to various stakeholders at a level 
that goes beyond what is necessary to ensure their willful participation (Freeman et al. 
2007; Harrison et al. 2010).  First, divorcing stakeholder utility functions from reality 
would nullify the very reason for overinvestment in stakeholders since there would no 
longer be a need for managers to gain access to stakeholder utility functions.  Rather than 
overinvesting to engender trust, managers would feel free to make decisions based on 
what they think stakeholder preferences should be rather than overinvesting in 
stakeholders to find out what they actually prefer.  Second, divorcing stakeholder utility 
functions from reality would eliminate the competitive advantage associated with 
stakeholder overinvestment since making reasonable assumptions about what 
stakeholders want as a group can be done just as easily by managers who attempt to 
extract as much value as possible from stakeholders as those who overinvest in them.  In 
fact, holding the ability to anticipate stakeholder demands as constant, managers who 
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overinvest in stakeholders will be at a competitive disadvantage since they would use 
more resources than managers who invest in stakeholders minimally without being able 
to meet stakeholder needs any better.  Third, divorcing stakeholder utility functions from 
reality would undermine the ethical core of stakeholder theory.  Stakeholder theory rests 
on a normative core comprised of a convergence of ethical positions that highlight the 
concern for others in addition to self-interest (Jones et al. 2007).  However, once 
managers unilaterally determine what stakeholders should want as a group rather than 
attempting to find out what they actually want, the focus shifts away from this other-
regarding normative core.  Rather than focusing on the interests of stakeholders, 
managers would be focusing – perhaps narcissistically – on their own ethical judgments 
about stakeholder interests instead. 
III. SPONTANEOUS ORDERING WITHIN THE FIRM 
Managers can begin to address the problems of localized knowledge, 
interpersonal comparison of utility, and bounded rationality by turning to the theory of 
spontaneous order.  A spontaneous order is “the result of human action but not the 
execution of human design” (Ferguson 1767: 122).  Leveraging the power of spontaneous 
orders can provide managers with a way to cope with limits to their knowledge because 
spontaneous orders create value for everyone within the system through decentralized 
decision-making.  This section argues that, although there are ways in which the firm is 
constituted by intentional design, there are also important aspects of the firm that reflect a 
spontaneous ordering of stakeholder relations.  Recognizing the spontaneous ordering of 
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stakeholders within the firm can enable managers to overcome the problems associated 
with managerial knowledge and supplement the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function 
model with a bottom-up model of stakeholder value creation within the firm. 
A) The Theory of Spontaneous Order 
A spontaneous order refers to a stable state of affairs at the macro-level that 
emerge through the aggregation of micro-level responses to a coordinating mechanism.  
Unlike made orders, which are organized around directives issued by a particular 
individual or institution that aim at a particular context with a particular purpose, 
spontaneous orders are organized around coordinating mechanisms that were not 
designed by anyone, are abstract, and are without purpose (Hayek 1960).  Take, for 
instance, the traditionally understood difference between the allocation of goods within 
firms and markets.  Hayek considers the firm to be a made order because it allocates 
resources internally through a central decision-making process (1973).  After evaluating 
the firm’s strategic position, management will issue directives to employees on how to 
allocate the firm’s resources to achieve its intended goals.  Such activity within firms is 
thus organized around a centralized decision-making body that issues directives aimed at 
a particular context with a specific purpose in mind.  Markets, on the other hand, 
represent a paradigmatic example of a spontaneous order.  Within markets, the social 
allocation of goods is achieved through a price system that coordinates individuals acting 
in accordance with their self-interest.  There is no one who created the price system.  
Instead, it is a mode for communicating localized information across society that 
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humanity only “stumbled upon… without understanding it” (Hayek 1945: 528).  The 
price system is also abstract, i.e., it functions in accordance with generalizable rules 
rather than context-specific facts.  The price for a good will increase if its demand 
outpaces its supply, regardless of what kind of a good it is and what the reasons may be 
for its shortage.  Lastly, the price system acts without purpose.  The purposes held by 
most market participants deal with their individual goals and not the overall social effects 
of their decision-making.  Of course, the aggregation of actions taken to achieve 
individual purposes serves a social function of coordinating the use of dispersed and 
localized knowledge in a wide, complex network to allocate goods and services.  
However, although this function can be recognized by those who aim to leverage it for 
their own purposes, it cannot be said to be a purpose that is inherent within the price 
system since no one enacted the system with an intention to bring about its desirable 
results.  Nor can anyone manipulate the price system intentionally to achieve an intended 
outcome at the systemic level. 
Because spontaneous orders involve dispersed actors utilizing their localized 
knowledge in response to a coordinating mechanism to allocate resources and achieve 
stability, they do not depend on any centralized decision-maker.  This decentralization of 
decision-making allows them to avoid the pitfalls of knowledge that place limitations on 
the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model.  The avoidance of central decision-
making helps to alleviate the problem of localized knowledge because individual 
stakeholders already know their own preferences better than anyone else.  It also 
alleviates the problem of interpersonal comparison of utility because there is no one who 
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is making any utility comparisons at all.  Lastly, it drastically reduces the problem of 
bounded rationality because actors within a spontaneous order act only need to respond to 
a coordinating mechanism to guide their action.  For instance, the price mechanism can 
achieve an efficient allocation of a scarce resource even if market actors do not perform 
any calculation of social welfare relative to the known supply and demand for the 
resource.  All they need to do is to respond to the price mechanism in accordance with 
their self-interest by producing more of the resource and/or consuming less of it (Hayek 
1945). 
The decentralization of decision-making through a central coordination 
mechanism within spontaneous orders can lead to greater welfare – and thus more value 
that is created – for those within the system than through central decision-making.  As 
noted above, spontaneous orders are more efficient in coordinating the use of knowledge 
to allocate scarce resources under changing circumstances.  Capitalism, for instance, has 
long been justified as a superior alternative to socialism because it relies on a 
decentralized means of resource allocation, which allows for greater innovation and 
adaptation in meeting consumer demand (Boettke 1998; Land et al. 1994; Smith 1776; 
Van Parijs 1995; Von Mises 1922).  Moreover, spontaneous orders can lead to greater 
welfare within the system because they are more efficient in the way they govern 
exchange relationships.  Legal scholars, for instance, have long found that informal 
coordinating mechanisms around which individuals organize within spontaneous orders 
are typically cheaper and more effective enforcement mechanisms than formal 
mechanisms (Bernstein 1992; Scott 2003).  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly if 
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liberty is a value in and of itself, spontaneous orders can lead to greater welfare within 
the system by preserving and promoting the liberty of its participants.  Spontaneous 
orders are consistent with liberty because they are constituted by individuals acting in 
accordance with their own wills rather than through the directives of a centralized 
authority (Hayek 1973).  In addition to possibly being a value in and of itself, liberty can 
also lead to greater progress and thus greater welfare because it “leaves room for the 
unforeseeable and unpredictable” (Hayek 1960: 29).  Rather than relying on human 
design to maximize value based on what is foreseeable at the time, preserving liberty for 
those within the system leaves room for the entrepreneurial element to discover new 
opportunities for value creation based on localized knowledge of changing circumstances 
(Kirzner 1973). 
B) Relational Contracts and Spontaneous Orders Within Firms 
Despite Hayek’s categorization of the firm as a made order, there is a long 
tradition of scholarship within organizational studies that have uncovered spontaneous 
ordering as a central feature of firms.  The insight began with the idea that the firm can be 
thought of as a nexus of contracts (Alchian and Demsetz 1972).  Since its introduction, 
the nexus-of-contracts view has become the dominant paradigm for theories of the firm.  
Even stakeholder theorists have largely embraced this view, with only minor 
modifications to challenge the norm of shareholder primacy that many nexus-of-contracts 
theories of the firm assume (Blair and Stout 1999; Freeman and Evan 1990).  The nexus-
of-contracts approach to the firm brings spontaneous ordering inside the firm by arguing 
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that the firm is constituted by a similar process as the market process, which is the 
paradigmatic example of spontaneous ordering.  In one of the classic articulations of the 
nexus-of-contracts firm, for instance, Jensen and Meckling argue that the firm is like the 
market in that it is the outcome of a complex process within which “the conflicting 
objectives of individuals... are brought into equilibrium within a framework of 
contractual relations” (1976: 311).  Within this view, the firm is an aggregation of 
decentralized actions taken by firm participants in pursuit of their own interests, just as 
the market is.  As will be explained below, the primary difference between spontaneous 
ordering within markets and firms is the usage of alternative coordinating mechanisms.  
Whereas spontaneous ordering is coordinated by the price system within markets, it is 
coordinated by organizational culture within firms. 
Although it may seem upon first glance as if the nexus-of-contracts approach to 
the firm overstates the decentralization of stakeholder relations within the firm, it 
becomes clear that spontaneous orders are prevalent within the firm once relational 
contracts are disaggregated from formal contracts.  Modern theorists of the firm have 
recognized that firms are riddled with not only formal contracts but relational contracts as 
well (Baker et al. 2002; Gibbons 2005).  In fact, many modern theories now understand 
the firm as a nexus of relational contracts in addition to formal contracts (Coff 1999; Kim 
and Mahoney 2005; Zingales 2000).  Economists distinguish formal and relational 
contracts by asking whether the terms of an economic exchange are specified ex ante in 
such a way that they can be verified and enforced ex post by a third party (Gibbons 
2005).  A formal contract is an economic exchange that specifies the terms of the 
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agreement in a way that can be enforced by a third party in the future.  A contract to 
deliver a good on a certain day in exchange for a certain price, for instance, is a formal 
contract because it is easy for a third party, e.g., a court, to determine whether each party 
fulfilled its end of the bargain and to enforce its terms.  Relational contracts, on the other 
hand, cannot be enforced in such a way.  Rather than specifying the terms of the 
agreement ex ante as formal contracts do, they leave the nature of the bargain open-
ended.  The ambiguity and flexibility built into relational contracts allow contracting 
parties to take advantage of new information and adapt to changing circumstances (Baker 
et al. 2002).  Unfortunately, these same features also render third-party enforcement very 
difficult and expensive, if not impossible, because there is never any clear specification 
of contract terms to enforce.  As a result, relational contracts are “sustained by the 
shadow of the future” rather than the threat of enforcement by a third party (Gibbons and 
Henderson 2012: 1350). 
The spontaneous ordering of formal contracts within the firm is difficult to 
recognize because they are the result of both intentional and spontaneous processes.  
Because formal contracts reflect an attempt by stakeholders to govern their economic 
exchange ex ante, they involve a significant amount of intentional design.  The formal 
contracts that constitute the firm have particular intentionality because they represent an 
effort to replace the spontaneous ordering of the market with an intentionally designed 
transaction that aims to reduce transaction costs and align interests (Williamson 1991).  
The decision to allocate more labor within a particular department, for instance, is a 
managerial decision that is made with a particular purpose for a particular context.  
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Nevertheless, there is still a fair amount of spontaneous ordering in the way that formal 
contracts aggregate into the firm itself.  The nexus-of-contracts view of the firm envisions 
firm participants bargaining in light of their self-interests without any ex ante regard for 
the system as a whole (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991).  Within this view, there is no 
predetermined design for intrafirm relationships.  Instead, the firm is shaped through the 
self-regarding wishes of its participants that are mediated through a bargaining process 
within the context of the broader market for labor and corporate governance.  As a result, 
both the exact shape and nature of each formal contract and the overall shape of the 
constellation of formal contracts that results from this process will include elements that 
are beyond the intentions of management or the firm’s founders.  Furthermore, the level 
of complexity within most organizations can lead to decisions that were not intended by 
any particular individual and thus are attributable to only the organization itself (Pettit 
2007).  When multiple individuals are responsible for the execution of these contracts, for 
instance, the resulting nexus of formal contracts will not reflect the intentional design of 
any particular individual.  Instead, it will be ordered in accordance with a firm’s decision-
making procedure that can only be attributed to the firm itself. 
Regardless of how much spontaneous ordering there is of formal contracts within 
the firm, however, spontaneous orders are prevalent within the firm because the vast 
majority of the relationships between stakeholders are governed by relational contracts 
rather than formal contracts.  Typically, stakeholders only enter into formal contracts 
with the firm itself rather than with other stakeholders.  Take, for instance, a simple case 
of a manager and a junior employee within a firm.  Aside from any potential collective 
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bargaining arrangements, the manager will have a formal contract with the firm that 
governs his employment in a way that could be enforced by courts in the event of a 
breach or a dispute, and the junior employee will have the same.  The relationship 
between the manager and the junior employee, on the other hand, is not governed by any 
formal contract.  For instance, there is no formal remedy for the junior employee if the 
manager decides to skip a scheduled meeting with her without informing her of his plans.  
A violation of most of the rights and obligations implicit within their working 
relationship must be addressed directly between the manager and the junior employee 
within the context of their relationship.  Even if a third party, e.g., the HR department, 
gets involved in the dispute through an escalation policy, the outcome of any resolution 
to the dispute will have nothing to do with the contract that the employee signed with the 
firm.  Intrafirm relationships, for the most part, are governed through an informal 
relational process rather than a formal one.  As a result, although formal contracts 
constitute an important backdrop within the context of stakeholder interaction, much of 
the contractual relationships within the firm are relational, not formal. 
And unlike formal contracts, relational contracts within the firm are almost 
entirely ordered spontaneously.  Hayek argued that a large-scale society, e.g., the social 
order within many modern communities, is a spontaneous order because it emerges from 
an evolutionary process within which individuals in society each go about their activity in 
accordance with rules within society that are not intentionally designed by anyone 
(1973).  Relational contracts create a spontaneous order within the firm in an analogous 
way.  Just as social norms coordinate individual action within societies, organizational 
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culture, defined here as “a complex set of values, beliefs, assumptions, and symbols that 
define the way in which a firm conducts its business” (Barney 1986: 657), coordinates 
the spontaneous ordering of relational contracts within the firm.  Relational contracts 
come into existence and evolve through an iterated process during which stakeholders 
respond to each other’s behavior in light of their shared knowledge about their tasks and 
about each other (Gibbons and Henderson 2012).  Organizational culture shapes the 
shared knowledge base among stakeholders by providing them with a shared frame for 
interpreting their interactions and with informal incentives/pressures that send signals for 
how they ought to relate with each other.  Just as a spontaneous order emerges from 
interactions between those who live within a large scale society as they follow the rules 
in society, a spontaneous order emerges within the firm through the relational contracts 
between stakeholders as they interact with each other within the context of their 
organization’s culture. 
Lastly, like the price system and rules in society, organizational culture shares the 
characteristics of coordinating mechanisms that lead to a spontaneous ordering of micro-
level processes.  As a coordinating mechanism, organizational culture shares many of the 
characteristics of other coordinating mechanisms for other kinds of spontaneous orders.  
Culture emerges from a dispersed collection of interactions rather through intentional 
design.  Even though others may try to manipulate it, as some do to the price system, its 
overall function in response to the aggregation of individual interactions cannot be 
predicted or controlled.  Moreover, organizational culture is abstract.  Rather than a rule 
that may govern a particular aspect of a specific kind of interaction, organizational 
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culture acts at a general level to shape all aspects of stakeholder interactions.  Lastly, 
because it is emergent rather than planned, there is no purpose embedded within 
organizational culture.  Although managers may attempt to leverage or even modify 
aspects of the culture to achieve their goals, the multiplicity of cultures within an 
organization, along with its interactivity and complexity (Barney 1986; Gregory 1983; 
Smircich 1983), will result in only a partial infusion of purpose within the culture, at best.  
The broad pattern of the nexus of relational contracts within the firm as they are shaped 
and governed by its culture, then, exhibit all the signs that other types of spontaneous 
orders exhibit.  And given the prevalence of relational contracts within the firm, it is not 
difficulty to see that there is a significant presence of spontaneous orders within firms. 
IV. THE STAKEHOLDER EQUILIBRATION MODEL 
The prevalence of spontaneous orders within the firm paves the way for managers 
to leverage the advantages of spontaneous ordering to create value for stakeholders.  This 
section argues that stakeholder theory already has resources within it to take advantage of 
spontaneous ordering within the firm because it envisions the firm as an equilibrating 
mechanism rather than as a governance mechanism.  Because norms within an 
organization shape and reflect its culture, managers can reinforce the conditions under 
which stakeholders can create value for themselves by identifying and refining the 
constellation of organizational norms within the firm as they adjudicate stakeholder 
interests.  This approach to stakeholder management – what I will call the stakeholder-
equilibration model – allows managers to translate the process of stakeholder value 
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creation into a sustainable competitive advantage because it will create more value for 
stakeholders, help achieve strategic fit, and foster the development of a valuable firm 
resource. 
A) Stakeholder Equilibration 
The stakeholder-equilibration model builds on the claim that stakeholder theory 
views the firm as an equilibrating mechanism rather than a governance mechanism 
(Venkataraman 2002).  The manager of a firm as a governance mechanism engages in a 
logic of control to create value for the firm and/or its shareholders.  For instance, modern 
theories of the firm often view the distinguishing feature of firms to be the residual rights 
of control established by contract or property rights that the manager/entrepreneur can 
exercise to govern relations with other firm participants (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; 
Williamson 1975).  Within this view, the value provided by labor and other productive 
inputs is to be carefully managed and extracted so as to enable maximal economic returns 
for the firm and/or its shareholders.  On the other hand, the manager of a firm as an 
equilibration mechanism engages in a logic of adjudication to align and reinforce 
stakeholder interests as they create value for themselves within the context of the firm.  
This alternative account views the firm as a nexus of formal and relational contracts that 
serves as an equilibrium point for stakeholders who pursue their own monetary and non-
monetary interests.  Within this view, value is co-created and captured by the firm’s 
stakeholders through contractual processes (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004; Priem 
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2007; Ramirez 1999), with no stakeholder group receiving prima facie priority over 
others. 
In both the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function and stakeholder-equilibration 
models, managers play a central role in allocating resources within the firm.  However, 
resource allocation is not synonymous with the stakeholder idea of creating value for 
stakeholders without resorting to tradeoffs.   For instance, managers who pay employees 
above their market rates may create more value for these employees.  The impact on this 
action on other stakeholders, however, can often lead a corresponding decrease in value 
for them.  Suppliers or shareholders may have to be paid less, and customers may have to 
pay more.  In fact, increasing stakeholder value on one dimension often leads to a 
decrease in value in another dimension (Grant et al. 2007).  Higher employee 
compensation, for instance, could lead to decreases in value for these very employees if 
they have to work harder, longer, or in otherwise more challenging social, emotional, or 
technical working conditions.  As a result, unilateral actions such as an employee pay 
increase is often not so much an act of stakeholder value creation as much as it is an act 
of stakeholder value redistribution.  Value creation for stakeholders within the firm 
requires a greater focus on the quality and nature of the relationships between 
stakeholders rather than on decisions that pertain merely to resource allocation. 
The source of value creation within the stakeholder-equilibration model lies 
within the spontaneous ordering of formal and informal contractual processes within the 
firm.  Within the model, the primary managerial role is to support the contractual 
processes by which each stakeholder applies her localized knowledge of her immediate 
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context and of her own subjective preferences to create value for herself.  Stakeholders 
interact with each other through formal and relational contractual processes because it 
advances their interests to do so (Freeman 2010).  As a result, the contractual processes 
through which stakeholders pursue their interests can constitute significant opportunities 
for stakeholders to create value for themselves.  And because stakeholders have greater 
knowledge of their set of preferences and their local context than managers do, they have 
opportunities to create value for themselves within the spontaneous ordering of 
stakeholder interactions in ways that managers cannot know within the top-down-
stakeholder-utility-function model. 
When managers make resource allocation decisions, then, the stakeholder 
equilibration model implies that managers ought to do so differently.  As is the case 
between the managing-for-stakeholders approach and the traditional approach to business 
(Freeman et al. 2007), the crucial difference between the stakeholder-equilibration model 
and the traditional model of management control is intent.  Rather than seeing himself as 
an architect of the organization’s culture and the value creation process within it, the 
stakeholder equilibration model envisions the manager seeing himself as one stakeholder 
among many others, each of whom participates within the stakeholder value creation 
process through formal and relational contractual relations.  As far as value creation is 
concerned, the manager acts to help stakeholders create value for themselves. 
Because the stakeholder-equilibration model focuses on value creation within the 
spontaneous ordering of stakeholder relationships, there is a tension between it and the 
top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model.  The top-down model implies a certain 
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amount of direct managerial action taken to create stakeholder value.  The stakeholder-
equilibration mode, on the other hand, not only emphasizes indirect ways of creating 
stakeholder value but also places limits on what kinds of direct actions should be taken.  
As noted above, a spontaneous order functions as “a system of interdependent actions 
determined by information and guided by purposes known only to the several acting 
persons but not to the directing authority” (Hayek 1973: 51).  Because such 
interdependence and complexity cannot be fully anticipated and controlled under 
conditions of bounded rationality, interference with the spontaneous ordering process can 
destroy the fragile balance within the system by distorting and otherwise interfering with 
decision-making at the individual level.  As a result, those who are tasked with 
maintaining the order must be careful to not interfere with it – what they refrain from 
doing is just as important as what they do.  Specifically, they must refrain from issuing 
centralized directives aimed at improving the spontaneous order directly but, instead, act 
“only indirectly by enforcing and improving… the formation of a spontaneous order” 
(Hayek 1973: 51).  Thus, the stakeholder-equilibration model requires that special care 
must be taken to not interfere with the established spontaneous order of stakeholder 
relations within the firm, even as managers act to create stakeholder value through the 
top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model. 
Nevertheless, the stakeholder-equilibration model does not imply managerial 
inaction nor a diminishment of the managerial role in stakeholder value creation.  The 
manager plays an important role within such an approach because each stakeholder will 
likely pursue her own interests if largely left alone, even at the expense of other 
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stakeholders and regardless of power imbalances that may exist between them.  If 
managers were to simply take a laissez-faire approach to stakeholder interactions, the 
business enterprise is likely to suffer – or perhaps even dissolve – due to high political 
costs associated with negotiations among various stakeholders with distinct sets of 
interests (e.g., Hansmann 1988).  Stakeholders who lack leverage may also choose to 
leave the business enterprise in favor of other firms rather than engage in negotiations 
with stakeholders who have much more leverage.  Lastly, firm performance may suffer 
because certain stakeholders with leverage may capture all the value that is available 
before it can be converted by the firm into future value-creating resources and 
opportunities (Coff 1999).  As a result, managers must take an active role in supporting 
and reinforcing the institutional context within which all stakeholders can further create 
value for themselves within the firm. 
B) Stakeholder Equilibration and Organizational Norms 
Managers can take an active role within the stakeholder-equilibration model by 
identifying and refining the organizational norms within the firm.  According to Hayek, 
the rules around which individual elements within a large-scale society interact to 
constitute a spontaneous order are identified and refined primarily by judges who 
adjudicate cases in accordance with the common law (1973).  Common law refers to 
rules that are articulated and refined through a judicial process rather than a legislative 
process.  For instance, common law jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and the United 
States have a set of elaborate rules that have evolved over centuries as generations of 
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judges have looked to previous adjudications of similar cases to identify a consistent set 
of rules that can be applied to a new pattern of facts.  For Hayek, judges who identify the 
rules in society according to which individuals act and adjudicate disputes in ways that 
articulate and reinforce these rules play a crucial role in maintaining the spontaneous 
order within society and thus preserve liberty and increase welfare within it.  Judges and 
legislators who attempt to create new set of rules through a centralized decision-making 
process, on the other hand, risk upsetting the equilibrium that is reached through the 
spontaneous ordering process and will likely undermine the welfare and liberty of those 
within society. 
Just as common law judges identify and refine rules within society to maintain its 
spontaneous order, managers can analogously identify and refine relevant rules within the 
firm to maintain its spontaneous order.  As noted above, spontaneous orders within the 
firm emerge out of stakeholder interactions organized around the firm’s culture.  
Leveraging the value creation potential of the spontaneous ordering of stakeholder 
interactions entails managers strengthening the firm’s culture and making it as 
predictable and stable as possible.  Although organizational culture can be a nebulous 
concept that is difficult to manage or manipulate, an organization’s norms are a 
manageable gateway into its culture.  Norms are “understood rules for accepted and 
expected behavior” (Cialdini et al. 1999: 196).  As such, they shape the values and 
behavior within an organization to create and reinforce its culture (Cooke and Rousseau 
1988; O'Reilly et al. 1991; Ouchi 1980).  By identifying norms within the organization 
around which stakeholders interact, finding ways to integrate them when they conflict, 
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and clarifying them as they are applied to particular facts, managers can act like common 
law judges interpreting a tradition of rules that give rise to a spontaneous order. 
Managers who act like common law judges look backwards to make decisions in 
the present.  The managing-for-stakeholders approach argues that managers ought to 
adjudicate stakeholder conflicts as best as they can, looking for synergies and searching 
for creative solutions that will avoid tradeoffs or, when tradeoffs are unavoidable, making 
the tradeoff and then immediately searching for ways to align stakeholder interests once 
again (Freeman et al. 2007).  Managerial adjudication of stakeholder interests that 
proceeds in a similar way as common law adjudication is one in which managers resolve 
stakeholder conflicts in accordance with organizational norms that can be identified 
through how stakeholder interests have been adjudicated in the past.  Just as judges 
identify and refine rules through a series of past decisions, managers can look backward 
to how the adjudication of similar conflicts between stakeholders within the organization 
can point to an organizational norm that can help them with their decision in the present.  
And just as common law judging is a highly fact and context specific affair, managers 
can focus on the relevant factors for their particular decision at hand to know which 
norms are relevant and when norms need to change or evolve. 
However, unlike common law judges, managers need not only be backward-
looking.  In addition to adjudicating stakeholder conflicts, managers can also act 
preemptively by enacting practices and policies that communicate, reinforce, and align 
with widely shared organizational norms.  One example of how managers can manage an 
organization’s norms to reinforce a desirable culture around which stakeholders can 
144 
 
 
create value for themselves is Charles O’Reilly’s framework for creating strong cultures 
(1989).  O’Reilly argues that managers can discern a firm’s values and norms by focusing 
on the firm’s incentives systems, the stories that are told by stakeholders, and the values 
embodied by leaders among stakeholder groups.  After sifting through these norms, he 
argues that managers ought to implement a variety of mechanisms for reinforcing 
desirable norms such as encouraging stakeholder participation, taking symbolic action to 
communicate the firm’s values, encouraging organizational consensus through team-
building activities, and enacting comprehensive reward systems.  By paying attention to 
the norms around which stakeholder relationships organize themselves into a spontaneous 
order, managers can help stakeholders create as much value as possible for themselves 
without allowing the firm to descend into anarchy or instability. 
C) Stakeholder Equilibration and Competitive Advantage 
The managing-for-stakeholders approach argues that creating value for 
stakeholders will also lead to a competitive advantage for the firm for a variety of 
reasons.  First, creating value for stakeholders is advantageous for the firm because it 
increases demand for the firm and its offerings, which allows the firm to command higher 
prices and/or higher quality inputs (Harrison et al. 2010; Harrison and Wicks 2013).  
Second, it can increase valuable assets within the firm because it leads to improved 
stakeholder relationships and other effects of moral capital (e.g., Berman et al. 1999; 
Godfrey 2005; Hillman and Keim 2001; Jones 1995).  Third, it can reduce costs by 
reducing the potential for stakeholder retaliation, e.g., lawsuits, boycotts, strikes, and 
145 
 
 
adverse governmental action (Harrison and St. John 1996; Spicer 1978; Steadman et al. 
1995).  Lastly, it can increase organizational flexibility by making the business enterprise 
more sensitive to stakeholder demands, thus allowing it to plan and adapt as stakeholder 
demands change over time (Freeman and Evan 1990). 
The stakeholder-equilibration model adds to this discussion by outlining a way 
that the firm can increase more demand for it and its products, accumulate more assets, 
reduce more costs, and increase its flexibility even more.  First, because the stakeholder-
equilibration model allows stakeholders to freely respond to localized circumstances in 
accordance with their knowledge of their own utility functions, it will help stakeholders 
to identify offerings and opportunities that are better suited for their particular 
circumstance and preferences than if their options were limited only to what the 
management team presents based on its limited knowledge.  The greater level of 
personalization and context-specificity will help drive even greater demand for the firm 
and its offerings.  Second, the ability to create more value for stakeholders will lead to 
increased goodwill and other intangible assets associated with a reputation for 
stakeholder satisfaction.  Not only are spontaneous orders efficient, a focus on 
organizational norms can open up more opportunities for stakeholder value creation 
because, as research on the common law system and economic development shows, 
having strong and predictable rules that govern spontaneous orders tends to increase 
value within the order itself (Hayek 1960; 1973; Mahoney 2001).  Third, because the 
stakeholder-equilibration model seeks to reinforce the firm’s culture, it can lead to a 
stronger culture and higher stakeholder commitment (O'Reilly 1989).  Combined with an 
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active management that encourages internal escalation of conflicts for managerial 
adjudication, managerial attempts at strengthening firm culture and increasing 
stakeholder commitment will reduce the potential for dissatisfied stakeholders who may 
increase costs for the firm.  Lastly, the stakeholder-equilibration model can lead to 
greater organizational flexibility because it grants more autonomy for stakeholders to 
utilize their localized knowledge to adapt to changing circumstances.  Spontaneous orders 
within the firm are the result of relational contracts through which stakeholders “utilize 
their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and… adapt to new information as it 
becomes available” (Baker et al. 2002: 40).  As a result, leveraging the power of 
spontaneous orders rather than through centralized decision-making will allow the firm to 
collect, process, and implement knowledge of changing circumstances more efficiently. 
Moreover, the stakeholder-equilibration model goes beyond existing insights 
within the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model by connecting stakeholder theory 
with competitive advantages described by two prominent theories of strategic 
management.  First, the stakeholder-equilibration model can lead to better strategic fit 
within the firm.  Strategic fit refers to the degree to which a set of factors match or are 
aligned to each other (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985; Venkatraman and Prescott 1990; 
Zajac et al. 2000).  Achieving fit between different internal aspects of the firm can be 
critical to firm success because it allows the firm to create a unique and valuable strategic 
position (Porter 1996).  By aligning and refining organizational norms, the stakeholder-
equilibration model helps to achieve fit between the various norms within the firm.  
Moreover, achieving fit between organizational norms can lead to a strategic fit between 
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the various stakeholder interactions within the firm since stakeholder relationships are 
shaped by organizational norms.  And the alignment of stakeholder interactions will help 
create a more aligned set of positions that are consistent with greater stakeholder value 
creation within the firm.  Second, by refraining from directly interfering with the 
spontaneous ordering of stakeholder relations within the firm, the stakeholder-
equilibration model fosters the development of a valuable resource within the firm.  
Within the resource-based view of the firm, the strategic position of the firm depends 
primarily on its bundle of assets or resources (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Wernerfelt 1984).  
Firms can sustain a competitive advantage when they have resources that are valuable, 
rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable (Barney 1991).  By encouraging the on-
going development of relational contracts within the firm, the stakeholder-equilibration 
model can lead to an accumulation of a thick set of transactional and relational 
knowledge developed through relational contracting (Gibbons and Henderson 2012).  
This transactional and relational knowledge is valuable and rare because it pertains to 
contextual knowledge that is relevant for stakeholder value creation, and it is imperfectly 
imitable and non-substitutable because it concerns tacit knowledge that cannot be easily 
articulated, let alone transmitted.  As a result, the stakeholder-equilibration model can 
lead to a sustainable competitive advantage for firms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The power of stakeholder theory lies in the convergence of ethical management 
and firm success.  Taken by itself, the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model has 
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the potential to undermine this power by envisioning the manager only as a central 
decision-maker who acts in light of his knowledge of stakeholder utility functions.  A 
manager who attempts to control the firm in such a way will be putting himself at a 
disadvantage because he does not know what stakeholders value and how his actions will 
lead to stakeholder value creation.  Rather than only controlling stakeholder interactions, 
it is better to look also to equilibrating stakeholder interactions and to refrain from 
interfering with the organization’s culture and norms.  The stakeholder-equilibration 
model argues that empowering stakeholders and allowing the firm to be shaped directly 
by its stakeholders can be an important component of the managing-for-stakeholders 
approach because it leverages the power of spontaneous ordering within the firm.  Since a 
more democratic organization led by managers who focus on organizational culture is 
also a more successful one, managers might benefit from focusing less on controlling and 
more on equilibrating. 
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